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Collective bargaining in the public education sector has 
increasingly become an issue that commands a great deal of attention 
from school administrators, teachers, parents, students and the 
general public. With increasing frequency, state legislatures have 
responded to this attention by passing legislation that addresses the 
issue of collective bargaining and public school employees. 
Illinois joined the ranks of those states with legislation in 
this area by passing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act 
(IELRA) in 1983. 
Statement of the Problem 
The.central problem addressed by this study is the probable 
interpretation of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act in the 
areas of scope of bargaining, unfair labor practices and unit 
organization. These areas generated the most controversy curing the 
legislative debates and the interpretation of the statute in these 
areas is of primary concern to teachers and administrators. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The IELRA establishes a list of mandatorily bargainable 
topics. However, it also provides that subjects which directly 
impact on the mandatory subjects of bargaining are mandatorily 
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bargainable unless they are inherently managerial rights. The 
determination of the scope of mandatory bargaining is important for 
several reasons that are closely interwined. 
First, the determination that a topic is mandatorily 
bargainable means that management may not make unilateral decisions 
in that area. Second, if a topic is determined to be mandatorily 
bargainable, management's ability to alter policy in that area is 
restricted. Third, most topics of bargaining involve monetary 
expenditures either directly or indirectly. This budget involvement 
means that the determination of a topic as a mandatory subject of 
bargaining will have an impact on the budgetary process. 
The determination of what constitutes an unfair labor 
practice will have a significant impact on how schools are governed. 
Administrative personnel will have to be sensitive to what 
constitutes an unfair labor practice and amend their practices 
accordingly. 
The determination of what consititutes unfair labor practices 
will also affect the collective bargaining process. Under the IELRA 
both management and employee groups may commit unfair labor practices 
during the life of the contract and during the bargaining process. 
Practices which may have been allowable before the statute are now 
proscribed and this will affect how both parties approach the 
bargaining table. 
Unit determination will establish which employees must be 
dealt with as a group. This is significant because of the 
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difficulty of bargaining with either a single group representing 
diverse interests, or conversely, with many groups simultaneously. 
This study will provide a basis for understanding how the 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) will approach 
resolution of these questions. It will also suggest probable 
interpretations of the pertinent portions of the IELRA. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of the study was a documentary research project. 
All of the published reports of the IELRB from January 1, 1984 to 
August 1, 1986 were read. This includes IELRB Opinions and Orders, 
Orders, and Recommended Decisions and Orders. All of the legislative 
history was read as well. This includes floor debates in the 
Illinois House of Representatives and Senate on Senate Bill 536 and 
House Bill 1530, the Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on House Bill 
1530, and listening to the tapes of the Committe Hearings on House 
Bill 1530. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into six chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 contains an introduction, statement of the problem, 
purpose and significance of the study, nature of the study, and 
organization of the study. 
Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the background of the 
IELRA and provides an overview of the content of the statute. 
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Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the scope of bargaining 
under the National Labor Relations Act, a review of the four tests 
for determining whether a topic is a mandatory or permissive subject 
of bargaining, an overview of the scope of bargaining under the 
IELRA, and specific analyses of the bargainablility of teacher 
evaluation, class size, teaching assignments and curriculum, and 
conclusions regarding the scope of mandatory bargaining under the 
IELRA· 
Chapter 4 contains a general consideration of unfair labor 
practices under the NLRA, a discussion of unfair labor practices 
under the IELRA with specific examples drawn from reported decisions, 
responses to six specific questions posed regarding unfair labor 
practices under the IELRA, and conclusions regarding unfair labor 
practices under the IELRA. 
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of unit determination under 
the NLRA, an analysis of the statutory framework for unit 
determination under the IELRA, a discussion and analysis of IELRB 
decisions dealing with unit determination, a discussion of 
supervisory, managerial and confidential exclusions, a discussion and 
analysis of decisions dealing with this area, and conclusions to be 
drawn regarding this topic. 
Chapter 6 contains a summary of the conclusions drawn in each 
chapter, a discussion of the implications of those conclusions and 
recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was formed and 
refined in three separate Congressional actions - the Wagner Act of 
1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 
1959. The Wagner Act was clearly an attempt by Congress to 
facilitate interstate commerce and to foster industrial peace by 
removing barriers to the formation of unions. The Taft-Hartley Act 
and the Landrum-Griffin Act both served to refine the process of 
bargaining and the adjudication of disputes under the NLRA as well as 
to clarify some provisions of the NLRA. The NLRA is found at USC 
Section 151, et seq. An in depth historical examination of the NLRA 
is to be found in Gorman (1976) and Meltzer (1977). 
The important aspect of the NLRA for this discussion is that 
it covers only employees of private industry engaged in interstate 
commerce, NLRA Section l(b). This limited coverage is in accord with 
Congress' stated purpose in passing the NLRA: 
•••• "to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe 
the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in 
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly 
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference 
by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to 
protect the rights of individual employees in their 
relations with labor organizations whose activities 
af feet conunerce, to define and proscribe practices on 
the part of labor and management which affect 
conunerce •••• NLRA Section l(b). 
However, this coverage excluded wh:it has grown to become a 
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very sizeable segment of the work force, the public sector employees. 
Without the protection of the NLRA, public employees did not 
have the right for their labor unions to be recognized and they did 
not have the right to bargain collectively on any issue. 
Specifically, they did not have the right to bargain over issues 
dealing with terms and conditions of employment or the right to 
engage in concerted activity in furtherance of those issues. As a 
result of this lack of protection it was unclear whether unions of 
public employees had any status at all. In fact, an early 
Connecticut decision, Norwalk Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 
83 A.2d 482 (1951), held that in the absence of statute or regulation 
there was no reason why public employees could not organize a union. 
However, that court refused to order the employer to recognize the 
union and stated that there was no constitutional right to 
recognition. 
It is against this background that the Illinois Education 
Labor Relations Act ( IELRA) was enacted by the General Assembly of 
Illinois in the summer of 1983. Governor James Thompson signed the 
bill into law on September 23, 1983 and used his amendatory veto 
power to alter its form. Under the terms of the statute, the full 
force and effect of the statute came into being on January 1, 1984. 
The history leading to the passage of the IELRA is 
interesting in itself. Illinois, Chicago in particular, has long had 
a reputation for being staunchly pro-union. However, Illinois was 
the last northern industrial state to enact public labor law 
6 
legislation. On the surface, this appears somewhat incongruous, 
especially since a carefully crafted labor-management relations bill 
for public employees was regularly introduced in the General Assembly 
throughout the late nineteen-sixties. (Scariano, 1984) However, the 
bill never received much consideration from the General Assembly. 
This puzzled the co-sponsors of the bill, Anthony Scariano and Abner 
Mikva, because the bill was fair to both workers and employers. 
Finally, Scariano went to see the Democratic leaders in the 
House. They told him that the "administration" was against the bill. 
He went to see then Governor Kerner about the matter. Kerner told 
Scariano that he knew nothing about the bill and had no position on 
it. It occurred to Scariano that when Cook County Democratic leaders 
spoke about the administration that they werz referring to the Mayor 
Daley. He visited Mayor Daley and was referred to the deputy Mayor. 
The deputy Mayor confirmed that the Mayor was against the bill. 
When Scariano pressed for an explanation, he was told, "We 
don't want our employees sitting across the table from us demanding 
things-they've got to ask and they must give things in return. We 
can't get anything from them if they have the right to it." 
(Scariano, p.3.) When Scariano inquired as to what was expected from 
the workers he was told, "Campaign contributions, workers in election 
campaigns, endorsements, etc. - we just don't want them sitting 
across the table from us as equals." (Scariano, p.3.) 
The exchange reported by Scariano explains why Illinois was 
so long in obtaining a public employees labor relations law. Giving 
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the right to public employees to organize and bargain would eliminate 
the control over one of the largest political assets of the 
controlling political party. 
When the IELRA did come into existence it was the result of a 
sustained effort by the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) and the 
Illinois Education Association (IEA). Representative Greiman's 
comments during the debates of May 18, 1983 make it clear how much 
input the IEA had in the drafting of the bill. In that debate, while 
discussing Amendment Seven of the bill, (a significant restructuring 
of the bill), Greiman made the following remarks: 
GREIMAN: "Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen 
of the House. I did think that I should make one thing 
clear. Amendment #7 is the product of a great deal of 
effort. It is supported by both of the major teacher 
organizations in this state, whom had significant input 
into the crafting of it. And in accordance with the 
desire of so many people to have labor peace, it was our 
effort and it remains our effort to bring management 
into the picture on a meaningful negotiating basis. 
Accordingly, I convened, and chaired •••• more or less 
chaired a meeting with management people last week. I 
hav~ been getting back some material from them. Today, 
we are proceeding, the managers •••• the four managers of 
this Bill, chose to proceed on the Bill, and that do now 
and this Bill arriving on the Governor's desk, that it 
will ••• that it is written in stone or that it will not 
be changed. And I wanted to make clear to those 
organizations who have contacted me, some of whom have 
provided me, just yesterday with proposals for changes 
of language, certainly that is possible between now and 
the moment when this Bill reaches the Governor's desk. 
And I didn't want them to believe that there was any act 
of bad faith or any act to which would foreclose 
consideration of other issues. I believe that House 
Bill 1530 is a significant matter, to be considered a 
step forward in employee public •••• employee relations, 
and ask that it be adopted." (House Debates, May 18, 
1983, pages 112, 113.) 
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Representative Stuffle' s remarks during the May 26 debates 
also make it clear that the IEA and the IFT were consulted at every 
step during the development of the bill: 
"stiJF"FLE: "Yes, Madam Speaker and Members of the House, 
this is, of course, the comprehensive collective 
bargaining Bill that covers educational employees in the 
public sector in Illinois. And if you might bear with 
me for a few moments, I would indicate that the Bill 
includes specific election and recognition procedures, 
mediation and impasse procedures, as well as injunctive 
relief procedures that are available to employees. I 
would point out to you that this comprehensive Bill was 
put together through many weeks of effort by the 
Speaker, who initiated the Bill. The Speaker of the 
House, Mike Madigan, asked those of us who have 
sponsored Bills for public sector educational employee 
bargaining over the years to try to sit down, through 
his efforts, to try to negotiate and end the stalemates 
between the teacher groups. Representative McPike, 
and Representative Greiman spent many weeks with the IFT 
and the IEA negotiating their differences. To their 
credit, the IFT and the IEA agreed to put aside 
long-standing differences, some small, some large, to 
put this Bill together under the leadership, as I said, 
of Speaker Madigan. Representative Greiman, thereafter, 
initiated meetings with management groups in the The 
Bill comes today not as a perfect Bill, but I think it's 
the closest thing I've seen to it in the over twelve 
years that I've worked on this particular Bill and in 
the seven I've sponsored. (House Debates, May 26, 1983. 
254,5.) 
The official statements of the IFT and of the IEA also 
claimed that the organizations had a good deal of input into the 
drafting of the bill. All of these uncontested statements created 
some obvious concerns on the part of management interests that the 
IELRA as enacted would heavily favor the interests of labor. 
Certainly, labor was afforded statutory rights that it did not have 
in the absence of the statute. 
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The intent of the legislature in passing this statute is 
clearly expressed in Section 1 of the IELRA: 
·POLIC·Y. It is the public policy of this State and the 
purpose of this Act to promote orderly and constructive 
relationships between all educational employees and 
their employers. Unresolved disputes between the 
educational employees and their employers are injurious 
to the public, and the General Assembly is therefore 
aware that adequate means must be established for 
minimizing them· and providing for their resolution. It 
is the purpose of this Act to regulate labor relations 
between educational employers and educational employees, 
including the designation of educational employee 
representatives, negotiation of wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment and resolution of disputes 
arising under collective bargaining agreements. The 
General Assembly recognizes that substantial differences 
exist between educational employees and other public 
employees as a result of the uniqueness of the 
educational work calendar and educational work duties 
and the traditional and historical patterns of 
collective bargaining between educational employers and 
educational employees and that such differences demand 
statutory regulation of collective bargaining between 
educational employers and educational employees in a 
manner that recognizes these differences. Recognizing 
that harmonious relationships are required between 
educational employees and their employers, the General 
Assembly had determined that the overall policy may best 
be accomplished by (a) granting to educational employees 
the right to organize and choose freely their 
representatives; (b) requiring educational employers to 
negotiate and bargain with employee organizations 
representing educational employees and to enter into 
written agreements evidencing the result of such 
bargaining; and (c) establishing procedures to provide 
for the protection of the rights of the educational 
employee, the educational employer and the public. 
Thus, the legislature took notice of the public policy of 
promoting peace between educational employers. It also took notice 
of the unique nature and needs of public education employees and 
employers. 
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The legislative history reveals some other interesting 
motivations for the passage of the bill. In Governor Thompson's 
prefatory remarks of the veto message he referred to collective 
bargaining as a "fundamental right." (Thompson, 1983, p.2) Within a 
legal context a fundamental right is the most basic of all rights and 
cannot be violated by the state. This is very strong language for a 
right that is to be conferred by statute and demonstrates the high 
priority placed on the passage of the bill by the Governor. 
It is of particular interest that part of the stated 
legislative purpose was added by the amendatory veto of Governor 
Thompson. The portion of this section that was added are the two 
sentences beginning wit~ the words "It is the purpose of this 
Act ...... and ending with "in a manner that recognizes these 
differences." (Thompson, 1983, p. 2) It is this addition that took 
legislative notice of the unique nature of educational employees and 
employers. The fact that this notice was added by amendatory veto 
and not in the text of bill might imply that the teacher 
organizations were not particularly anxious for this notice to be 
taken. 
Another statement made by Representative Stuffle during the 
May 26 debaces expressed a reason for the introduction and passage of 
the bill. 
"We live in the 20th Century, and we need to face 20th 
Century realities. The Bill is not capitulating to 
labor, but it's an effort to provide a true and 
systematic method of resolving impasses, of limiting 
strikes, not promoting them, of eliminating decades of 
strife in this state •••• It's time we settle our 
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differences across the bargaining table. It's time we 
settle them there, not in the streets, that we realize 
educational people ought to be and are people, are 
taxpayers, and ought to be first class citizens." 
(Stuffle, 1983, p.255.) 
The implications from this passage are that bargaining ~n the 
education sector was archaic, that educational personnel were treated 
as though they were not people and that educational personnel had 
been treated as second class citizens. If those were the beliefs of 
Representative Stuffle then the motivation in introducing the bill 
was not simply to "promote orderly and constructive relationships 
between all educational employees and their employers." 
Any statute requires the careful reading by the individual 
wishing to understand the statute. However, general provisions of 
the statute must be discussed to provide a framework for the ensuing 
study. 
Section 2 of the IELRA provides definitions for specialized 
terms within the IELRA. Many of those terms will be discugsed within 
other chapters but some of them must be discussed here to provide a 
general understanding. 
Subsection (a) provides the definition of "Educational 
employer": 
(a) "Educational employer" or "employer" means the 
governing body of a public school district, combination 
of public school districts, including the governing body 
of joint agreements of any type formed by 2 or more 
school districts public community college district or 
State college or university, and any State agency whose 
major function is providing education services. (IELRA, 
Section 2(a)) 
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This is a broad definition and was provided expressly to 
include joint agreements. 
Subsection (b) defines an educational employee as any 
individual employed full or part time by an educational employer. 
This provides broad coverage but that coverage is narrowed by the 
exclusion of "supervisors, managerial, confidential, short term 
employees, student and part-time academic employees of community 
colleges ...... (IELRA, Section 2(b)). 
Section 3 establishes employee rights and Section 4 provides 
for employer rights. These sections will be discussed in the chapter 
dealing with scope of bargaining. 
Section 5 establishes the Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Board ( IELRB). It is composed of three members, no more 
than two from the same political party, appointed by the Governor 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The section provides that 
members must have at least five years of experience directly related 
to labor and employment relations in representing educational 
employers or educational employees in collective bargaining matters. 
The section gives broad powers to the IELRB in order to carry 
out 'the objectives of the IELRA. The IELRB may ...... subpoena 
witnesses, subpoena the production of books, papers, records and 
documents which may be needed as evidence on any matter under inquiry 
and may administer oaths and affirmations." (IELRA, Section S(g)) 
Section S(h) gives the IELRB the power to make rules and 
regulations pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. 
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The IELRB has created those rules and regulations. They are found 
at 80 111. Adm. Code Sections 1100-1130. Specific rules and 
regulations will be discussed in appropriate chapters. 
section 6 provides for the establishment of the Illinois 
Education Labor Mediation Roster. This is necessary because 
mediation is one of the prerequisites before a teacher organization 
can file a notice of intent to strike. 
Section 7 establishes the process and guidelines the IELRB is 
to follow when considering concerning unit determination. This 
section will be discussed more fully in the chapter on unit 
determination. 
Section 8 provides for the election and certification process 
of the exclusive bargaining representative. 
Section 9 requires the IELRB to establish rules and 
regulations governing " •••• the appropriateness of bargaining units, 
representation elections, employee petition for recognition and 
procedures for voluntary recognition of employee organizations by 
employers." (IELRA, Section 9) This is a particularly important 
provision because it requires the IELRB to enunciate the standards to 
be used in determining appropriateness. The regulations that have 
been promulgated in this area will be discussed in the chapter on 
unit determination. 
Section 10 establishes the duty to bargain in good faith 
within parameters established by the section. This section will be 
explored more fully in the chapter on the scope of bargaining. 
14 
Section 11 allows non-member fair share payments to be 
included in a negotiated contract. The fair share cannot include any 
fees for contributions related to the election or support of any 
candidate for political office. The section also allows an employee 
objecting to fair share on a religious basis to pay his fair share to 
8 non-religious charitable organization agreed upon by the employee 
and the exclusive representative. 
Section 12 establishes the impasse procedures to be followed. 
Basically, if the parties have not reached an agreement by 90 days 
before the scheduled start of the coming school year, the parties 
must notify the IELRB of the status of the negotiations. If a 
reasonable period of negotiations has passed, and it is within 45 
days of the scheduled beginning of the school year, either party may 
petition the IELRB to begin mediation. The IELRB also has the power 
to initiate mediation on its own motion. If settlement has not been 
reached within 15 days of the scheduled start of the school year the 
IELRB is required to invoke mediation. 
Section 13 establishes five conditions that must be satisfied 
before educational employees may engage in a strike. The conditions 
are: 
Educational employees shall not engage in a strike 
except under the following conditions: 
(a) they are represented by an exclusive bargaining 
representative; 
(b) mediation has been used without success; 
(c) at least 5 days have elapsed after a notice of 
intent to strike has been given by the exclusive 
bargaining representative to the educational employer, 
the regional superintendent and the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Board; 
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(d) the collective bargaining agreement between the 
educational employer and educational employees, if any, 
has expired; and, 
( e) the employer 
representative have 
unresolved issues to 
13(a)-13(3)) 
and the exclusive bargaining 
not mutually submitted the 
arbitration. (IELRA, Section 
All five of the conditions must be met before employees may 
legally engage in a strike. The section also allows the employer to 
seek an injunction if the strike presents a clear and present danger 
to the health or safety of the public. An unfair labor practice or 
other evidence of unclean hands by the employer is a defense to such 
an action. 
Section 14 lists the action by educational employers and 
employees that will be considered unfair labor practices. This 
section will be considered in the chapter on unfair labor practices. 
Section 15 establishes the procedures to be followed when an 
employee or employer believes an unfair labor practice has been 
committed. This section provides that after a charge has been filed 
the IELRA will investigate the charge to determine if the charge 
states an issue of law or fact. If the IELRA finds that the charge 
meets that requirement the IELRB is to issue and serve a complaint 
upon the party charged and hold a hearing on the charges. Both 
parties are entitled to have an attorney present at the hearing and 
the IELRB may seek a court order to compel the attendance of the 
parties. 
If the IELRB finds that the charged party has committed an 
unfair labor practice the IELRB may issue an order requiring the 
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practice to cease. The IELRB may take additional affirmative action 
including requiring periodic reports to demonstrate compliance with 
the order. The detailed mechanics of processing an unfair labor 
practice charge are contained within the Rules and Regulations. 
Those details will be discussed in the chapter on unfair labor 
practices. 
Section 16 provides that a charging party or any person 
aggrieved by a final decision of the IELRB has the right to seek 
judicial review in the Appellate Court of the judicial district in 
which the IELRB maintains its principal office. Currently, that is 
the First District. 
This section also gives the IELRB the right to seek judicial 
relief if any person has violated a final order of the IELRB. If the 
Court grants the relief and a party violates the Court order the 
Court is empowered by this section to treat the violation as civil 
contempt. 
Section 17 establishes that the IELRA will prevail and 
control if there is a conflict between it and any other law, 
executive order or administrative regulation. 
Section 18 establishes that the provisions of the Open 
Meetings Act will not be applicable to collective bargaining 
negotiations and grievance arbitrations conducted pursuant to the 
IELRA. 
A careful reading of the IELRA reveals that the areas most 
likely to yield disputes between employers and employees are scope of 
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bargaining issues, unit determination issues, and unfair labor 
practices. A chapter will be devoted to each of these areas. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase, scope of bargaining, refers to the range of 
issues which will be bargained between employer and employees. The 
scope of bargaining provided by the National Labor Relations Act, 
(NLRA) is found in Section 8(d) of the NLRA. It requires the 
employer and representative of the employees to meet "at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions of employment •••• " This language is precisely 
the same as that found in Section 10 of the IELRA. 
Although the IELRB is not bound by the National Labor 
Relation Board's (NLRB) interpretation of the identical provision in 
the NLRA, it is clear that the IELRB will lock to the decisions of 
the NLRB for guidance. See, e.g. Lake Zurich School District No. 95, 
Case No. 84-CA-0003, Decision of IELRB, 1 PERI 1031 (1984). 
Therefore, the approach of the NLRB to scope of bargaining will be 
discussed. Following that discussion, there will be a general 
treatment of different states' approach to scope of bargaining 
issues, the IELRA 's application to scope questions in general and 
then specific treatment of four issues involving the scope of 
bargaining. 
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In the landmark case of NLRB v Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner 
corp., 356 U.S. 342 ( 1958), the Supreme Court established the 
division of bargaining topics into three categories - mandatory, 
permissive, and illegal. Mandatory topics lawfully regulate wages, 
hours and other terms and conditions of employment and must be 
bargained in good faith. However, either party may insist on its 
position until impasse and may use economic force to support its 
position. Permissive topics deal with subjects other than wages, 
hours and terms and conditions of employment and may be included in 
the contra<;:t: on a voluntary basis. Illegal contractual provisions 
are those which are prohibited by statute or public policy. Those 
provisions so prohibited may not be included within a labor contract 
even if both parties voluntarily agree to them. The Borg-Warner 
approach has been widely accepted by states with similar statutory 
language and will probably be followed by the IELRB. 
The NLRB has broadly construed the meaning of wages under the 
NLRA. Provisions classified as wages, and thus mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, have included merit or incentive pay (NLRB v. Katz, 
1962), pay for sick leave (NLRB v. Katz, 1962), pay differentials for 
workers of different shifts (NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse 
Co~, 1966), paid holidays and vacations (Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB~ 
1942), group health insurance (W.W. Cross and Co. v. NLRB, 1949), 
overtime pay (NLRB v. Tom Johnson·, 1965), bonuses if they are 
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remuneration for work done (NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 1952), 
food prices and services where the employer provides an on site 
cafeteria for employees (Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 1979), remuneration 
of bargaining unit members for time spent actually negotiating 
(Axelson, Inc. v. NLRB, 1979), and pension plans (Allied Chemical and 
Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co~, 1971). This long list 
gives some indication of how broadly the NLRB has construed the term 
'wages'. 
The NLRB has also provided a broad construction of what 
constitutes 'hours' within the meaning of the NLRA. The number of 
hours to be worked in each day, the particular hours to be worked in 
each day and the particular days to be worked in each week have been 
deemed to be 'hours' for the purposes of the NLRA (Local 189, Meat 
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co~, 1965). 
The NLRB has also expanded the number of items which are 
included within the phrase "other conditions of employment." The 
list of items includes company rules and hiring practices (S.S. 
Kresge Co. v. NLRB), the rental rate of company housing, (American 
Smelting & Refining Co. v. NLRB), safety rules (NLRB v. Miller 
Brewing Co~), employee work loads (Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB), 
effects of plant relocation (NLRB v. Die Supply Corp.), contracting 
out of work (Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. NLRB), and 
grievance procedures (Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB). However, even with 
that broad construction, the Supreme Court has recognized that some 
parameters have to be established for the scope of bargaining under 
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the phrase "conditions of employment." 
Justice Stewart, in his concurrence in Fibreboard, attempted 
to articulate those limits: 
in common parlance, the conditions of a person's 
employment are most obviously the various physical 
dimensions of his working environment •••• In many of 
these areas the impact of a particular management 
decision upon job security may be extremely indirect and 
uncertain and this alone may be sufficient reason to 
conclude that such decisions are not 'with respect to 
•••• conditions of employment.' •••• Nothing the Court 
holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to 
bargain collectively regarding such managerial 
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial 
control. (Fibreboard at 223) 
Justice Stewart noted that there are some managerial rights, not 
listed in the statute, that should not be labeled as subjects of 
mandatory bargaining. 
Currently, the test used by the NLRB to determine whether a 
management decision is subject to bargaining under the NLRA is based 
on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. First National Maintenance 
Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981). That test is whether the subject 
proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the 
bargaining process. 
This brief overview of the scope of bargaining under the NLRA 
yields a perspective as to how broadly the NLRB has construed that 
scope. It must be cautioned, however, that the decisions of the 
NLRB, decisions of federal courts on review, and decisions of other 
state agencies are not binding on the IELRB although the IELRB may 
take into consideration those decisions it finds relevant and 
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persuasive to the case it is considering. (Lake Zurich School 
District No. 95~) It must be noted that the NLRA is dealing with 
-
private sector labor disputes, does not have the equivalent of the 
strong management rights provision in Section 4 of the IELRA and 
is not drafted to accomodate the unique considerations of public 
education employees. 
Four Tests for--Determining Whether a -Subject- ·1s· .Mandatory· or 
permissive 
Ritter's article, "The Duty to Bargain Under Education Labor 
Relations Acts," delineates four tests used by state public labor 
relations boards and courts for determining whether a particular 
issue is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. The four 
tests are the minimal relations test, the significant relations test, 
the primary relations test and the balancing test. 
The minimal relations test is the easiest test to satisfy. 
Essentially, it classifies a subject as mandatory if it in any way 
impinges on wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment. 
Under this standard, nearly any management decision would become a 
subject of mandatory bargaining. This test is articulated and 
applied in State College Educ. Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd~, 
337 A.2d 262 (1975). 
The significant relations test is also relatively easy to 
satisfy. It requires a significant relation between the subject and 
wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment. It does not 
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require the balancing of the employer's interests or rights. This 
test is articulated and applied in Clark County School Dist. v. Locai 
Gov't. Employee Management Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114 (1974). 
The primary relations test is more difficult to satisfy and 
gives more deference to the concept of managerial rights. It will be 
satisfied only if the subject primarily relates to or affects wages, 
hours or terms of conditions of employment. A topic can have a 
significant relation but not have a primary relation so the primary 
relations standard is higher. This test is articulated and applied 
in City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 242 
N.W.2d 231 (1976). 
The balancing test is different than the other three because 
it explicitly recognizes that each side may have interests and 
attempts to balance those interests. By definition, the balancing 
test must be applied on a case by case basis. The advantage of this 
test is that it does not begin with a conclusive priority which 
biases the outcome. This test is articulated and applied in ~ 
County Bargaining Council v. Centennial School District, 685 P.2d 452 
(1983). 
Scope of bargaining under the.IELRA 
Section 10 of the IELRA imposes the affirmative duty to 
bargain on the public employer and the exclusive representative. 
Section lO(a) requires them to: 
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meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions 
of employment, and to execute a written contract 
incorporating any agreement reached by such obligation 
provided that such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. (IELRA, 1984) 
The portion of this section dealing with the scope of 
bargaining is the phrase wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment." 'Wages' is fairly straightforward. 
'Wages' include salary, fringe benefits and cash bonuses. 'Hours' is 
also fairly straightforward. 'Hours' is the duration of time that 
the employee must spend toiling for the employer before the employee 
can receive the wages and benefits. 'Terms and conditions of 
. .. 
employment' however, is difficult to interpret because virtually 
anything within the education work world could be construed as a term 
or condition of employment. However, The Act does limit the scope 
somewhat in Section lO(b) and requires some specific items in 
Sections lO(c) and (d). 
Section lO(b) limits the scope of bargaining by labeling some 
subjects of bargaining as illegal. It states that the parties " 
shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining 
agreement if the implementation of that provision would be in 
violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute 
or statutes enacted by The General Assembly of Illinois" ( IELRA, 
1984). The section does allow contractual provisions which 
supplement Illinois state statutes pertaining to wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment. However, if the provisions 
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have the effect of "... negating, abrogating, replacing, reducing, 
diminishing or limiting in any way ••• " employee rights under such 
statutes, those provisions will be void and unenforceable. However, 
permissible provisions of the collective bargaining agreement will 
still be valid and enforceable. (IELRA, 1984) In short, even if the 
parties agree, they may not, in any way, replace or limit employee 
rights and benefits under statutes dealing with wages, hours and 
employment conditions. 
Sections lO(c) and (d) have specific items which must be 
included in the contract. First, the contract must include a 
grievance resolution procedure that applies to all the employees 
within the bargaining unit. The grievance procedure must provide for 
binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or 
interpretation of the agreement. 
Second, the agreement must contain appropriate language 
prohibiting strikes for the life of the agreement. This provision 
was included so the stated purpose of the IELRA " to promote 
orderly and constructive relationships between all educational 
employees and their employers ..... could be effected (Section 1, 
IELRA, 1984). 
The final affirmative requirement ia that the agreement must 
be reduced to writing and signed by both parties. 
The expansive language of the scope of bargaining under 
Section lO(a) is somewhat limited by the language of Section 4 under 
the heading of Employer Rights. The limitation imposed is: 
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Employers shall not be required to bargain over matters 
of inherent managerial policy, which shall include such 
areas of discretion or policy as the functions of the 
employer, standards of services, its overall budget, the 
organizational structure and selection of new employees 
and direction of employees. (Section 4 of IELRA, 1984) 
There is nothing within the wording of the statute to 
indicate that the listing of the managerial policies is exhaustive. 
The policies listed are definitely managerial rights, other 
managerial policies may be determined as inherent rights through the 
interpretations of the IELRB. 
However, even as employers are granted relief from bargaining 
over matters of inherent managerial policy, they are required to 
bargain over the impact of policy decisions. Section 4 states that 
employers: 
Shall be required to bargain collectively with regard to' 
policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms 
and conditions of employment as well as the impact 
thereon upon request by employee representatives. 
(Section 4 of IELRA, 1984) 
First, it should be noted that impact bargaining is only 
required if the employee representative requests it. Because an oral 
request may well be forgot ten or ignored, it is likely that the 
requests for impact bargaining will be put in written form. 
Second, there is no guidance within the statute as to the 
meaning of the requirement imposed. It is clear that increasing the 
length of the school day, while arguably an inherent managerial 
right, has a direct effect on the hours worked by the employee and is 
a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is not nearly as clear whether 
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the elimination of interscholastic sports is a change in working 
conditions. 
When read together, Sections 10 and 4 create an uneasy 
tension. Section 10 clearly requires that the employer bargain over 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 
On the other hand, Section 4 relieves the employer from the 
obligation to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy. 
However, that relief does not extend to inherent managerial policies 
directly affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment or from the impact of policy decisions on wages, hours and 
terms and conditions of employment. 
Arguably, any managerial decision will have an impact on 
those areas. Was that the intent of the legislature? Or did the 
legislature intend that a line be drawn at some point? To answer 
these questions, it is instructive to look at the legislative record. 
The Employer Rights provision did not appear in the draft 
form of House Bill 1530 (later to become known as IELRA). In fact, 
it was not inserted into the bill until Governor Thompson's 
amendatory veto on September 23, 1983. The language of the provision 
is nearly identical to the Management Rights provision of the 
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, known in bill terms as Senate 
Bi 11 536. The only differences in language are the titles and the 
inclusion of the phrase "examination techniques" in the first 
sentence of the Senate Bill 536, Section 4. Therefore, a 
consideration of the legislative record must begin with an analysis 
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of the debates concerning the scope of bargaining under Senate Bill 
536° 
Before the addition of the "Management Rights" language to 
senate Bill 536, an important exchange took place on May 2 7, 1983 
between Senator Collins, one of the Senate sponsors, and Senator 
Keats regarding the scope of bargaining: 
SENATOR KEATS: 
Would the ••• would the labor board under this 
legislation consider the same factors as those 
considered by the NLRB in its ••• determinations; such 
as, determinations of whether a subject of bargaining is 




(Senate Debate on S.B. 536, May 27, 1983) 
At that point, then, the sponsors of the bill believed that 
the scope of bargaining would be patterned after the guidelines 
established by the NLRB, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
bill was sent to the House, the Management Rights provision was 
added. The bill was referred back to the Senate. On June 30, 1983 
there was more interaction between Senators Collins and Karpiel to 
clarify the meaning of the Management Rights provision: 
SENATOR COLLINS: 
Yes, thank you, Mr. President and members of the Senate. 
Senate Bill 536, I'm sure as you know, creates the 
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. This bill has gone 
to the House and has been amended, and I feel that the 
final product of this bill is designed to protect the 
rights of both public employers and employees and it 
provides for orderly procedures for implementation and 
the administration of the Act. This bill is the product 
of about six months of concentrated effort of various 
segments of labor, public employees, public employers, 
mayors, attorneys, Chicago, industry commerce and 
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industry and many lawyers across this State. And I 
personally feel that it is a workable product and that 
we should concur. The House amended this bill • • • It 
added back the management right sections that we had 
previously had in the drafting of the bill ••• 
SENATOR KEATS: 
So, if you don't mind, I'm just going to ask three 
questions and the sponsor has been kind enough to ••• 
give some thought to these answers. Does the management 
rights clause not included in Section 4 of Senate Bill 
536 set forth those matters not subject to bargaining 
under this Act with the intention of preserving as 
management rights all areas of discretion or policy 
affecting the functions of the employer? 
Senator Collins. 
SENATOR COLLINS: 
~es. Amendatory binding Statute /sic/ is not extended 
to any of the areas of employment subject to management 
discretion or policy making ••• (Senate Debate on S.B. 
536, June 30, 1983) 
This exchange clearly indicates that at least one sponsor saw 
the Management Rights provision as one that would protect management 
discretion, not subject it to mandatory bargaining. 
The final exchange on the Management Rights provision of 
Senate Bill 536 took place on November 2, 1983. In this exchange, 
Senator Greiman, another sponsor of the bill responded to questions 
by Senator Karpiel: 
f<AR.i?IEL: 
"Representative, could you answer ••• Is there a Section 




"Could you tell me what they include?" 
GREIMAN: 
"Sure. Section ••• I think it's 
1 o o k precise 1 y at it • 0 ka y • 
paragraphs and it precisely sets 
management." 
KARPIEL: 
Section IV, but we' 11 
Section IV is two 
out the rights of the 
"I don't have the Bill in front of me, Representative. 
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Could you tell me what some of those are?" 
GREIMAN: 
" ••• I will give you a synopsis of it. 'Employers shall 
not be required to bargain over matters of inherent 
managerial policy'. And then it suggests a number of 
items which are discretionary as to that policy and deal 
with the function of the employers and the standards of 
service. It is quite clear." 
GREIMAN: 
"The management rights are quite clear. They are 
explicit. They are based on a history of the National 
Labor Relations Act. They are based on a history of 
labor relations in this state, and they are some 25 
lines in this Bill. And they are quite ,clear as to what 
the rights of management, and they are quite awesome." 
(Senate Debate on S.B. 536, November 2, 1983) 
This interaction clearly reflects that management should 
retain powerful rights in the bargaining process. It certainly 
indicates that the scope of bargaining is to be no broader than the 
scope under the NLRB, perhaps it is to be narrower since 
practitioners do not consider management rights to be 'awesome' under 
the NLRB. 
There is only one specific discussion in the legislative 
history of the Employer Rights provision of IELRA. It came after the 
Governor's amendatory veto and is contained in an exchange between 
Senators Buzbee and Bruce on November 2, 1983. Senator Buzbee asked 
a general question about the scope of bargaining under the IELRA and 
Bruce res ponded: 
SENATOR BRUCE: 
Senator Buzbee, we do have a long history in the State 
of Illinois, and historically, the scope of bargaining 
has been very broad and this bill will not change that. 
In fact, within Section 4 of the Act, it states that 
"employers shall be required to bargain collectively 
with regard to any matter concerning wages, hours or 
conditions of employment about which they have bargained 
31 
phrase 
for and agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement 
prior to the effective date of this Act." In addition 
to that, the preceding paragraph puts that language in 
that they shall, in fact, if they have not already 
bargained, bargain over wages, hours, terms, and 
conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon 
upon request by employee representatives. So, in fact, 
it will give the bargaining rights over wages, hours, 
terms and conditions, other things mentioned in the bill 
which would include, already, class size, textbook ••• 
selection, evaluation procedures and like ••• like things 
presently in collective bargaining agreements and 
presently being bargained." 
This response is significant because he does not refer to the 
... policy matters directly affecting ••• " contained within 
the second sentence nor attempt to broaden the traditional scope of 
bargaining. This traditional scope of bargaining, it should be 
remembered, is shaped by decisions of the NLRB. 
As dis cussed earlier, the Employer Rights provision of the 
IELRA was inserted by Governor Thompson's Amendatory Veto. The 
message that accompanied that action on September 23, 1983 recognized 
the unique needs of schools in the area of management rights and 
reflected a desire to strengthen the law in order to protect those 
rights. 
• • • I believe that several changes need to be made in 
the legislation to create a workable and fair system 
that balances the rights of educational employees with 
unique managerial problems that beset educational 
employers and the taxpayers who ultimately pay the bill. 
(Veto Message, page 1). 
The history of the IELRA makes it clear that the statute is a 
result of long and concerted effort. It is also clear that the 
32 
statute, as enacted, is designed to meet the unique needs of the 
educational employer and employee. Having completed the discussion 
of the legislative history, decisions of the Illinois Education Labor 
Relations Board (IELRB) and its Hearing Officers will now be 
considered. 
There are four cases which provide some indication as to how 
the statute will be interpreted. The cases are Heyworth School 
District No. 3, Case No. 84-CA-0044-S, Hearing Officer's Recommended 
Decision and Ord·:r; Berkeley School District No. 87, Case No. 
84-CA-0056-C, Opinion and Order; Carbondale Comrnuni ty High School 
District No. 165, Case No. 84-CA-0057-S Opinion and Order; and 
Community Unit School District No.4, Case No. 84-CA-0015-S, Hearing 
Officer's Recommended Decision and Order. 
Heyworth was· an early case under IELRA, the charge being made 
on September 5, 1984. It was the first to deal with the 
interpretation of "hours" under the statute and is instructive for 
that purpose. Briefly, the following facts lead to the charge that 
the school board was refusing to bargain over a mandatory topic. 
Prior to June 6, 1984 there had never been an employee 
organization within the school dlstrict. The Heyworth Education 
Association was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative 
of the teachers on June 6, 1984. The bargaining representative 
requested that collective bargaining begin on June 19, 1984 and the 
first bargaining session was held on July 26, 1984. On July 25, 1984 
the school district announced that the working day of the teachers 
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bad been increased by 15 minutes each day. The School District's 
bargaining representative did not discuss the change at the July 26 
bargaining session. On July 26, the school district informed the 
employees' bargaining representative that all employees in the 
bargaining unit would be required to attend faculty meetings one day 
each month from 3:50 until 4:30. 
In the hearing, the employee's representative maintained that 
the unilateral change in the hours was an unlawful act because the 
particular hours of employment in a day was clearly within the realm 
of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. 
The school district, looking to Section 4 of the IELRA, 
argued that the change in the work day was a managerial prerogative 
because it concern[ ed] a matter of educational policy 
fundamental to the existence, direction and control of a school 
system " (Heyworth, p.2) 
The Hearing Officer rejected the reasoning of the School 
District. 
The length of an employee's work day as well as his 
starting and quitting time are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, unless the phrase "hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment" is devoid of meaning, it must 
necessarily refer to the length of an employee's work 
day and his starting and quitting time. (Heyworth, page 
2). 
This is an unequivocal statement about what must be bargained 
in terms of hours. The Hearing Officer went on to attempt an initial 
clarification of Section 4: 
Matters "fundamental" to the operation of a school 
district are those matters historically recognized as 
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falling outside an employee's concern, such as an 
employer's budget, the nature of the service the 
employer provides and its basic structure. • •• There 
can be few items of more fundamental concern to an 
employee than his hours of labor and his starting and 
quitting times. (Heyworth, p. 3). 
The Hearing Officer found that the school district had 
engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain over a 
mandatory topic of bargaining. As the remedy, he ordered the school 
district to return to status quo, to cease and desist the practice, 
and to provide back pay for those employee's who performed extra work 
associated with the school district's unilateral change. 
Heyworth stands for two important propositions. First, any 
change in the length of the work day, the starting time or the 
quitting time is a mandatory topic of bargaining. Second, the IELRB, 
or at least this Hearing Officer, is going to be very hesitant about 
using the provisions of Section 4 to narrQw the traditional scope of 
bargaining. 
Berkeley is an Opinion and Order by the full IELRB. As such, 
it serves as precedent for future decisions by Hearing Officers 
unless modified by judicial action. The Opinion and Order, issued on 
May 30, 1986 is one of great significance as declared by the IELF~, 
"the issue is one of first impression for this Board and presents, as 
one of the parties noted, the basic and fundamental issue as to the 
proper interpretation of Section 4 of the Act." (Berkeley, p.10). 
The facts of the case, briefly are as follows. The school 
district began to consider the possibility of changing from an 
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interscholastic athletic program to an intramural program in the 
school year 1981-82. Among the reasons for considered change were 
the school district's desire that more students participate in the 
athletic program and for reduced costs for transportation and 
referees. 
During the 1983-84 school year the school district began to 
consider the change even more seriously and developed proposals for 
the school board to consider. The school board voted to implement 
the change effective school year 1984-85 on June 25, 1984. 
The school board, in accordance with its collective 
bargaining agreement, sent a copy of its minutes to the president of 
the teachers' association with the following statement about the 
change: 
That the Board approved the change from an 
interscholastic athletic program to an intramural 
athletic program in the Middle schools, effective with 
the start of the 1984-85 school year and as previously 
discussed at an Education and Finance Committee meeting. 
(Berkeley, page 3). 
The School Board implemented the change on September 19, 1984 
while negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement for the 
1984-85 school year were still underway. 
The athletic program change was first raised as an issue at 
the bargaining table on September 18, 1984. Although there had been 
informal discussions between the bargaining representatives, no 
formal demand to bargain was made before that date. The school 
district listened to the demand, caucused and returned to notify the 
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teacher's agent that it would not bargain about the decision to 
adopt an intramural athletic program. The school district invoked 
the protection of Section 4 and claimed that the decision was 
managerial in nature and not subject to the duty to bargain. 
The issue was raised again at the September 24 bargaining 
session. The school district held firm in its position but stated 
that it was ready to negotiate the impact of the change. On October 
5, the teachers' representative proposed that the coaches be paid at 
the rate of $10.50 an hour. The school district presented a counter 
proposal on October 9 that offered compensation of $64 a week for a 
program that lasted from 3:15 until 5:00, four days a week. The 
bargaining representative filed the unfair labor charge on October 
10. 
There were several points at issue in the case, including 
jurisdictional issue and a question of mootness. The issue of 
importance for the discussion at hand, however, is whether the school 
district committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain 
over its decision. 
The IELRB began its analysis with a consideration of the 
wording of Section 10. However, the phrasing of the question before 
it gives the careful reader some idea of how the analysis might go. 
On page 9 of the opinion, the IELRB phrased the issue before it as 
" ••• whether the District was obligated to bargain in good faith over 
its decision to change the focus and nature of its athletic program." 
The key words in that phrase are "focus and nature". The earlier 
37 
discussion in this paper that dealt with the traditional scope of 
bargaining under the NLRA pointed out that a change in the focus and 
nature of a business were not subject to the duty to bargain. 
At any rate, the Board's analysis began with the wording of 
section 10 and it quickly determined that decision was not subject to 
the duty to bargain under that Section: 
It seems clear on its face, and is apparently at least 
impliedly acknowledged by both parties here, that the 
decision about the kind of athletic program the District 
considered most appropriate for its students would not 
be considered "wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment:, and thus would not be a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, under 
accepted public and private sector precedent 
interpreting the "traditional" scope language of Section 
10. (Berkeley, p.3) 
However, the basic argument of the teacher's representative 
was not that Section 10 required that the decision be bargained but 
that Section 4 requires bargaining because the decision was • • • a 
policy matter directly affecting wages, hours, and tenns and 
conditions of employment ..... of the junior high coaches. 
The IELRB acknowledged that the meaning of Section 4 was 
unclear on its face. (Berkeley, page 11). It characterized the 
teachers' representative's position as maintaining that inherent 
policy matters are subject to collective bargaining if they 
"directly" affect wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment. The IELRB characterized the school district as 
disagreeing with the teacher's position because to adhere to that 
interpretation would •••• "contradict(s) the plain meaning of the first 
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sentence of the section and would render Section 4 meaningless 
because almost every managerial decision directly affects wages, 
hours and terms and conditions of employment." 
After acknowledging that the statute contained nothing that 
would help clarify the situation, the IELRB went through the 
legislative history in the same fashion as presented in pages 28-32 
of this work. At the end of that process, the IELRB concluded that: 
We find no intention expressed in any of this 
legislative or veto history on either 536 or 1530 that 
the Section 4 language in either Act was meant to 
significantly broaden the scope of mandatory subjects of 
bargaining and thus radically shift the thrust of these 
Acts away from the intention to follow traditional, 
accepted and known public and private sector practice 
with respect to mandatory bargaining, as expressed in 
the legislature on May 27, 1983 (536) and June 27, 1983 
(1530). Indeed, quite the contrary seems to be the 
case. Yet, the ultimate effect of accepting the 
Association's position on Section 4 would be that the 
"Employer Rights" provision of our statute would 
crucially restrict and diminish rather than protect 
so-called "inherent management rights." There is no 
evidence that this is what was intended by the 
legislature. (Berkeley, page 17). 
In short, the IELRB rejected the position of the bargaining 
representative because 1) to allow it would broaden the traditional 
scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining and 2) restrict management 
rights. Neither of those possibilities were supported by the 
legislative record. 
The IELRB was still faced with the question of how Section 4 
was to be construed if the teachers' interpretation was to be 
rejected. It followed judicially recognized rules of statutory 
construction and construed the meaning of the section from the 
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context of the section and the statute as a whole. Therefore, it 
looked to the language and to the object and purpose of Section 4 as 
expressed by Governor Thompson in his amendatory veto message. The 
expressed purpose of that message was to balance the right to bargain 
collectively with the unique managerial problems facing educational 
employers as well as protect the rights of the taxpayers. 
(Amendatory veto message, page 1) The IELRB then came to this 
conclusion: 
In our judgment, the interpretation of Section 4 most 
consistent with a reasoned attempt to relate each of the 
sentences and phrases of Section 4 to the underlying 
purpose of the entire Section and to the legislative 
history is that "policy matters directly affecting 
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment" are 
those policies that have wages, hours and terms and 
conditions of employment as their primary subject; 
clearly, decisions concerning such policies are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, the inherent 
managerial policy decision involved here -- a change in 
the nature of the District's athletic program -- does 
not have wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment as its primary subject and only indirectly 
affects those matters; thus it is not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. (Berkeley, p. 18). 
By coming to this conclusion, the IELRB essentially embraced 
the primary relations test discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
IELRB also took this opportunity to carefully distinguish the IELRA 
from the Pennsylvania statute mentioned earlier. It noted that: 
In Pennsylvania, employers are enjoined only to "meet 
and discuss," not to engage in good faith 
bargaining," ••• over policy matters affecting wages, 
hours ..... Under our Section 4, formal, good faith 
bargaining, not "meet( ing) and discuss( ing)" is 
mandated, but only with respect to " ••• policy matters 
that directly affect wages, hours ..... (emphasis added). 
These differences -- "meet and discuss" versus "bargain" 
and the crucial addition of the word "directly" as a 
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qualifier of "policies affecting" are, in our estimation 
significant enough to render Pennsylvania precedent not 
particularly useful as a guide to our deliberations in 
this case under our statute. (Berkeley, p.19). 
Thus, although the language of Section 4 of the IELRA was 
clearly based on the Pennsylvania statute the IELRB has made it clear 
that it will not be bound by Pennsylvania precedent. 
The IELRB also found that the school district did have a duty 
to bargain the impact of the decision. It further found that the 
school district met that duty by offering to bargain, and indeed 
bargaining, as soon as the bargaining representative of the teacher 
made a demand to bargain. 
This case, then, stands for three very important 
propositions. First, the IELRB will rely upon the words and context 
of the statute as well as the legislative history to interpret the 
meaning of the statute. This is significant because it gives the 
IELRB much greater latitude in coming to decisions. 
Second, the IELRB intends to give import to the concept of 
employer rights. This should help to allay the fears held in some 
quarters that the IELRB is an employee oriented body. More 
importantly, it established that educational employers are unique and 
the management rights possessed by them are important to the public 
good. 
Third, the IELRB will use the primary relations test in 
determining if a policy decision directly affects the mandatory 
topics of bargaining. It is not, of course, clear what decisions 
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will be construed as directly affecting the topic of mandatory 
bargaining. However, at least there is now an articulated test for 
coming to that determination. 
Finally, although the case cannot be considered as standing 
for a proposition in this area, the IELRB left open the possibility 
that it might even consider narrowing the scope of bargaining given 
the unique managerial needs of educational employers. 
The same day that the IELRB decided Berkeley, it also decided 
Carbondale. In Carbondale, the school district determined that it 
might be more economically efficient for its custodial and 
maintenance work to be sub-contracted than for it to continue to be 
done by members of a recognized bargaining unit. The school district 
notified the employee's group of its interest in sub-contracting and 
invited the employee's group to work with the school district in 
exploring ways that costs might be contained. When the school 
district decided that the possibility merited serious consideration, 
it invited the employee group to bargain over the decision. The 
school district did finally sub-contract the work and an unfair labor 
charge was filed. 
Carbondale is of primary importance for its analysis of what 
kind of bargaining must occur if an employer wishes to avoid unfair 
labor charges. However, it also clearly stands for the proposition 
that the sub-contracting of work is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. (Carbondale, p 9, 11) 
Community Unit School District No. 4 is a Hearing Officer's 
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Recommended Decision and Order that was issued on June 20, 1986. 
Exceptions have been filed by the teacher's union so the decision is 
not final. However, the decision was based on Berkeley so there is a 
substantive basis for the decision. Briefly, the facts of the case 
are as follows. 
Prior to 1984, the school district employed both counselors 
and deans at its two high schools. Counselors worked primarily with 
the students' personal, emotional and academic needs while the deans 
dealt primarily with attendance and disciplinary problems. However, 
the duties of the two groups were inter-related and overlapped. The 
counselors were in the bargaining unit but the deans were not. 
In April of 1984, the principal of one of the high schools 
told the counselors and the deans that the school district was 
considering the creation of a new administrative position by 
combining the separate positions of dean and counselor. The deans 
and counselors of the other high school did not learn of the 
possibility of the change until the afternoon of May 24, 1984 when 
they were told that the change would be proposed at the Board of 
Education meeting scheduled for that evening. 
At the Board of Education meeting on the evening of May 24, 
the school district announced that there would be a reorganization of 
the services beginning with the school year 1984-85. At that 
meeting, the president of the teachers' union requested that the 
school district bargain over both the reorganization and over the 
impact of the decision. 
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The school district refused to bargain over the decision to 
reorganize and implemented the plan on August 1, 1984. There were no 
terminations as a result of the decision. The school district also 
refused to bargain over the impact of the decision. 
The Hearing Officer de::._ rmined, based upon the record, that 
the decision was not mo::ivated by a desire to reduce labor costs or 
that the decision was by anti-union animus. The Hearin;; Officer 
began his analysis by noting that the IELRB had not yet considered 
whether a decision to reorganize student service programs was a 
subject of mandatory bargaining under Section 10 (Community Unit 
School District No. 4, p. 10). He noted that decisions of the NLRB, 
federal courts and other state agencies were not binding. However, 
under Lake Zurich School District No. 95, he was empowered to take 
into consideration those cases he considered to be pE:rsuasive and 
relevant to the case at hand. With that empowerment, he began his 
analysis with a U.S. Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. First National 
Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666(1981). 
In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court held that 
the employer's decision to terminate part of its operation was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The court stated the premise 
underlying mandatory bargaining " ••• that collective bargaining backed 
by the parties economic weapons will result in a decision better for 
both management and labor and for society as a whole ••• " and went on 
to point out that this premise is only valid if the subject proposed 
as a mandatory subject of bargaining is amenable to resolution 
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through the bargaining process. 
The Hearing Officer also cited Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB 891 
(! 984) where it was held that an employer's decision to consolidate 
its operations to eliminate overlapping functions was not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. The Hearing Officer noted that under the NLRB 
analysis discussed earlier in this chapter, an employer's decision is 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining where the decision does not 
turn upon labor costs. 
The findings of fact had already established that it was not 
a desire to save labor costs that motivated the decision but rather a 
desire to eliminate inefficiency. That finding of fact, coupled with 
the analysis of the NLRB led to the conclusion that the decision was 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining under Section 10. 
The Hearing Officer also found that the decision was a matter 
' 
of inherent managerial policy under Section 4. He based that 
decision on the "primary subject" analysis established in Berkeley 
and found that: 
The primary subject of this policy decision is not 
wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment, but 
rather a change in the methods of providing student 
services. The impact of that decision on wages, hours 
and terms and conditions of employment thus only 
indirect. (Community Unit School District No.4, p. 14) 
The Hearing Officer did find that the school district was 
guilty of an unfair labor charge for failing to bargain the impact of 
the decision after a demand to bargain was made by the teacher's 
union. 
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This decision is significant for two reasons. First, the 
NLRB analysis used by the Hearing Officer gives school districts 
potential defenses against unfair labor charges of failure to bargain 
such issues as teacher evaluation, class size and curriculum. For 
instance, a school district might argue that the decision is not 
amenable to the collective bargaining process or that it was 
motivated by a desire to save on labor costs. 
Second, it is the first case to use the analysis enunciated 
by the IELRB in the Berkeley decision. This acknowledgment of 
precedent is of particular importance. The composition of the IELRB 
is subject to change, and with change, may vary interpretation of the 
issues before it. However, well established precedent imposes 
constraints upon those possible variations. 
The preceding discussion provides the analytical framework 
for considering how the IELRB is likely to determine whether the 
following topics are subjects of mandatory bargaining: teacher 
evaluation, class size, teaching assignments and curriculum. Each of 
the topics is presented separately. Consideration will be given to 
the decisions of other states, Illinois legislative history, and any 
Illinois decisions that have bearing on that particular issue. 
Teacher Evaluations 
The question of whether teacher evaluation is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining is currently of great concern to both employee 
groups and school districts. A major reason for this heightened 
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concern is the amendment to the Illinois School Code which states 
..... a school district shall develop, in co-operation with its 
teachers, or where applicable the exclusive bargaining representative 
of its teachers, an evaluation plan for all teachers in contractual 
continued service" (Section 24A-4) 
The language of Section 24A-4 makes it clear that school 
districts must at least "meet and confer" with teachers regarding the 
evaluation plan. However, the statutory provision does not directly 
address the bargainability of the issues. In addition, the issue of 
teacher evaluation is not addressed in either Section 4 or Section 10 
of the IELRA. 
Employee groups would like to see the evaluation process and 
the evaluation standards treated as mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
In order to support this view, the assertion would be that by virtue 
of Sections 10 and 4 of the IELRA, anything that is, or affects, a 
term or condition of employment, is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. Teacher evaluations would be construed as a term or 
condition of employment, or at least directly affecting terms and 
conditions of employment, and thus a subject of mandatory bargaining 
under Sections 10 or 4. Several states have determined that teacher 
evaluations are a subject of mandatory bargaining. 
Michigan and Indiana are cited to support this position. 
Michigan 
Cases from 
The first case is Central Michigan University Faculty 
Association v. Central Michigan University, 273 N.W. 2d 21 (1978), 
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decided by the Michigan Supreme Court. 
In that case, the Faculty Senate passed a resolution adopting 
a teaching effectiveness program. As part of that program, students 
and department faculty would evaluate faculty members. The results 
were to be utilized in departmental recommendations for 
re-appointment, tenure and promotion. The Faculty Association filed 
an unfair labor charge against the University. The charge was based 
on the claim that the adoption of the program was a unilateral change 
in the terms and conditions of employment and thus a violation of the 
duty imposed by Section 423.15 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 
The court determined that in this case, the evaluation 
procedures were a subject of mandatory bargaining (Central Michigan~ 
1978, p.25). In reaching this conclusion, the court used a two step 
process. 
First, the court looked to the interpretation of the NLRA. 
It noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has found that a liberal 
approach to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining is the 
best way to attain the objective of labor peace. This approach 
shaped Michigan's view and the court asserted that " ••• Michigan hci.s 
adopted a broad view of other terms and conditions of employment." 
(Central Michigan, p. 25.) 
The second step was to borrow the analysis from another 
public employee sector case, Detroit Police Officers Association v. 
Detroit, 214 N.W. 2d 803 (1974). In that case, the court had looked 
at private sector rulings for guidance and found that "such subjects 
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as ••• seniority and promotion are ••• mandatory subjects of 
bargaining." (Detroit Police Officers, p.809). 
Because the results of the evaluations were going to be 
considered in decisions to promote, retain and grant tenure, the 
court determined that the evaluation process was a mandatory subject 
of bargaining. (Cent. Michigan, p.25) 
There are two important points to be remembered when applying 
this result to situations in Illinois. First, there is no management 
rights clause in the Michigan statute. This allows a potentially 
wider scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining in Michigan. 
Second, it was because the evaluations were used in 
retention, re-appointment and promotion decisions that the court 
deemed them mandatory subjects of bargaining. The record does not 
indicate that the University ever argued that the decision was an 
educational policy decision and thus excluded from the bargaining 
process because it was an "inherent ·managerial policy." 
Indiana 
The second case is Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation 
v. Roberts, 405 NE 2d 895, decided by the Indiana Supreme Court. In 
that case, the school corporation (district) implemented a teacher 
evaluation plan without any discussion with the exclusive bargaining 
representative for the teachers. The purpose of the plan was to 
maintain high teacher competence by means of self-evaluation forms, 
classroom observations by evaluators and evaluation conferences. The 
record indicates that, "the entire process may result in a 
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recommendation for a change of assignment or a teacher dismissal ..... 
(Evansville-Vanderburgh, p. 898). The school corporation had met 
with a group of teachers, not members of the bargaining unit, before 
the implementation of the plan. 
An unfair labor charge was filed by a member of the 
bargaining unit, alleging that the school corporation had violated 
Indiana Code 20-7.5-1-5 by failing to discuss the plan with the 
exclusive bargaining representative before implementing the change. 
The applicable portion of that Section provides: 
A school employer shall discuss with the exclusive 
representative of certificated employees, and may but 
shall not be required to bargain collectively, negotiate 
or enter into a written contract concerning or be 
subject to or enter into impasse procedures on the 
following matters: working conditions, other than those 
provided in Section 4; curriculum development and 
revision, textbook selection; teaching methods; 
selection, assignment or promotion of personnel; student 
discipline; expulsion or supervision of students; 
pupil-teacher ratio; class size or budget 
appropriations ••• (20-7.5-1-5-(a)) 
Because of the stated philosophy of the plan, and the fact 
that the results could result in a change of assignment or dismissal, 
the court determined that this particular teacher evaluation plan was 
a "working condition." (Evansville-Vanderburgh, p. 898) 
There are three important points to remember when applying 
this decision to Illinois situations. First, a careful reading of 
20-7.5-1-5 reveals that the charge was based on a failure to meet and 
confer, not on a failure to bargain over a mandatory subject. The 
section clearly says that the school corporation may bargain 
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collectively over the enumerated matters but shall not be required to 
bargain over those matters. The court's decision did not establish 
that the evaluation plan was a mandatory subject of bargaining. It 
simply established that the plan was a mandatory subject of 
discussion. The court went to some length to make that clear by 
citing Indiana Code 20-7.5-1-2 (0): 
'discuss' means the performance of the mutual obligation 
of the school corporation through its superintendent and 
the exclusive representative to meet at reasonable times 
to discuss, to provide meaningful input, to exchange 
points of view, with respect to items enumerated in 
Section 5 of this chapter. This obligation shall not, 
however, require either party to enter into a contract, 
to agree to a proposal, or to require the making of a 
concession. A failure to reach an agreement on any 
matter of discussion shall not require the use of any 
part of the impasse procedure ••• 
This definition of 'discuss' makes it abundantly clear that the court 
did not perceive the plan to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Second, there is no provision similar to Illinois' Section 4 
that protects inherent managerial policies from the scope of 
mandatory bargaining. Because of that lack, there was no argument 
made that the primary purpose of the plan was related to educational 
policy. Teacher evaluation was clearly a working condition under the 
meet and confer requirements of 20-7.5-1-5. 
Under the evaluation plan, the evaluation process mlght 
result in a recommendation for an assignment change or a dismissal. 
This would clearly fall within the meet and confer requirements 
regarding selection, assignment or promotion of personnel as 
contained in Section 20-7.5-1-5. 
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It is the clarity of that statutory language that led the 
court to its decision. The court did not consider whether the 
primary purpose of the plan was related to educational policy. In 
fact, the court did not at all consider the policy underlying the 
decision. 
Third, the Illinois statute does not have a provision 
comparable to Section 20-7.5-1-5 of the Indiana Code. There is no 
listing of subjects in the Illinois Statute that the employer is 
required to discuss although not required to reach agreement on. 
As discussed earlier, the approach of the IELRA is similar to 
that of the NLRA when dealing with the scope of bargaining. There 
are mandatory, permissive and illegal subjects of bargaining. There 
is no fourth category of mandatorily "discussable" topics. Because 
of the unique category contained in Indiana law, it is misleading to 
look to Indiana law in this area. 
Proponents of the view that teacher evaluations are not a 
subject of mandatory bargaining will find support in a series of 
court decisions from the states of Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Oregon. The courts of these states have determined, with different 
variations, that teacher evaluation is not a subject of mandatory 
bargaining. 
Kansas 
The seminal case in th~ s~ate of Kansas is National Education 
Association of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Education of Shawnee 
Mission Unified School District No. 512, 512 p. 2d 426 (1973). At 
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that time, school districts negotiated under the authority of the 
Kansas Professional Negotiations Act. That Act required teacher 
organizations and school districts to bargain over "terms and 
conditions of professional service." 
Shawnee Mission was the first case to interpret the scope of 
bargaining under this Act. In that case, the school board had 
submitted two items for negotiation and the teachers' organization 
had submitted a master contract of 123 pages containing 22 sections 
and 122 subsections. 
The major issue before the court was how to determine what 
were subjects of mandatory bargaining so that the impasse could be 
resolved and the parties could get back to the table. The court 
chose to use the following approach in interpreting the Act. 
The "terms and conditions of professional service" which 
are negotiable under the act are something more than the 
minimal economic terms of wages and hours, but something 
less than the basic educational policies of the board of 
education. The key to determining whether an issue is 
negotiable or not is an assessment of how direct an 
impact it has on the well-being of the individual 
teacher, as opposed to its effect on the operation of 
the school system as a whole. Such assessment must be 
made on a case-by-case basis. (Shawnee-M.ission, p.427. 
Using this analysis, the court determined that "terms and 
conditions of professional service" included salaries, hours and 
amounts of work, vacation allowance, holidays, sick leave, personal 
leave, insurance benefits, wearing apparel, jury duty, and grievance 
procedures. The court also agreed with the position of the teachers' 
organization that mandatory subjects of bargaining included 
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period, transfers, teacher appraisal procedure, probationary 
disciplinary procedure, and resignations and terminations of 
contracts. Therefore, under Shawnee Mission, teacher evaluation was 
a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The Kansas legislature took note of the decision in Shawnee 
Mission and amended K. s.A. 72-5413 in 1977. The amendment defined 
"terms and conditions of professional service" as follows: 
"(!)'Terms and conditions of professional service' means 
salaries and wages, hours and amounts of work, vacation 
allowance, holiday, sick and other leave, number of 
holidays, retirement, insurance benefits, wearing 
apparel, pay for overtime, jury duty, grievance 
procedure, disciplinary procedure, resignations, 
termination of contracts, matters which have a greater 
direct impact on the well-being of the individual 
professional employee than on the operation of the 
school system in the school district or of the comm.unity 
junior college and such other matters as the parties 
mutually agree upon as properly related to professional 
service. Nothing in this act, or the act of which this 
section is amendatory, shall authorize the adjustment or 
change of such matters which have been fixed by statute 
or by the constitution of this state." 
This was how the law read when the National Education-Topeka 
and Unified School District No. 501 began negotiations for the 
1978-79 school year. The law was interpreted in the court case that 
ensued when the two parties could not reach agreement. That case is 
N.E.A.-Topeka v USD 501. 502 P.2d 93 (1979). The court was concerned 
with interpreting the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining under 
the revised statute. In doing so, it noted that the statute had 
incorporated the impact test enunciated in Shawnee Mission. That is, 
mandatory subjects of bargaining included those matters "which have a 
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greater impact on the well being of the individual employee than on 
the operation of the school system." 
The court also noted that the legislature, in providing a 
definition of terms and conditions of professional service, 
specifically excluded probationary period, transfers and teacher 
appraisal procedures (teacher evaluations) from the list of mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, (N.E.A.-Topeka, p.97). 
The court then refused to include teacher evaluations as 
being subjects of mandatory bargaining because it did not satisfy the 
impact test. 
There are three important aspects of this case for those 
seeking to use it in interpreting Illinois law. First, there is no 
management rights clause in the Kansas statute that is comparable to 
the one found in the Illinois statute. Therefore, the Kansas statute 
cannot be used to help interpret Section 4 of the IELRA. 
Second, the court looked at legislative intent for assistance 
in interpreting the statute. The legislature had opted to exclude 
teacher evaluation in a defined list of mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. However, it had provided the opportunity for judicial 
interpretation by allowing subjects that satisfied the impact test to 
be determined as mandatory topics of bargaining. 
The third important aspect is that the court considered the 
impact test, as provided in the statute and enunciated in Shawnee 




The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act imposes a 
duty upon public employers to bargain in good faith concerning terms 
and conditions of employment. This obligation is imposed by Section 
179.61 of the Minnesota Statutes. 
The Minnesota Act also includes a managerial rights section 
in Section 179.66. In part, that section reads: 
Subdivision 1. A public employer is not required to 
meet and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial 
policy, which include, but are not limited to, such 
areas of discretion or policy as the functions and 
programs of the employer, its overall budget, 
utilization of technology, the organizational structure 
and selection and direction and number of personnel. 
This section is quite similar to the Illinois Act. Both Acts 
identify matters of inherent managerial policy as functions of the 
employer, the overall budget, the organizational structure and the 
selection and direction of employees. The Minnesota Act specifically 
includes programs, utilization of technology and number of employees 
while the Illinois statute does not specifically mention those items. 
The Illinois statute specifically includes standard of services, 
while the Minnesota Act does not use those terms. 
The similarity of the Illinois and Minnesota statutes makes 
it particularly appropriate to look to Minnesota cases to determine 
if teacher evaluations are a mandatory subject of bargaining or an 
employer right. 
At this time, there is only one Minnesota case that addresses 
this question. That case is University Education Association v. 
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Regents of the University of Minnesota, 353 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1984). 
-
In that case, the University Education Association (UEA) alleged that 
the Board of Regents had committed an unfair labor practice by 
refusing to bargain the subjective criteria used to determine 
promotion and tenure, review of faculty evaluations and the academic 
calendar. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that all three of these 
issues were matters of inherent managerial policy. 
The basis of the NEA' s argument was that the three matters 
all had a significant impact on faculty job security, advancement, 
compensation and work assignment so were terms and conditions of 
employment. (University Education Association, p. 537.) 
The court began its analysis by noting that: 
This court has repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of 
PELRA requires the scope of the mandatory bargaining 
area to be broadly construed so that the purpose of 
resolving labor disputes through negotiation could best 
be served. (University Education Association, p. 578). 
However, it also noted that a string of Minnesota decisions 
recognized " ••• that many inherent managerial policies concomitantly 
and directly affect the terms and conditions of employment." (Id at 
539). 
Because areas of 'inherent managerial policy' and 'terms and 
conditions of employment' often overlap, the court had to establish a 
test for determining how an issue would be categorized. 
The court had established such a test in St. Paul 
Firefighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 
1983). The court established the basic approach as follows: 
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A decision in respect of a matter of inherent managerial 
policy--a discretionary decision which a public employer 
is not required to negotiate--may well impinge upon 
negotiable terms and conditions of employment. 
Minn.Stat. S 179.66 (1982). The impact upon the terms 
and conditions of employment of an inherent managerial 
policy decision does not, however, render the policy 
decision a subject of mandatory negotiation if the 
decision and its implementation are so inextricably 
interwoven that requiring the public employer to meet 
and negotiate the method of carrying out its decision 
would require the employer to negotiate the basic policy 
decision. See Minneapolis Association of Administrators 
and Consultants v. Minneapolis Special School District 
No. 1, 311 N.W. 2d 474, 476-77 (Minn. 1981). If, 
however, the inherent managerial policy decision is 
severable from its implementation, the effect of 
implementation on the terms and conditions of employment 
is negotiable to the extent that negotiation is not 
likely to hamper the employer's direction of its 
functions, and objectives. Minneapolis Federation of 
Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School 
District No. 1, 258 N.W. 2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977); 
International Union of Operating Engineers v. City of 
Minneapolis, 305 Minn, 364, 233 N.W. 2d 748 (1975). 
(St. Paul Fire Fighters, 336 N.W. 2d at ·302.) 
Essentially, the approach established by St. Paul Fire 
Fighters is a two- part test. First, the impact of a policy decision 
upon terms and conditions of employment must be determined. If the 
policy impinges upon mandatory subjects of bargaining, the court must 
then determine if the policy and 'terms and conditions of employment' 
are so interwoven that negotiation of the issue would require 
negotiation of the policy. If they can be separated, bargaining is 
mandatory for the issues relating to the implementation of the 
policy. 
After establishing that this was the proper approach, the 
court addressed each of the three issues. It dealt with the issue of 
58 
faculty evaluations in two brief paragraphs on page 542 of the 
opinion: 
The MEA argues that the faculty has a direct interest in 
assuring that evaluations are fair, accurate and 
properly used. The faculty evaluation issue relates to 
all faculty and consequently is an issue separate from 
tenure and promotion. 
The substantive criteria, weights and review of faculty 
evaluations are undoubtedly managerial matters while the 
application of the evaluations is an issue that may 
directly affect a faculty member's terms and conditions 
of employment. The fairness of the application of 
faculty evaluation standards is ensured by the 
negotiability of the tenure and promotion procedural 
process. It is obvious that the quality of work an 
employer, public or private, expects is a managerial 
decision. (University Education Association, p. 542) 
It is important to note that the court saw a distinction 
between the substantive criteria, weights and review of faculty 
evaluations and the application of those evaluations. This kind of 
distinction is also recognized in Section 4 of the IELRA by the 
impact bargaining provision. 
This case is significant for three reasons. The first is 
that it involves a statute with an employer's rights provision 
similar to that of the IELRA. 
The second is that in creating an approach to the dilemma 
created by the employer's rights provision, the court realized that 
there would often be an overlapping between subjects of mandatory 
bargaining and matters of inherent managerial policy. The approach 
recognizes that and acknowledges that a balance must be struck that 
will fulfill the legislative purposes of the Act. 
The third important aspect of the case is the distinction the 
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court made as discussed above. This distinction may be analogized to 
the provisions of Section 4 of the IELRA and will be referred to 
later in this discussion. 
WisconSin 
Wisconsin's statute establishing the right of bargaining in 
the public sector is found in Section lll.70(1)(d) of the Wisconsin 
Statutes. The statute requires public employers and employee 
representatives to bargain with respect to wages, hours and 
conditions of employment. The statute does not have as an employer's 
rights provision as explicit as the Illinois Act. However, it does 
reserve some power to management within the statute: 
The employer shall not be required to bargain on 
subjects reserved to management and direction of the 
governmental unit except insofar as the manner of 
exercise of such functions affects the wages, hours and 
conditions of employment of the employees. 
It is important to note that those management rights are 
limited if the exercise of them affects the wages, hours and 
conditions of employment of the employee. 
The most significant case to date in interpreting the scope 
of bargaining in Wisconsin is City of Beloit, Etc. v. Wis. 
Employment, Etc, 242 N.W. 2nd 231 (Wis. 1976). In this case, the 
Beloit Education Association (BEA) and the Beloit City School Board 
could not agree whether a list of eleven topics were mandatory or 
permissive subjects of bargaining under the Wisconsin statute. The 
eleven subjects were: 
(1) the manner in which supervision and evaluation of 
teachers will be conducted, 
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(2) the structure and maintenance and availability to 
teachers of school district files and records, 
(3) right of representation prior to reprimand, warning 
or discipline, 
(4) whether or not "just cause" shall be the standard 
applied in limitation of the Board's actions with 
respect to renewal of individual teachers 
contracts, 
(5) the procedure and order of preference to be 
utilized in event of teacher layoffs, 
(6) the treatment and disposition of problem students, 
(7) class size, 
(8) type and extent of in-service training to be 
conducted, 
(9) the type and extent of reading program to be 
utilized, 
(10) the establishment and structure of summer programs, 
(11) the school calendar. 
Because they could not agree, they took advantage of a 
provision in the statute that allowed them to submit the list to the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission for a declaratory ruling on 
whether they were mandatory. The Commission issued a declaratory 
ruling and the ruling was appealed. 
The court first discussed the statute, the limitations on the 
scope of the bargaining and the nature· of the parties. When it came 
to the discussion of the problem, the court stated that the problem 
with interpreting the statute was that many subject areas relating to 
wages, hours and conditions of employment also had " ••• a relatedness 
to matters of educational policy and school management and 
operation." (City of Beloit, 235). 
After defining the problem, the court considered how to best 
construe the statute. The court concluded that "What is 
fundamentally or basically or essentially a matter involving wages, 
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hours and conditions of employment, is, under the statute, a matter 
that is required to be bargained." (Id, at 236). This kind of test, 
by necessity, must be applied on a case by case basis. 
The court then applied this test to the question of teacher 
evaluations. The court acknowledged that the area of teacher 
evaluation related to management and direction as well as to wages, 
hours and conditions of employment using the primary relations test, 
the court held that BEA proposals regarding who was to evaluate 
teacher performance and assistance to teachers with poor evaluations 
were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, five proposals 
went "to the right of teachers to have notice and input into 
procedures that affect their job security," (Id., at 237.) Those 
five proposals were: 
Teacher Supervision and Evaluation ( 1) Orientation of 
new teachers as to evaluative procedures and techniques, 
(2) Length of observation period and openness of 
observation, (3) Number and frequency of observations, 
(4) Copies of observation reports and conferences 
regarding same, and teachers' objections to evaluations, 
and (5) Notification of complaints made by parents, 
students and others. (Id., Footnote 16 at 237) 
There are three important aspects to be remembered when 
applying this case to Illinois. First, the employer's rights clause 
in Wisconsin is not as strong as that in Illinois. 
Second, the court did not address the negotiability of 
criteria. That is important because many school districts are 
willing to concede the negotiability of procedures but will maintain 
that criteria are strictly matters of educational policy and 
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therefore insulated by Section 4. 
Third, the language of Section 4 only requires the 
negotiation of policy matters "directly" affecting wages, hours and 
terms and conditions of employment. Arguably, this is a different 
test than the primary relations test applied by the Wisconsin court. 
Oregon 
Oregon's Public Employment Collective Bargaining Act, found 
in the Oregon Revised Statutes, Section 243. 650 et seq., requires 
public employer to bargain in good faith over "matters concerning 
direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacations, sick leave, 
grievance procedures and other conditions of employment." (Oregon 
Revised Statutes, Section 243.650 [7]). Oregon has elected to use a 
balancing approach to determine the scope of bargaining when dealing 
with school districts. That approach "weighs the comparative effect 
of a proposed bargaining subject on educational policy and on teacher 
employment conditions •••• " East County Bargaining Council v. 
Centennial School District No. 28JT, 685 P. 2d 453 at 454 (Or. App. 
1984). 
This approach was adopted by Oregon's Supreme Court in a 1980 
decision, Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 621 P.2d. 547 
(Ore. 1980). That decision developed a three-part standard for 
applying the balancing approach to teacher evaluation proposals: 
"ERB concluded that the bases for and use of evaluation 
related predominantly to educational policy, although 
they affect teachers' working conditions somewhat, 
because the bases represent the determination of 
programs and program standards and the use of evaluation 
is to determine whether these program standards are 
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being met. The determination and measurement of program 
standards are management functions. 
ERB also concluded that the mechanics of evaluation also 
affect working conditions, but relate primarily to 
educational policy because the mechanics and bases of 
evaluation are 'inextricably intertwined.' The form, 
content, number and sequence of evaluations, and the 
resources allocated therefore, ERB reasoned, must be 
designed to correlate to the program standards and to 
serve as the basis for subsequent managerial action. 
Accordingly, both the bases for and uses of evaluation 
and the mechanics of evaluation were deemed not to be 
conditions of employment and, hence, subject to 
permissive rather than mandatory bargaining. 
ERB next concluded that those parts of the proposals 
dealing with procedural fairness (e.g., notice and 
opportunity to be heard) had no effect on the 
formulation and achievement of program and little effect 
on the allocation of resources, but greatly affected 
teachers' employment. Hence, procedural fairness 
procedures were deemed to be subject to mandatory 
bargaining." 290 Or. at 235-37, 621 P. 2d 545. 
Following that case, however, the Oregon legislature amended 
the Oregon Statute governing teacher evaluations. That statute, 
found at Oregon Revised Statutes Section 342.850 was amended to 
include a provision very similar to the Illinois statute dealing with 
teacher evaluations on that matter. The section added, reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(2)(a)The district school board shall develop an 
evaluation process in consultation with school 
administrators and with teachers. If the 
district's teachers are represented by a local 
bargaining organization, the board shall consult 
with teachers belonging to and appointed by the 
local bargaining organization in the consultation 
required by this paragraph. 
(b) The district school board shall implement the 
evaluation process that includes: 
"(A) The establishment of job descriptions and 
performance standards which include but are 
not limited to items included in the job 
description; 
"(B) A pre-evaluation interview which includes but 
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is not limited to the establishment of 
performance goals for the teacher, based on 
the job description and performance standards; 
"(C) An evaluation based on written criteria which 
include the performance goals; and 
"(D) A post-evaluation interview in which (i) the 
results of the evaluation are discussed with 
the teacher and (ii) a written program of 
assistance for improvement, if needed, is 
established. 
"(c) Nothing in this subsection is intended to prohibit 
a district from consulting with any other 
individuals." 
A subsequent case determined whether the amendment of the 
evaluation law affected the application of the Springfield test for 
determining what evaluation related matters are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. That case is East County Bargaining Council v. 
Centennial School District No. 28JT, 685 P.2d 452 (Or. App. 1984). 
In that case, the teachers' bargaining council (council) 
argued that: 
because the amendment made the statutory requirements 
for evaluations more specific, increased the 
evaluation-related rights of teachers and reduced the 
flexibility and discretion of school districts in 
connection with evaluations, the effect was to shift the 
balance from the educational policy to the employment 
conditions end of the spectrum and to make virtually all 
matters pertaining to teacher evaluations mandatory 
bargaining subjects. The council implicitly makes the 
related point that, because the district must comply 
with the statute, it has no educational policy interests 
which militate against bargaining about proposals that 
simply duplicate the statutory requirements. (Id., at 
455, 456). 
The court however, determined that any bargaining proposal 
was still subject to the balancing test. Indeed, the court stated 
that the amendment did not "explicitly enlarge the scope of 
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mandatorily bargainable subjects." (Id at 457.) 
The most significant aspect of this case, within the Illinois 
context, is the court's holding that the amendment did not enlarge 
the scope of mandatory bargaining. This is particularly important 
when considered in conjunction with Section 17 of the IELRA. 
Illinois 
There are no Illinois decisions to date that deal with the 
issue of teacher evaluation as a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
However, a Complaint and Notice of Hearing has been issued by the 
Executive Director of the IELRB for a case involving this issue. 
The case, Community Consolidated School District 59, Case No. 
86-CA-0012, deals with a demand to bargain collectively about the 
development of evaluation criteria and procedures as well as the 
impact of them. The complaint was issued on July 24, 1986. 
There is also very little legislative history on this issue. 
Teacher evaluation was not discussed at all in the House debates and 
was only mentioned once in the Senate debates. That discussion is 
cited on page 32 of this work and gives no direction on this issue. 
However, based on the IELRB decisions discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the NLRB decisions and the decisions of other states, 
it is possible to make a reasonable prediction as to how the IELRB 
might approach this question. 
First, the IELRB will likely reject the argument that teacher 
evaluations have been made a mandatory subject of bargaining by the 
amendment to the School Code which requires school districts to 
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develop " •••• in co-operation with its teachers, or where applicable 
the exclusive bargaining representative of its teachers, an 
evaluation plan for all its teachers in contractual continued 
service." (Section 24A-4). A careful reading of that amendment 
reveals that the school district is required to develop a plan in 
co-operation with the teachers or their bargaining representative. 
The language does not impose an affirmative duty to bargain the 
contents of that plan but rather, is similar to the meet and confer 
requirements of a state like Indiana. 
Another reason the IELRB is likely to reject this argument is 
because of the provisions of Section 17 of the IELRA. That section 
reads: 
Effect on other laws. In case of any conflict between 
the provisions of this Act and any other law, executive 
order or administrative regulation, the provisions of 
this Act shall prevail and control. Nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to replace or diminish the rights of 
employees established by Section 36d of "An Act to 
Create the the State Universities Civil Service System", 
approved May 11, 1905, as amended or modified. 
This section makes it very clear that the IELRA is to be the 
controlling law if there is any conflict between the IELRA and any 
other state law. Further, the only exception to this rule that the 
legislature was willing to contemplate was incorporated in Section 
17. Therefore, the only way the list of mandatory subjects of 
bargaining can be expanded by statute is by amending the IELRA to 
reflect that change. The new teacher evaluation law is incorporated 
in the School Code, not the IELRA. Therefore, it cannot be regarded 
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as a statutorily imposed subject of mandatory bargaining. 
The IELRB will consider several factors when it addresses the 
issue of whether teacher evaluations are a subject of mandatory 
bargaining. One will be the strong language of Section 4 of the 
IELRA· In Berkeley the IELRB made it very clear that it viewed 
management rights as significant and that educational employers are 
unique. In that decision, the IELRB considered the claims by both 
sides and determined that the word 'directly' was very significant 
and that unless there was a direct effect on the subjects of 
mandatory bargaining, the decision was to be left to management. 
Another factor that the IELRB will likely consider is whether 
teacher evaluations are a matter of educational policy. All the 
state courts that have considered this question have concluded that 
teacher evaluations at least include an element of educational 
policy, even those courts that have determined that teacher 
evaluations are a mandatory subject of bargaining. The IELRB wi 11 
most likely concur with those courts and determine that teacher 
evaluations are a matter of educational policy. 
Al though all the courts cited have determined that teacher 
evaluations include a question of educational policy, they have 
applied different tests to determine whether it might still be a 
subject of mandatory bargaining. Under the minimal relations test 
and the significant relations test the courts have determined that 
teacher evaluations are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
However, under the primary relations test and the balancing 
68 
test the courts have determined that teacher evaluations are not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. In Berkeley, the IELRB adopted the 
primary relations test. The application of that test in the context 
of teacher evaluations is best exemplified in Beloit discussed 
earlier. 
If the IELRB applies the primary relations test as in Beloit, 
it will find that the number, frequency and duration of evaluations 
will be subjects of mandatory bargaining. It will also find that the 
time span between the observation and the evaluator/teacher 
conference will be a mandatory subject of bargaining. However, the 
identity of the evaluator will probably be found to be an inherent 
managerial right. The criteria for the evaluation are clearly 
matters of educational policy because they are pronouncements of what , 
the district considers to be proper teaching behavior as the behavior 
relates to attaining the district's educational objectives. This 
will be the result if the IELRB follows the lead of the Wisconsin 
courts. 
One caveat is in order, however. The Wisconsin statute 
dealing with managerial rights, cited on page 60, gives employees the 
right to bargain over managerial rights if the exercise of those 
rights affect the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the 
employees. That statute does not include the word 'directly' that 
the IELRB found so significant in Berkeley. Therefore, the primary 
relations test applied by the IELRB may narrow the scope of mandatory 
bargaining even beyond that established in Beloit. 
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In summary then, if the IELRB follows Beloit, it will find 
that the procedures of teacher evaluation are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining but that the identity of the evaluator and the criteria 
for evaluation will be permissive subjects of bargaining. If the 
IELRB continues to place great reliance on the presence of the word 
'directly' in Section 4 it may even find that the procedures are not 
subjects of mandatory bargaining. At any rate, both the procedures 
and criteria will likely be found to be subjects for impact 
bargaining under Section 4. 
CLASS SIZE 
Class size is another topic that the teacher unions will 
likely consider as a mandatory subject of bargaining. Teachers have 
long believed that the number of pupils in a class has a direct 
impact on the quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the 
classroom. School administrators might agree with that sentiment, 
but argue that precisely because the number of students affect 
teaching and learning, a determination of class size based on that 
belief would be an educational policy decision. Employee groups 
would likely consider it a term or condition of employment. 
Several states now have judicial determinations of whether 
class size is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
include Connecticut, Nevada, Florida and Wisconsin. 
Connecticut 
Those states 
The Connecticut Teacher Negotiations Act is found at C.G.S.A. 
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sections 10-153(a) through 10-153(h). It requires school boards to 
negotiate over "salaries and conditions of employment." This 
statutory requirement was interpreted with respect to class size in 
the case of West Hartford Education Association v. DeCourcy, 162 
Conn. 566 (1972). 
West Hartford was an action for a declaratory judgment 
determining whether certain items were mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. In the court's analysis of the scope of bargaining, it 
began by noting that absent guidance from the statute, the court must 
look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of 
"conditions of employment. (Id.at 533.) All three of the labor acts 
covering public employees in Connecticut mirrored the language of the 
National Labor Relations Act and made it mandatory for the employer 
to bargain over wages, hours and conditions of employment. The court 
determined that the omission of hours from the Teacher Negotiations 
Act reflected a legislative judgment that "teachers' hours of 
employment' determine students' hours of education and that this is 
an important matter of education policy which should be reserved to 
the board of education." (Id. at 534.) 
Because of that attributed legislative judgment, the court 
found that the length of the school day and the school calendar were 
not mandatory subjects of bargaining. It also used the perceived 
legislative judgment as the basis of the analysis regarding class 
size. The court asserted that the legislature intended that the 
scope of negotiations should be broad, stating that, "The use of the 
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phrase 'conditions of employment' reflects a judgment that the scope 
of negotiations should be relatively broad, but sufficiently flexible 
to accommodate the changing needs of the parties." (Id at 535.) 
Having made that determination, the court looked to decisions 
under the National Labor Relations Act. The scope of bargaining 
under that Act, as discussed earlier, has been expanded under the 
penumbra of the phrase, "terms and conditions of employment." 
However, there are still some limits to that scope as defined in 
Fibreboard Paper Products ,"nothing should be understood as imposing 
a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, 
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." (379 U.S. 203 at 
223.) The Connecticut court equated the controls in Fibreboard with 
matters of educational policy in the case at hand and defined 
educational policy as "those which are fundamental to the existence, 
direction and operation of the enterprise." (West Hartford at 536.) 
The Connecticut court also looked to the history and custom 
of the industry in collective bargaining and to the policies 
underlying the Teacher Negotiation Act. The court took notice of the 
fact that of the ninety-six teacher contracts negotiated in 
Connecticut, sixty-one had class size provisions. The court also 
noted that the Act divested the boards of education of some of the 
discretion they would normally have in an effort to eliminate any 
"need for resort to illegal and disruptive tactics." ( Id at 536.) 
Using this three pronged analysis, the court stated that, 
"There can be no doubt that policy questions are involved •••• but that 
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cannot be decisive in the present case •••• Class size and teacher load 
chiefly define the amount of work expected of a teacher, a 
traditional indicator of whether an item is a condition of 
employment." (Id. at 537.) 
There are two important aspects of this decision when applied 
to the Illinois situation. The first is that the Connecticut statute 
does not have the equivalent of the employer's rights section of the 
Illinois Act. The second is that the Connecticut court engaged in a 
kind of balancing test. This is quite different than the "primary 
relations" test enunciated by the IELRB in Berkeley and applied in 
Community Unit School Dist. No. 4. 
Nevada 
The Nevada statute requires every government employer to 
negotiate concerning "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment." NRS 288.150(1). However, this obligation is limited by 
subparagraph 2 of that section: 
"2. Each local government employer is entitled, without 
negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from 
negotiation: 
(a) To direct its employees; 
(b) To hire, promote, classify, transfer, assign, 
retain, suspend, demote, discharge or take disciplinary 
action against any employee; 
(c) To relieve any employee from duty because of lack 
of work or for any other legitimate reason; 
(d) To maintain the efficiency of its governmental 
operations; 
( e) To determine the methods, means and personnel by 
which its operations are to be conducted; and 
(f) To take whatever actions may be necessary to carry 
out its responsibilities in situations of emergency. 
The interpretation of this statute as it concerns the 
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negotiability of class size is found in the case of Clark County 
School District v. Local Government Employee Management Relations 
Board...!. 90 Nev. 442, 520 P.2d 114 (1974). This case consolidated two 
-
separate actions where the court was called upon to determine the 
negotiability of several items including class size. In the 
decision, the court upheld the standard enunciated by the Employment 
Management Relations Board, "that the government employer be required 
to negotiate if a particular item is found to significantly relate to 
wages, hours and working conditions even though the item is also 
related to management prerogative." (Id. at 117.) Using that 
analysis, the court found that because class size had a significant 
impact on working conditions, it was a subject of mandatory 
bargaining. 
There is one very important aspect of this case when applying 
it to the Illinois situation. The test applied in Nevada is the 
significant relationship test which is a much easier test for 
employee groups to satisfy than the primary relations test adopted by 
the IELRB. 
Florida 
The Florida statute requires school boards to negotiate over 
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. F.S.A. Section 
447.309(1). However, this obligation is modified by F.S.A. Section 
447. 209 which allows public employers to unilaterally set "standards 
of service to be offered to the public." 
The application of this statute to the negotiability of class 
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size is found in Hillsborough Classroom Teachers Association v. 
School Board of Hillsborough County, 423 So.2d 965 (1982). In that 
case, the court found that class size was not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. However, the impact of a decision regarding class size 
will be a subject of mandatory bargaining after the employee group 
makes a showing of negotiable impact. The basis of that decision was 
the belief that class size was a matter of educational policy and 
thus was within the term "standards of service to be offered to the 
public" and to be unilaterally set by the public employer. 
There are two important aspects of this case when applying it 
to the Illinois situation. The first is that the Florida court's 
conclusion that class size was an educational policy decision is in 
agreement with the other state courts that have considered this 
question. The second important aspect is that the limiting factor in 
Florida, standards of service to be offered to the public, is 
different than the limiting factor in Illinois which is the 
management rights found in Section 4. 
Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin statute, found at W.S.A. Section lll.70(l)(d) 
requires the parties to meet and confer with respect to wages, hours, 
and conditions of employment. The case applying this statute to the 
negotiability of class size is City of Beloit, discussed in the 
section of this chapter dealing with the negotiability of teacher 
evaluations. 
The court began its discussion of the general scope of 
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negotiability by offering an evaluation based on class size: 
The difficulty encountered in interpreting and applying 
Sec. lll.70(1)(d), is that many subject areas relate to 
"wages, hours and conditions of employment," but not 
only to such area of concern. Many such subjects also 
have a relatedness to matters of educational policy and 
school management and operation. What then is the 
result if a matter involving wages, hours and 
conditions of employment" also relates to educational 
policy or school administration? An illustration is the 
matter of classroom size, subsequently discussed. The 
number of pupils in a classroom has an obvious 
relatedness to a "condition of employment" for the 
teacher in such classroom. But the question of optimum 
classroom size can also be a matter of educational 
policy. And if a demand for lowered classroom size were 
to require the construction of a new school building for 
the reduced-in-size classes, relatedness to management 
and direction of the school system is obvious. Would 
such required result of a new building not be a matter 
on which groups involved, beyond school board and 
teachers' association, are entitled to have their say 
and input? (City of Beloit at 235,6.) 
Thus, the Wisconsin court acknowledged the difficulty of 
separating the issues when educational policies are related to the 
subjects of mandatory bargaining and explicitly used class size as 
the perfect kind of example of this conflict. 
After establishing the primary relations test, discussed at 
page 24 of this work, the court addressed the issue of negotiability 
of class size at pages 240 & 241 of its opinion. The teacher's 
association proposal regarding class size read as follows: 
Because the pupil-teacher ratio is an important aspect 
of an effective educational program, the Board agrees 
that class size should be lowered wherever possible to 
meet the optimum standards of one (1) to twenty-five 
( 25). Exceptions may be allowed in traditional large 
group instruction or experimental classes, where the 
Association has agreed in writing to exceed this 
standard. (Footnote 35 at 240.) 
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The court conceded that class size had an impact on 
conditions of employment but adopted the language of the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission's memorandum which stated: 
size of a class is a matter of basic educational policy 
because there is a very strong evidence that the 
student-teacher ratio is a determinant of educational 
quality. Therefore, decisions on class size are 
permissive and not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
(Footnote 36 at 241.) 
Therefore, the application of the primary relations test 
resulted in a finding that although there was an impact of the 
decision on the working conditions, the decisions concerning class 
size were purely managerial and not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
However, the court did find that the impact of that decision 
was mandatorily bargainable because if the class was larger, there 
would be more papers to grade, more preparation would be required, 
there would be a greater likelihood of discipline problems, and there 
would be more work projects to be supervised. (Id. at 241.) 
Illinois 
Apart from the exchange between Senators Bruce and Buzbee on 
November 2, 1983, quoted on page 32, there is no mention in the 
legislative history of the negotiability of class size. Therefore, 
it is likely that the IELRB will look to other jurisdictions with 
similar statutes for guidance in applying the IELRA to this question. 
The IELRB will not find the Connecticut decision persuasive 
for four reasons. The first reason is that when the Connecticut 
court looked to its legislative history, it found that the scope of 
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bargaining was to be relatively broad. This is in direct contrast to 
the Berkeley decision which found a narrow scope of bargaining 
reflected in the Illinois legislative history. 
The second reason is that there is no management rights 
provision in the Connecticut statute. The very presence of such a 
provision in the Illinois statute sets it apart from Connecticut. 
The third reason is that the Connecticut court looked to the 
history and custom of the industry when considering the question and 
found it persuasive that nearly two-thirds of the Connecticut school 
districts had class size provisions. There is nothing in the 
Illinois statute or in the IELRB decisions to indicate that the IELRB 
will look to custom and history of the industry if it can find 
guidance in the statute and in the legislative history. 
The fourth reason is that the Connecticut court relied on a 
balancing test rather than the type of primary relations test adopted 
by the IELRB. Because the weight accorded each factor was different 
than it might be in Illinois (according such difference to the habit 
and custom of the industry) the result was very likely different than 
it would be in Illinois even if the balancing test was used. In 
addition, the primary relations test is very different than the 
balancing test. 
The IELRB will not find the Nevada decision persuasive for 
two very important reasons. The first, as noted above, is that the 
Nevada court used the significant relations test. That standard is 
much easier to satisfy because all that must be demonstrated is that 
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there is a significant relationship between the topic and the 
conditions of employment. However, the test adopted by the IELRB 
requires that there must be a primary relationship between the topic 
and the conditions of employment. 
The second reason for the IELRB's unwillingness to follow the 
Nevada court is to be found in the legislative history of the IELRA. 
As noted earlier, the management rights provision was added to the 
IELRA by the Governor's amendatory veto and is essentially the 
management rights provision found in the IPLRA. That management 
rights provision was added to the IPLRA through an amendment by 
Senator Greiman. However, before that amendment was adopted the 
House rejected a management rights provision by Representative Davis. 
That amendment read: 
Public employers should not be required to bargain over 
matters of inherent managerial policy, which should 
include, but shall not be limited to, such areas of 
discretion or policy as the functions and programs of 
the employer, the standards of services, the overall 
budget, the utilization of technology, and the 
organizational structure, and selection, and direction 
of personnel. 83rd Gen. Assem. House Debates on S.B. 
536, p279 (June 23, 1983). 
This language is very similar to the management rights provisions in 
Nevada. The Nevada statute, found at NEV. REV. STAT. Sec. 288.150(2) 
reads: 
Each local government employer is entitled without 
negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from 
negotiation: (a) to direct its employees; (b) hire, 
promote, classify, transfer, assign, retain, suspend, 
demote, discharge, or take disciplinary action against 
any employee; (c) to relieve any employee from duty 
because of lack of work or for any other legitimate 
reason; (d) to maintain the efficiency of its 
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governmental operation; (e) to determine the methods, 
means and personnel by which the operations are to be 
conducted; and {f) to take whatever actions may be 
necessary to carry out its responsibilities in 
situations of emergency. 
The Illinois legislature had opportunity, then, to consider a 
provision that would have allowed the IELRB and the courts to look to 
Nevada for precedent and chose to reject it. By doing this, it can 
be inferred that the legislature intended to provide stricter 
guidelines than that afforded the administrative agency and judiciary 
in Nevada. The legislature's decision to use the clause it did and 
to qualify the exceptions by the use of the word directly reflects a 
desire to construe the scope narrowly and to take some options out of 
the hands of the judiciary. 
The IELRB may look to the Florida court for confirmation that 
class size is indeed a matter of educational policy, a conclusion 
that is shared by the other state courts that have considered this 
question. However, the management rights provision of the IELRA is 
even a stronger argument for determining class size to be a 
non-mandatory topic of bargaining than the standard of services 
relied upon by the Florida court as in the question concerning the 
negotiability of teacher evaluations, the IELRB is most likely to 
look to the Wisconsin court, if any, for guidance in the question at 
hand. Because class size is so clearly related to educational 
policy, the IELRB will find it as a matter of inherent managerial 
policy if the employer defends its position on that basis. The only 
way that class size might be viewed as a subject of mandatory 
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bargaining is if, as suggested in Community Unit School District No. 
!!_, it is clearly evident that the district's decisions are prompted 
only by a desire to save labor costs. A school district wishing to 
retain the right to make class size decisions as a matter of inherent 
managerial policy must argue that it needs the flexibility to do so 
in order to adequately meet the educational needs of its students. 
CURRICULUM 
Curriculum is likely to be another subject that teacher 
organizations would prefer to see classified as a mandatory subject 
of bargaining while school boards would see it as a matter of 
inherent managerial policy. Teacher organizations might argue that 
curriculum is similar to the tools used by craftsman and thus a 
condition of employment. On the other hand, schoo: districts might 
look to Section 4 of the IELRA and argue that curriculum falls under 
the rubric of "standards of service." 
Curriculum certainly is an area of educational policy. The 
question is whether its impact on working conditions is great enough 
to meet any of the four tests discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. Using any of the four tests, only one state was found that 
established that curriculum was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
A state using the minimal relations test is Pennsylvania. In 
State College Ed. Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 306 
A. 2d 404 (1973), the court held that curriculum was a matter of 
inherent managerial policy within the ambit of Pennsylvania's 
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management rights clause. This is the easiest test to satisfy and 
curriculum was still believed to a matter of inherent managerial 
policy. 
A state using the significant relations test is Nevada. In 
Clark County School District v. Local Government Employee Management 
Relations Board, the court held that there was a significant 
relationship between the amount, type, quality and availability of 
instructional supplies and the working conditions of teachers. 
Therefore, curriculum was held to be a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. However, the management rights clause of Nevada's 
statute is significantly different than that of Illinois. The 
Illinois legislature had considered and rejected a clause like that 
of the Nevada statute. 
A state utilizing the primary relations test is Wisconsin. 
In City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the 
court held that a school reading program related primarily to basic 
educational policy and was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. In 
the court's words: 
"It is clear that the Association's proposal on 
'reading' relates primarily to basic educational policy, 
and therefore concerns a matter subject to permissive, 
but not mandatory bargaining. The need for such a 
program is essentially a determination of whether the 
District should direct itself toward certain educational 
goals." (City of Beloit at 242, Footnote 39.) 
A state using the balancing test is Oregon. In Springfield 
Education Association v. Springfield School District No. 19, the 
court held that where matters to a large extent involve questions of 
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educational policy, those matters are not mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. Because curriculum was found to involve educational 
policy to a greater extent than it involved working conditions, the 
court held that curriculum was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
In support of this finding, the court looked at rulings of a number 
of other states: 
Labor relations boards and courts in other jurisdictions 
have reached similar conclusions. Dunellen Bd. of Ed. 
v. Dunellen Ed. Assn., 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973) 
(class size, curriculum, transfers, work assignments 
held not mandatory bargaining subjects); School Dist. of 
Seward, 188 Neb. 722, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (class size, 
work schedules and transfers held not mandatory 
subjects); Burlington Cty. Col. Fae. Assoc. v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 31l A.2d 733 (1973) (the school 
calendar held not a mandatory subject); Aberdeen Ed. 
Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Ed., S.D., 215 N.W.2d 837 
(1974) (class size and the availability of materials and 
supplies held not mandatory bargaining subjects). 
(Springfield Education Association at 650.) 
There is a Michigan case that must be discussed as well 
because of the contrast it has with Nevada. Like Nevada, Michigan 
applies the significant relations test. However, in doing so, 
Michigan came up with the opposite result that Nevada reached. 
The case that applied the test in dealing with the issue of 
curriculum is West Ottawa Education Association v. West Ottawa Public 
Schools Board of Education, 334 N.W. 2d 533 (Mich. App. 1983). In 
this case, the school board had decided to quit offering a Dutch 
dance class. The teacher's organization filed a complaint charging 
that the decision was a change in working conditions and therefore a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Michigan court articulated the 
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test to be applied in this fashion: 
Various tests have been employed to determine whether a 
subject is a "term and condition of employment", and, 
therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. This 
Court has developed a standard which incorporates· 
several of these tests. Any matter which has a material 
or significant impact upon wages, hours, or other 
conditions of employment or which settles an aspect of 
the relationship between employer and employee is a 
mandatory subject, except for management decisions which 
are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate 
enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon 
employment security. (West Ottawa at 542.) 
After enunciating that test, the court looked to the Supreme 
Court's decision in First National Maintenance. In that decision, 
The Supreme Court decided that absent an anti-union animus, a 
business was not required to negotiate a partial closing of a 
business for economic reasons. The Michigan court analogized the 
decision to drop a class offering to the partial closing of a 
business and found that: 
We conclude that the board was not required to bargain 
over its initial decision to drop the Dutch dance 
program. The decision was made solely because of school 
budget cuts. The decision related to the board's right 
to determine curriculum. West Ottawa at 543. 
Illinois and the negotiability of curriculum 
The prevailing weight of states have held that curriculum is 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although Illinois is not 
bound by any of those state decisions the IELRB will certainly be 
aware of them and may look to them for guidance. 
The state that uses the test most similar to the one 
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articulated by the IELRB in Berkeley, Wisconsin, has held that issues 
of curriculum are not mandatory subject of bargaining. It should be 
expected that the IELRB will look first to Section 4 of the IELRA and 
determine that curriculum would fall under the category "standards of 
service. Applying the primary relations test, the IELRB will find, 
if it follows the weight of opinion, that issues of curriculum are 
not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
TEACHER TRANSFERS 
Another concern of teacher organizations is the negotiability 
of teacher transfers. Teacher transfers means the transfer of 
teachers between buildings and/or a change of subject assignments. 
In light of building closings and termination of teaching positions, 
teacher organizations can be expected to argue that a transfer to 
another building or a change in teaching assignment is a change in 
working conditions and thus a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
School boards will look to Section 4 of the IELRA and argue that 
teacher transfers fall within the scope of "organizational structure" 
and "direction of employees." It should be assumed that the IELRB 
will use the primary relations test established in the Berkeley 
decision. 
The weight of authority is that teacher tr.ansfers are not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. Springfield Education Association, 
Dunellen Board of Education, School District of Seward. The only 
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case discovered that found teacher transfers to be a subject of 
mandatory bargaining was the Nevada case of Clark County School 
District discussed earlier in the chapter. 
One case deserves special mention because of the wording of 
its statute and its clear analysis of the issue. That case, 
Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special 
School District No. l, 258 N.W. 2d 802 (1977), deals with a situation 
where the teachers' organization sought a declaratory judgment on the 
question of whether the school district's teacher transfer procedures 
were subject to mandatory negotiations. 
The wording of Minnesota's employer rights is very similar to 
the language contained in the Illinois statute. The Minnesota 
statute, found at Minn. St. 179.66 provides in pertinent part: 
"Subdivision l. A public employer is not required to 
meet and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial 
policy, which include, but are not limited to, such 
areas of discretion or policy as the functions and 
programs of the employer, its overall budget, 
utilization of technology, the organizational structure 
and selection and direction and number of personnel. 
For purposes of the question at hand, the only difference 
between the two statutes is that Illinois' statute refers to the 
selection of new employees and direction of employees while 
Minnesota's statute refers to the "selection, direction and number of 
personnel." 
Relying upon that phrase in the statute, the Minnesota court 
held that the decision to transfer a number of teachers was a 
managerial decision and not a subject for negotiation: 
86 
Minn. St. 179.66 outlines in very broad terms what 
managerial policy shall be. Thus, under the phrase 
"selection and direction and number of personnel," the 
question is what scope is to be given the word 
"direction." If the entire section is read, however, it 
seems ~lear the legislature intends the board shall have 
direction over the broad educational objectives of the 
entire district. There is no doubt the decision to 
transfer a number of teachers is a managerial decision. 
The criteria for determining which teachers are to be 
transferred, however, involves a decision which directly 
affects a teacher's welfare and enters into a field 
which we hold is in fact negotiable. (Id at 806) 
Therefore, although the decision to transfer was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, the adoption of criteria by which 
individual teachers may be identified for transfer was found to be a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Illinois will probably adopt the prevailing view and find 
that teacher transfers are not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Nevada's decision is not likely to be persuasive because it applied a 
different test than that adopted in Illinois and because of the 
difference in the language of the statute discussed under the section 
dealing with class size. 
In addition, the IELRB is compelled to look at the language 
of the statute before considering even legislative history. The 
language of Section 4 appears to be clearly applicable to this issue. 
School closings and resultant transfers appear to be included within 
the term "organizational structure" and the term "direction of 
employees" would apply to the transfer of teachers for any other 
reason and to changes of subject teaching assignments. 
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CONCLUSION 
Determining the scope of bargaining under the IELRA will be a 
difficult task because of the potential conflict presented by the 
strongly worded employer rights section. The legislative history 
clearly indicates that the purpose of that section was to provide 
notice to the judiciary that the scope of bargaining was not to be 
extended beyond traditional norms. The legislative history also 
makes it clear that the unique nature of the educational employer was 
one of the reasons that the employer rights section was included. 
The two IELRB decisions dealing with this issue to date have 
recognized this legislative intent and have adopted the primary 
relations test as a means of determining whether particular issues 
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
The IELRB will consider each issue on a case by case basis 
and will carefully consider the individual facts of each case before 
making its determination. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with unfair labor practices under the 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA). The chapter will 
first provide a general consideration of unfair labor practices under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and then a general 
consideration of unfair labor practices under the IELRA. Both of 
those discussions will include consideration of six specific 
questions regarding unfair labor practices: 1. Is an illegal strike 
an unfair labor practice under the IELRA? 2. Can employees file 
charges of unfair labor practices? 3. Who is to prosecute an unfair 
labor practice charge under the IELRA? 4. Does a breach of the duty 
of fair representation constitute an unfair labor practice under the 
IELRA? s. Is recognitional picketing an unfair labor practice under 
the IELRA? 
IELRA? 
6. What is the standard of the burden of proof under the 
National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA recognizes that both the employer and the employee 
have legitimate rights. (NLRA Section l(b)) The rights of the 
employees are listed in Section 7: 
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to 
refrain from any or all such activities except to the 
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in section 
8(a)(3). 
However, it is worth noting that although the NLRA clearly recognizes 
that there are legitimate employer rights it does not explicitly list 
them. 
One of the stated purposes of the statute is to "provide 
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by 
either (the employee or the employer) with the legitimate rights of 
the other. (NLRA Section l(b)) Those means of prevention are listed 
in Sections 10 and 11. 
Another of the stated purposes of the statutes is to "define 
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which 
affect commerce and are critical to the general welfare." (NLRA 
Section l(b)) Those practices, known as unfair labor practices, are 
found in Section 8. This section does list specific unfair labor 
practices for both the employer and the employee organizations. 
Section 8(a) lists the unfair labor practices for the 
employer: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer --
( l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization or contribute 
90 
financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject 
to rules and regulations made and published by the Board 
pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be 
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him 
during working hours without loss of time or pay; 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in 
any other statute of the United States, shall preclude 
an employer from making an agreement with a labor 
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted 
by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an 
unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of 
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth 
day following the beginning of such employment or the 
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the 
later, (i) if such labor organization is the 
representative of the employees as provided in section 
9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit 
covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless 
following an election held as provided in section 9(e) 
within one year preceding the effective date of such 
agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least 
a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such 
election have voted to rescind the authority of such 
labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided 
further, That no employer shall justify any 
discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in 
a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds 
for believing that such membership was not available to 
the employee on the same terms and conditions generally 
applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable 
grounds for believing that membership was denied or 
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the 
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation 
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership; 
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony 
under this Act; 
(S) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees, subject to the 
provisions of section 9(a). 
The application of the statute has resulted in the following 
acts being defined as unfair labor practices by the NLRB: 
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Failure to re-employ striking employees. Western 
Cartridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
c.c.A.7, 139 F.2d 855, 858. Refusal of employer to 
reinstate union members who were evicted from plant 
unless members would withdraw from union. National 
Labor Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136 
F.2d 585, 590, 592, 596. Refusal of employer to bargain 
collectively in good faith. National Labor Relations 
Board v Griswold Mfg. co., c.c.A.3, 106 F.2d 713, 724; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Somerset Shoe Co., 
C.C.A.l, 111 F.2d 681, 688, 689. Threats by employer to 
close if union gained a foothold in plant. National 
Labor Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136 
F.2d 585, 590, 592, 596. Anti-union statements made by 
employer's supervisory employees during and after 
strike, together with statement to one of the strikers 
that he would never get a job in that town anymore. 
N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., C.C.A.7, 149 F.2d 987, 
992, 996. Refusal of employer to permit posting of a 
notice that employer would not discriminate against 
employees who wished to join union. National Labor 
Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136 F.2d 
585, 590, 592, 596. Discharge of am employee because of 
membership in or activity on behalf of a labor 
organization. National Labor Relations Board v. Newark 
Morning Ledger, C.C.A.3, 120 F.2d 262, 268; National 
Labor Relations Board v. Bank of America Trust & Savings 
Ass'n, C.C.i\.9, 130 F.2d 624, 628, 629. Employer's 
interference with and his dominating formation and 
administration of new labor organization. National 
Labor Relations Board v. Swift & Co., C.C.A.8, 116 F.2d 
143, 145, 146; National Labor Relations Board v. 
Blossom Products Corporation, C.C.A.3, 121 F.2d 260, 
262; National Labor Relations Board v. Stackpole Carbon 
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employer which had refused to bargain with union which 
had been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent. 
National Labor Relations Board v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 
C.C.A.3, 134 F.2d 553, 558. Assault by persons employed 
by manufacturer upon union organizers or sympathizers. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co., 
c.c.A.6, 114 F.2d 905, 911, 915. Discharge of employee 
because he would not become member of union in 
accordance with closed shop agreement. Virginia 
Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
C.C.A.4, 132 F.2d 390, 396. (Black's 1979) 
It is clear from this brief list that the NLRB has taken a broad view 
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of what constitutes an unfair labor practice on the part of an 
employer. 
Section 8(b) of the NLRA lists the unfair labor practices for 
employee organizations. Because of the nature of labor disputes in 
the private sector, not all of the provisions of Section 8(b) are 
pertinent to this discussion. However, the pertinent provisions make 
it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or 
coerce employees in their Section 7 rights, to cause or attempt to 
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee with regard to 
hiring, tenure of employment, or conditions of employment or to 
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer. It is also an unfair 
labor practice to picket or cause to be picketed an employer, or 
threaten that action where an object of the picketing is to force the 
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of his employees. 
The application of the statute has resulted in the following 
employee acts being defined as unfair labor practices by the NLRB: 
an employee walkout protesting failure to transfer a supervisor, 
Communication Workers Local 2250, a strike to force the employer to 
concede on a subject which is not a term or condition of employment, 
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., striking to induce 
alteration of contract terms without complying with the notice and 
cooling off provisions of Section 8(d), Local 113, United Elect. 
Workers v. NLRB, 1955, striking in violation of a no strike clause in 
the contract, NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., "wildcat" strikes, NLRB v. 
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Draper, engaging in violence, assault, and trespass, NLRB v. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Corp., an employee protest which is timed so as to 
create a risk of injury to the employer's plant or equipment, NLRB v. 
Wheeler Car Wheel Co., blatant disloyalty, insubordination, or 
disobedience, NLRB v. !BEW Local 1229, false accusations against the 
employer, Atlantic Towing Co. v. NLRB, and intermittent work 
stoppages or slowdowns, NLRB v. Montgomery Ward and Co •• 
Clearly, employee groups may be found guilty of committing 
unfair labor practices. However, the scope of practices found to be 
unfair by employees is narrower than the scope of unfair labor 
practices by employers. It is of passing interest to note that the 
courts have been willing to broaden the scope of unfair labor 
practices for employees much more than the NLRB has been willing to. 
Illegal Strikes 
Illegal strikes are not unfair labor practices under the 
NLRA. However, participants in unprotected strikes are not protected 
from being discharged as a result of their participation. 
Filing of an Unfair Labor Practice Charge by an Employee 
The NLRA is silent as to whether an individual may file 
charges. However, the NLRB regulations allow charges to be filed by 
any person. The NLRB and its agents, however, are not empowered to 
institute charges. The charges are usually filed by the employee or 
a representative from his union if the employer is the charged party 
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and by the employer or his representative if the union is the charged 
party. 
After the complaint is made, an investigation is conducted to 
determine if a complaint and notice of hearing should be issued. The 
NLRB is given the power to investigate and issue a complaint in 
section 10 of the NLRA. 
Responsibility to.Prosecute an Unfair Labor Practice Charge 
If a complaint and notice of hearing is issued, the 
respondent is given the opportunity to file an answer. The hearing 
is conducted in a trial-like setting before an Administrative Law 
Judge. As far as practicable, the federal rules of evidence are 
applied in this hearing. (NLRA Section lO(b)) 
At the hearing, the charging party is represented by an 
attorney from the office of the General Counsel for the NLRB. 
Therefore, once a complaint and notice of hearing has been issued, it 
is the responsibility of the NLRB to prosecute the charge. In fact, 
the charging party is not even required to be present at the hearing. 
(Gorman, 1976) 
A Breach of the Dutf of Fair Representation a~ an Unfair Labor 
Practice 
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that if a majority of the 
employees in an appropriate unit select a representative for 
bargaining purposes, then that representative becomes the exclusive 
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representative for all the employees in that unit for the purpose of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment or other conditions of employment. 
Because the majority representative has the power to speak 
for all the employees, it has been established that it has a 
corresponding duty to make a good faith representation of the 
interests of all the employees within the unit. This duty was first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in dictum in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB. 
In 1962, the NLRB declared that it was an unfair labor 
practice on the part of the union to fail in that duty. The case in 
which that declaration was made was NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.. In 
that case, an employee began an extended leave three days early and 
the union requested that the employer drop the employee to the bottom 
of the seniority list. A synopsis of that case is provided in 
Meltzer: 
The duty of fair representation is a corollary of the 
representative's exclusivity under Section 9(a) and is 
incorporated into Section 7. A bargaining agent's 
breach of that duty, regardless of whether it was 
influenced by an employee's union activities, violates 
Section 7 and Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. 
Furthermore, a bargaining representative's attempt to 
secure employer participation or acquiescence in such a 
violation constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(2), 
and resultant arbitrary employer action is derivatively 
a violation of Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3). (Meltzer, 
1977, p.920)). 
Recognitional Picketing as an Unfair Labor Practice 
Recognition picketing is construed as picketing by a union 
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with the object of forcing the employer to recognize that union. 
This should be distinguished from organizational picketing which is 
directed at employees with the intent of persuading the employees 
that they should affiliate with a particular union. This 
distinction, relatively clear on its face, becomes very difficult to 
interpret in practice. There is an element of both types of 
picketing in situations where the picketing union is not recognized 
as the exclusive representative. 
This difficulty is reflected in the legislative history of 
Section 8(b). (Gorman, 1976, pages 220-223) Congress attempted to 
clarify the situation by adding Section 8(b)(7) in 1959. That 
section outlaws recognition picket or organizational picketing if: 1) 
the employer has already lawfully recognized another union and there 
is not a question of representation under 9(c); 2) a valid 
representation election has taken place in the preceding twelve 
months and; 3) picketing is taking place without a valid 
representation election petition being filed within a reasonable 
period of time. 
The statute clearly prohibits pure recognition picketing. 
However, picketing with the elements of organizational purpose as 
well as recognition are prohibited if it falls within any of the 
three categories discussed above. 
The Standard of the Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof refers to the duty of affirmatively 
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proving a fact or facts in dispute. That burden always belongs to 
the charging party in an unfair labor practice charge. The standard 
refers to the required level of belief that a trier of fact must 
have. 
Section lO(c) of the NLRA states clearly that the standard 
for the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. That 
standard is defined as "Evidence which is of greater weight or more 
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it." 
(Black's, 1979) 
Unfair.Labor Practices.Under the iELRA 
The listing of unfair labor practices under the IELRA is 
contained in Section 14. Like the NLRA, the IELRA names practices 
that are unfair for both the employer and employee organizations. 
The listing of unfair labor practices for employers is found in 
Section 14(a): 
Educational employers, their agents or representatives 
are prohibited from: 
(1) Interfering, restraining or coercing employees in 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed under this Act. 
(2) Dominating or interfering with the formation, 
existence or administration of any employee 
organization. 
(3) Discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any employee 
organization. 
(4) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an 
employee because he or she has signed or filed an 
affidavit, authorization card, petition or complaint or 
given any information or testimony under this Act. 
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with 
an employee representative which is the exclusive 
representative of employees in an appropriate unit, 
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including but not limited to the discussing of 
grievances with the exclusive representative; provided, 
however, that if an alleged unfair labor practice 
involves, interpretation or application of the terms of 
a collective bargaining agreement and said agreement 
contains a grievance and arbitration procedure, the 
Board may defer the resolution of such dispute to the 
grievance and arbitration procedure contained in said 
agreement. 
(6) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement 
to writing and signing such agreement. 
( 7) Violating any of the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Board regulating the conduct of 
representation elections. 
(8) Refusing to comply with the provisions of a binding 
arbitration award. 
Much of the language in Section l(a) is similar to that found in the 
NLRA, especially subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5). The section 
does not directly address any of the questions posed at the beginning 
of the chapter. 
The unfair labor practices by employee organizations are 
listed in Section 14(b): 
Employee organizations, their agents or representatives 
or educational employees are prohibited from: 
(1) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed under this Act. 
(2) Restraining or coercing an educational employer in 
the selection of his representative for the purposes of 
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. 
(3) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with 
an educational employer, if they have been designated in 
accordance with an provisions of this Act as the 
exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate 
unit. 
( 4) Violating any of the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Board regulating the conduct of 
representation elections. 
(5) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement 
to writing and signing such agreement. 
(6) Refusing to comply with the provisions of a binding 
arbitration award. 
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This language is similar to that found in the NLRA, especially 
subsections (2) and (3). 
The procedure for handling charges of unfair labor practice 
charges is found in Section 15. The section provides that a charge 
may be filed with the IELRB by an employer, an individual or a labor 
organization. The IELRB is then supposed to investigate the charges 
and, if it states an issue of law or fact, the IELRB is to issue a 
complaint and notice of hearing. There is to be at least five days 
notice given to the parties. At the hearing, the charging party may 
present evidence in support of the charges and the responding party 
may file an answer to the charges and present evidence in defense 
against the charges. 
The section also gives the IELRB the power to issue subpoenas 
and administer oaths. 
If the IELRB finds that the charged party has committed an 
unfair labor practice it is empowered to issue an order requiring the 
party to stop the unfair practice and may require additional 
affirmative action. A charge of an unfair labor practice must be 
filed within six months of the alleged violation or the IELRB may not 
take action on the charge. If the IELRB finds that the charged party 
did not commit an unfair labor practice the IELRB must make findings 
of fact and dismiss the charge. 
Section 15 also grants the IELRB broad powers to petition the 
circuit court of the county in which the violation occurred or where 
the charged party resides or transacts business, to enforce an order 
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and for other relief. 
The actual mechanics of the processing of unfair labor 
charges are found in Section 1120.20-1120.50 of the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relation Rules and Regulations. 'llle charge is to 
be made on a form provided by the IELRB. The form requires the 
names, addresses and affiliations of both the charging party and the 
respondent, a statement of the facts supporting the charge, and a 
statement of the relief sought.' The complaint must be made within 
six months of the alleged unfair labor practice. 
'llle IELRB has empowered its Executive Director to investigate 
charges and issue complaints. He, in turn, has empowered the Hearing 
Officers of the IELRB to issue complaints, make investigations of the 
charges and to recommend to him whether a complaint should be issued 
or dismissed. The test that determines whether the complaint should 
be issued was established in the IELRB's full board decision of Lake 
Zurich School District 95: 
" •••• in order to support the issuance of complaint and 
to set the charge for hearing, the investigation must 
disclose adequate credible statements, facts, or 
documents which, if substantiated and not rebutted in a 
hearing, would constitute sufficient evidence to support 
a finding of a violation of the Act." (Lake Zurich 
School District 95, 1 PERI 1031.) 
If a complaint is issued the responding party has 15 days in 
which to file an answer. The answer must include a specific 
admission, denial or explanation of each allegation of the complaint. 
If the respondent does not have sufficient knowledge to make that 
response the respondent must state that this is the case and the 
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statement will operate as a denial. The answer must also contain a 
specific, detailed statement of any affirmative defenses. A failure 
to file a timely answer will be considered as an admission of the 
material facts alleged in the complaint and the right to a hearing 
will be waived. If the respondent fails to answer any part of the 
complaint that part of the allegation will be considered to have been 
admitted. 
The actual hearing will be conducted in front of a Hearing 
Officer. Interested persons wishing to intervene in the hearing may 
direct a request to the Hearing Officer who has the discretion to 
grant or deny the request. The Hearing Officer is to consider the 
timeliness of the request, the degree to which the person requesting 
the intervention has a real interest at stake and the ability of the 
parties to represent the interest of the person making the request. 
Section 1120.40( c) encourages Hearing Officers to schedule 
voluntary prehearing conferences with the parties if such conferences 
might narrow or resolve the issues. 
It is the responsibility of the Hearing Officer to make a 
full inquiry into all the matters that are in dispute. After the 
record is closed either party may move the removal of the case to the 
full IELRB. The Hearing Officer is to rule on such motions within 10 
days after the close of the record. The Hearing Officer may also 
order the case removed on his own motion. If the case is not 
removed, the Hearing Officer is obligated to file and serve a 
recommended decision on both parties as promptly as possible. 
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After a recommended decision has been served the parties have 
15 days in which to file exceptions. The parties may file briefs in 
support of those exceptions. If the exceptions are not filed within 
15 days the exceptions will be considered as waived. 
The full IELRB will review the recommended decision upon 
request by either party. It may also review the recommendation on 
its own motion. The full IELRB may adopt all, part, or none of the 
recommended decision. 
If cases are removed to the full IELRB the parties are 
required to file briefs. The IELRB has the power to direct the 
manner in which the briefs are to be presented. Oral argument is not 
a right of the parties but may be allowed at the discretion of the 
IELRB. 
The IELRB has determined a wide range of actions to be unfair 
labor practices. Some practices were particularly flagrant and it 
should be expected that they would be deemed to be unfair. Others 
are more mundane but still deserve mention because they reflect the 
approach taken by the IELRB. 
One of the more flagrant examples is the case of Board of 
Education School District No. 1, 2 PERI 1029. In that case, the 
district's administration and school board were charged with several 
violations. 
The district terminated the employment of three employees at 
the end of the 1983-84 school year. One of the teachers, Tamara 
Worchester, was warned early in the 1983-84 school year by a board 
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member to "watch out for the older teachers and that union." (2 PERI 
l029, p.68) Worchester ignored the warning and joined the union. In 
March of 1984, during her second evaluation, her principal told her 
that she was doing a fine job but there was a problem about rehiring 
her "because of the way the Board felt about the union." (Id. at 
p.68) 
1he second teacher, William Wrate, was asked by his principal 
to be president of the PTA for the 1983-84 school year. At that 
point Wrate was not a member of the union because of his belief that 
there was disparate treatment of union and non-union teachers. (Id. 
at p.68) Wrate agreed to serve as president of the PTA and later 
joined the union. After Wrate stated his position on a controversial 
board policy matter in December 1983, his principal allegedly told 
Wrate that if he had known that Wrate was going to join the union 
that Wrate would never have been asked to become PTA president. 
Three months after this conversation Wrate received a letter of 
termination. 
The third employee, Katherine Evans, was a school nurse. She 
was very active in union affairs. She had participated in the 
organizational process, picketed during contract negotiations and had 
served as an unofficial courier for union literature. Her employment 
was terminated in March and her position was eliminated. 
The IELRB determined that each of the dismissals was in 
response to protected activity and thus a violation. The IELRB also 
found that the school district committed unfair labor practices when: 
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l) A school board member met with the union president and proposed 
that if she would resign her position and use her influence to get 
other teachers to resign from the union, the school board member 
would use his influence to help her get the teaching position she had 
requested for the coming year. 2) The school district conditioned 
wage increases for the teachers upon the local unit's willingness to 
bargain directly with the District and not rely upon the State 
affiliate. 3) The school district refused to offer wage increases 
during the negotiations. 4) Principals questioned prospective 
employees about their union sympathies and recommended against union 
membership. 5) The school district only agreed to meet once for 
negotiations during a six month period. 
As a remedy to the violations, the IELRB issued a cease and 
desist order, required the posting of notices of the findings in all 
the school buildings, required the mailing of the notice to all the 
employees, and ordered the reinstatement of Worchester, Wrate, and 
Evans. Titis variety of remedial actions is an example of the powers 
that may be exercised by the IELRB under Section 15, discussed 
earlier. 
Another example of an unfair labor practice is found in Oak 
Lawn Community High School District No. 218, 2 PERI 1014. The IELRB 
found that it was an unfair practice for a school district to 
continue to deduct dues on behalf of the incumbent union when 
employees had made a proper and timely request that the dues 
deductions be redirected to a rival union. 
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The IELRB also found an unfair labor practice when a school 
district discharged a part time librarian after she had assisted in 
the organizational campaign for a union and initiated negotiations 
for a collective bargaining agreement. The factual pattern leading 
to that determination is found in Balyki Community School District 
No. 125, 2 PERI 1047. 
Judith Hilst, the librarian, was a member of the Illinois 
Education Association and the National Education Association at the 
time she was hired in 1973. She became president of the local in the 
late 1970's. At that time, the local was not recognized by the 
school district. 
In October, 1983, the local sought recognition. 'nle school 
district refused to grant voluntary recognition and the local then 
filed a recognition petition. The local was certified as the 
exclusive representative of all certified full-time and part-time 
teachers, excluding all administrative employees on December 20, 
1984. 
Hilst began preparation for negotiations in January, 1985. 
She surveyed the membership and requested financial information from 
the school district. In early March, she notified the Superintendent 
that the union was about to present its demands for collective 
bargaining. On March 13, 1985 the Superintendent informed her that 
she was not going to be recommended for re-employment. The school 
board accepted the Superintendent's recommendation and formally 
dismissed Hilst effective May 25, 1985. 
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The basis of Hilst' s complaint was that the discharge was a 
discriminatory discharge and thus a violation under Section 14(a) of 
the IELRA. The test applied by the IELRB for establishing a prima 
facie case of discriminatory discharge was a three- prong test. It 
required that the evidence show: 1) That Hilst engaged in activity 
protected under Section 3 of the IELRA; 2) that the school district 
was aware of the activity; and 3) that Hilst was discharged for that 
activity. 
The IELRB found that Hilst had engaged in activities 
protected under Section 3, (organizing activities and presenting a 
demand to bargain) , and that she had maintained a very vocal and 
highly visible role in those activities. Furthermore, the school 
district knew of those activities by their own admission and by 
obvious inference. Finally, the discharge followed so closely on the 
heels of the protected activity that the IELRB construed the 
discharge as motivated by Hilst' s union activity. Because Hilst had 
established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the 
burden of proof shifted to the school district to demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge was for legitimate 
reasons. 
The school district argued that the discharge was because of 
unsatisfactory work by Hilst. However, the IELRB found that the 
behavior complained of, maintaining a cluttered library that was not 
conducive to study and failure to promptly complete Title IV program 
forms, had been tolerated for eleven years and no at tempt to 
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remediate had been made during that time period. Furthermore, before 
the successful organizational campaign, the superintendent had asked 
Hilst if she might be interested in a full time job as a librarian 
for the coming year. Because of those actions, the IELRB determined 
that the school district failed to meet its burden of proof and that 
the district was guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 
14(a)(l) and 14(a)(3). 
The case is significant not only because of its finding that 
the district was guilty of an unfair labor practice but also because 
of the articulation of the three-prong test to be applied in 
discriminatory discharge cases. 
The case of Chicago Board of Education, 2 PERI 1089 is 
significant because it provides an exception to the six month filing 
requirement imposed by Section 15. In this case, the employee did 
not know that the employer had refused to comply with a grievance 
arbitration award until eleven months after the school district had 
made the refusal. The employee filed the complaint six weeks after 
the letter of repudiation was received. The IELRB held that the 
complaint was timely because the statute of limitations period was 
tolled when knowledge was imputed to wronged party, not when award 
was issued. 
Another representative example of employer unfair labor 
practices is found in Goreville Districts Nos. 18 & 71, 1 PERI 1108. 
In this case, the union had filed a complaint alleging that the 
school district had altered the work load of teachers in violation of 
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the contractual agreement and had threatened reprisals unless the 
union dropped the complaint. The school district failed to answer 
the charge of an unfair labor practice until after the response date 
bad passed and then failed to present good cause for its failure to 
make a timely response. 'llle IELRB held that the failure on the part 
of the school district constituted an admission on the part of the 
school district. The case is significant because it indicates the 
IELRB's resolve to enforce the timely response provision of Section 
15· 
In Heyworth School District No. 3, 1 PERI 1069, the IELRB 
found that the unilateral change of the high school starting time, 
the unilateral addition of fifteen minutes to the teacher work day, 
and the unilateral requirement of ·teacher attendance at monthly 
meetings were all unfair labor practices by the school district. 
The IELRB has been less willing to find unions guilty of 
unfair labor practices. 'llle IELRB did not issue any findings of 
unfair labor practices by union in 1984 or 1985. In 1986, the IELRB 
did find one instance of where a union technically committed an 
unfair labor practice. That instance, reported in Catlin Unit 
District No. 5, 2 PERI 1023, involved a situation where the union 
failed to post a notice concerning fair share dues in violation of 
Section 1125.20 of the IELRB Emergency Rules. Although this was a 
technical violation, the IELRB found that there was no showing of 
prejudice because the non-union employees received adequate notice 
through receipt of the negotiated contract and the union's 
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enforcement of the contract. 
IELRB dismissed the complaint. 
Because there was no prejudice, the 
It is also instructive to be aware of actions that the IELRB 
has determined are not unfair labor practices. One such action was 
complained of in Maine ToWnship High School District No. 167, 2 PERI 
1034·. In that case, the IEA filed an unfair labor practice charge 
against the school district as a result of the district's action 
during a representation election. The IEA contended that the school 
district timed an announcement of increased salaries and benefits to 
precede the election when the announcement would usually have 
followed the election, that the school district granted materially 
greater benefits than had been granted in previous years, that the 
school district publicized the increases in a more extensive fashion 
than in previous years, and that the school district met with 
employees to solicit grievances in an attempt to resolve them before 
the election. 
The IELRB dismissed the charges except for the contention 
that the school district had timed the announcement of the wages and 
benefit increases with the intent of affecting the representation 
election. The IELRB found that the increases were not materially 
greater than those of previous years. The publicity was accurate and 
not untoward. Because of these facts, the pre-election announcement 
did not constitute an unlawful conferral of benefits. 
The case is significant because it recognizes the right of 
school districts to carry on business in a normal manner without the 
110 
fear of being found guilty of an unfair labor practice as long as the 
district does not deviate from past practices or act in any manner 
inconsistent with its normal procedures. 
City Colleges of Chicago 11108, Case No. 86-CA-0021-C, is 
another significant case. In this case, Melvin Malone, a training 
specialist with City Colleges, filed a complaint alleging violations 
of Section 14(1) and (3). He had been dismissed from employment. 
The stated reason for his dismissal was a lack of work. 
The basis of Malone's complaint was that he was discharged in 
retaliation for his complaints about the inadequate cleaning of his 
classroom and the frequent transfers that he experienced. However, 
there was no evidence that he was engaged in concerted or protected 
activities when he complained. (City Colleges, p.2) On that basis, 
the Hearing Officer recommended that the 14(a)(l) charge be 
dismissed. In considering the Section 14(a)(3) charge, the Hearing 
Officer noted that although it was illegal for an employer to 
discriminate in regard to the hire or tenure of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization, the 
IELRA does not proscribe all types of employment discrimination. On 
that basis, the Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of the 14(1)(3) 
charges as well. 
The significance of this case is that the IELRB recognized 
that there is not recourse for every perceived wrong and that unfair 
labor practices are only those practices proscribed under the IELRA. 
The procedures and sanctions available under the IELRA are only 
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available when the provisions of the IELRA are violated. 
East St. Louis School District No. 189, Case No. 84-CA-OOSl-S 
deals with the standards a labor organization must meet if it is to 
attain successor status under the IELRA. In this case, the school 
district had refused to recognize a union as successor union on the 
basis that more than de minimis changes had occurred. The union that 
had been the exclusive representative filed unfair labor practices 
alleging violations of Section 14(a)(l), (2), (3), and (S). The 
IELRB upheld the dismissal of all the charges and provided a lengthy 
explanation of why the 14(a)(S) charges did not meet the Lake Zurich 
standard. 
Local 2S3 had been the recognized union. The SEIU ordered 
that Local 2S3 be consolidated and merged with Local SO. Local SO 
simultaneously imposed the following changes: 
1. Former Local 2S3 became a division of Local SO. 
2. Division 2S3 was governed by the constitution and 
by-laws of Local SO. 
3. Local SO assumed indebtedness incurred by former 
Local 2S3 including legal expenses, Illinois 
property tax and sewage bills. 
4. The structure of elected of fices at the local level 
was changed to reflect control by Local SO. The 
former offices of local president, vice-president, 
recording secretary (treasurer) and business 
representative became division chairperson, 
vice-chairperson, secretary and board members. 
s. Local SO' s existing officers were given authority 
over the day-to-day operations of Division 2S3. 
6. Additionally, Local SO appointed a full-time 
business representative to meet with the Employer 
to administer the contract on behalf of Division 
2S3's employees. p.3 
The IELRB first considered whether the union had attained the 
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status of exclusive representative under the IELRA and could invoke 
sanctions under Section 14(a)(5) of the IELRA. 
The IELRB applied the test found in Triton College, 2 PERI 
1013· That test states that a surviving union after a merger will 
attain successor status if the change involves nothing more than a de 
minimis change in name and structure. In this context, the IELRB has 
defined de minimis as "a modification in name or structure which does 
not result, directly or indirectly, in more than a minimal change in 
the focus of authority or control over either the internal affairs of 
the organization or its external relationship to the Employer in 
collective bargaining matters." (East St, Louis, p.2.) Using that 
test, the IELRB determined that the changes imposed were significant 
changes and that Local 50 did not qualify as a successor union. 
The most significant change imposed was that Local 50 
appointed the collective bargaining agent for Division 253 rather 
than allowing Division 253 to select its own agent. That fact, 
coupled with the other five imposed changes, convinced the IELRB that 
there was more than a de minimis modification of status. 
The union also argued that its status as exclusive 
representative was determined by a federal court in a prior consent 
judgment. That action had been brought to keep former oificers of 
Local 253 from interfering with the operation of Local 253 as a 
division of Local 50. That action had been settled by a consent 
judgment which acknowledged the status of Local 50 as the controlling 
body. However, the IELRB found that the consent judgment dealt with 
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internal matters rather than recognition status, so the judgment was 
not binding on the IELRB. 
The case is significant for two reasons. The first is the 
IELRB's unequivocal statement that the federal court proceeding does 
not "deal disposively with recognition under our statute." (Id., 
p.5) 
The second important proposition this case stands for is that 
representation must be sought and won before an employer is bound to 
deal with a union if the union has changed in a significant way since 
it gained recognition. 
Another case where no unfair labor practice was found is 
Carbondale Community High School District No. 165. In that case the 
school district decided to subcontract its custodial and maintenance 
services. The union, Service Employees International Local union 
#316, charged that the school district violated Sections 14(a)(l) and 
(5) of the IELRA. The IELRB, reversing the recommended decision of 
the Hearing Officer, dismissed the charges. 
The school district had recognized the SEIU as the exclusive 
representative of its custodial and maintenance employees for many 
years and entered into successive labor agreements with SEIU on 
behalf of those employees. 
The fact pattern leading to the school district's decision to 
sub-contract began in the fall of 1983. At that time, the district 
became aware of a deficit in revenues of $177, 000 for 1983 and an 
anticipated deficit of approximately $100, 000 for 1984. The school 
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district had budget deficits for the two previous years as well. As 
a result, the district began to look for more ways to reduce costs. 
At that point, the district and the union were beginning the last 
year of their collective bargaining agreement. 
In February, 1984, the Board of Education directed the school 
district administration to look into the possibility of 
subcontracting custodial and maintenance services as a way of 
reducing costs. They directed the district's business manager, 
Donald Yost, to gather information regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of subcontracting for cleaning services. 
At the end of March, 1984, Yost reported to the Board of 
Education that the school district could save approximately $27,000 
by subcontracting its custodial and maintenance services. At the 
same time, Yost informed the business agent of the union, Elmer 
Brandhorst, that the Board of Education was exploring the possibility 
of subcontracting the work. 
On May 17, 1984, the Board of Education directed the school 
district administration to seek bids on the custodial work so they 
could see whether the estimated cost savings could actually be 
achieved. It is not clear from the facts when the bid specifications 
were released to prospective bidders but Yost sent Brandhorst a copy 
of the bid specifications on June 4, 1984. 
The bids were opened on June 11, 1984. The low bidder was 
City Wide Maintenance with a bid of $109,000. It had cost the school 
district $243,000 for the same services by its own employees in the 
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1983-84 school year. 
On June 14, 1984, Yost sent Brandhorst a letter informing him 
that the school district was seriously considering the possibility of 
subcontracting the custodial services for economic reasons. The 
letter invited SEIU to bargain over the matter as soon as possible. 
The school district and the union met for the first 
negotiating session on June 18, 1984. Representatives for the school 
district noted the potential savings of the district if the work were 
subcontracted. They urged the union representatives to make a 
proposal in light of City Wide's bid and also expressed a willingness 
to discuss effects bargaining if no agreement was reached. 
On June 27, 1984, another session was held. At that meeting 
Brandhorst asked for additional information about the ~ype of 
proposal desired by the school district and also asked for more time 
to make a proposal. The district representative explained that the 
union should make a proposal competitive with City Wide' s bid and 
that the only factor concerning the district was cost. The district 
agreed to give more time to the union for preparation of the proposal 
and affirmed that the district was willing to consider and discuss 
proposals make by the union. 
Yost called Brandhorst several times between June 27 and July 
18. Brandhorst testified that the purpose of the calls was to 
suggest ways that the union might craft a proposal that would be 
acceptable to the school district. 
The next negotiating session was on July 18, 1984. The union 
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presented a proposal providing the same services as proposed by City 
Wide, but at a cost of $157,525. The Board of Education immediately 
considered and rejected the proposal. 
On July 24, 1984, Yost informed Brandhorst that the union's 
proposal had been rejected and set a follow-up meeting for July 26. 
At the July 26 meeting the district informed the union that the 
proposal was rejected because it was too costly. Brandhorst 
presented a joint letter for Yost to sign, requesting mediation from 
the Department of Labor. Yost signed the letter and it was submitted 
to the Department of Labor. 
A mediation session was held on August 14, 1984. At that 
meeting the SEIU informed the school district that the $157 ,000 
proposal was the last offer. Brandhorst also informed the school 
district that, unlike the City Wide bid, the SEIU proposal would not 
include a guarantee about the quality of work. The school district 
responded that the City Wide bid of $109,000 was its proposal. At 
the conclusion of the session Brandhorst declared that the 
negotiations were at an impasse •. 
The School Board, at its regular meeting on August 22, 
accepted City Wide's bid and terminated the custodial and maintenance 
employees. 
The school district and SEIU began "effects bargaining" on 
August 24. Both sides presented proposals on items such as severance 
pay, retraining programs and preference for hiring for SEIU employees 
by City Wide. After another session on August 28, a proposal was 
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presented to the union membership. The proposal was unanimously 
rejected and there was no further attempt by either party to bargain 
about the decision or the effects. 
The IELRB took careful notice of all these facts when 
reaching its decision. It affirmed the finding of the Hearing 
Officer that the decision to subcontract is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. (Id. at 11) However, the IELRB determined that the 
school district had in fact bargained in good faith about the topic. 
The IELRB began its analysis by stating that in a 
subcontracting context, good faith bargaining means "the employer 
must give notice to the union, meet with the union, provide 
information necessary to the union's understanding of the problem, 
and consider, in good faith, any proposals that the union advances." 
(Id. at 11, 12) 
In the opinion of the IELRB, the school district had met 
those requirements. The school district provided notice to the union 
that it was considering the possibility before it actually sought the 
information. The district met with the union as frequently as the 
union wished and the district provided any information sought by the 
union. In fact, Brandhorst acknowledged in his testimony that Yost 
had provided good faith suggestions for ways in which the union might 
prepare a proposal that would be acceptable to the district. In a 
footnote, the IELRB found it important that there was an economic 
reason for the district's decision and that there was an absence of 
bad faith: 
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It is significant to our decision that the Hearing 
Officer found that the District did not take its actions 
to undermine the union or to discourage union 
membership, but rather acted solely for economic 
reasons. Also, there was no evidence of any collusion 
between the District and City Wide to "low ball" the bid 
to oust the union. (Id. at 13, fn. 11) 
The case is significant in two ways. First, it clearly 
establishes that an employer must follow certain procedures if it 
wishes to consider subcontracting work that has been performed by 
members of a recognized bargaining unit. The employer must give 
notice to the union that it is considering the possibility, meet with 
the union to discuss the possibility, provide information necessary 
to the union's understanding of the problem, and, in good faith, 
consider any proposals by the union. 
The second important result of this case is the IELRB's 
recognition of the right of the employer to seek bids in this type of 
situation. The IELRB acknowledged that "it was a legitimate means of 
determining whether its beliefs or estimates about the outcome of 
subcontracting were founded in fact or merely speculative" (Id. at 
14) This case allows a school district to seek bids and then to 
place the bid of its choice on the bargaining table as a proposal. 
One final example of conduct that was not considered an 
unfair labor practice is found in Crystal Lake Community High School 
District 155, 2 PERI 1073. In that case the school district filed an 
unfair labor charge against the union because the union designated a 
department chair to sit as a representative on the union's bargaining 
team. This was in violation of a contractual agreement between the 
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union and the district which prohibited department chairs from 
participating on the collective bargaining team. The Hearing Officer 
dismissed the charge because the alleged conduct did not violate any 
terms of the IELRA. 
The case is significant because it makes it clear that 
parties may not use the offices of the IELRB to seek redress for just 
any grievance. The conduct complained of must violate some provision 
of the IELRA before a party can use remedies afforded by the statute. 
Illegai· Strikes as Unfair Labor Practices.Under the IELRA 
Section 13 of the IELRA lists five prerequisites for a legal 
strike by educational employees. The five requirements are: 1. That 
the employees be represented by an exclusive bargaining agent, 2. 
That mediation be used without success, 3. That a five day notice be 
given, 4. 1bat the collective bargaining agreement, if one exists, 
be expired, and 5. That the parties have not jointly submitted any 
unresolved issues to arbitration. All five of the requirements must 
be met or the strike is illegal. 
There are two situations where the first requirement might be 
violated. The first is a "wildcat" strike, a strike when employees 
strike without the authorization of their union. In that situation 
the strike would be conducted by some party other than a labor union 
so the IELRB would not have jurisdiction. 
unfair labor charges can be filed. 
The second situation is when 
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Without jurisdiction no 
a union engages in 
organizational or recognitional picketing. That situation will be 
discussed under a separate subheading. 
The statute clearly requires the parties to engage in 
mediation. Refusal to participate in mediation would be a refusal to 
bargain in good faith. This would be a violation of Section 14(a)(5) 
by the employer and a violation of Section 14(b)(3) by the union. An 
outright refusal to comply with clearly stated requirements of the 
statute presents a prima facie case of an unfair labor practice. 
The basic purpose of the five day notice requirement is to 
allow the IELRB to ensure that a good faith attempt at mediation has 
occurred and a failure to provide that notice presents another prima 
facia case of a failure to bargain in good faith. 
A strike when a collective bargaining agreement exists 
presents a situation where there is both a contractual violation and 
a violation of the statutory requirements. Section lO(c) requires 
all contracts to have a no strike clause so every legal contract will 
have one. Under Crystal Lake, discussed supra, an intertwining of 
the facts will not necessarily make a contractual violation an unfair 
labor practice. However, an intertwining of legal issues will result 
in the IELRB having jurisdiction over the dispute as an unfair labor 
practice. 
However, Section 10 of the statute also requires the contract 
to include binding arbitration of disputes concerning the 
administration or interpretation of the contract. This reflects a 
policy consideration in the drafting of the statute. The policy is 
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to assure students and educational employers that the educational 
process will not be disrupted while there is an enforceable contract 
in existence. 
Therefore, it is likely that the courts will allow 
educational employees to seek an injunction pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 13(3) and the employer will not be forced to 
pursue its remedy through the administrative process. 
Violation of the final provision will result in an analysis 
similar to the one just described. The requirement of interest 
arbitration is another one of the trade-offs for the no strike 
provision. A violation of this implicit agreement should result in 
the employer being given access to the process leading to injunctive 
relief. 
Filing of an Unfair Labor Charge by an Employee 
The original wording of the statute did not address the 
question of whether an individual employee could file an unfair labor 
charge. In the Board of Governors of State Colleges and 
Universities, 1 PERI 1175, the IELRB dismissed the charges filed by 
an individual. The charge had been filed pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 1120. 20 of the Rules and Regulations which authorized 
individuals to file unfair labor charges. 
The legislature recognized the problem caused by the 
statute's failure to address the question and amended Section 14 of 
the statute to expressly authorize an individual to file unfair labor 
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practice charges. This amendment was effective on July 1, 1985. 
Responsibility to.Prosecute an Unfair Labor Practice Charge 
Section 15 of the IELRA provides that the charging party may, 
at the hearing, present evidence in support of the charges. Section 
1100. 60 of the Rules and Regulations provides that parties may be 
represented by counsel or any other representative of their choosing. 
The inference to be made from the statute and regulation, therefore, 
is that the charging party has the responsibility to prosecute the 
charges. 
Indeed, that is the official position of the IELRB. Robert 
Perkovich, the Executive Director of the IELRB wrote a brief article 
entitled "Practice and Procedure Before the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Board." In that article, he stated unequivocally 
that "the Board does ~ prosecute the unfair labor charge, but 
rather the charging party is required to appear on its own behalf or 
through a duly designated representative and must prosecute the 
claim." (Ferkovich, p. 5) 
A Breach of the.Duty of Fair •epreseniaticin ~s ~n Unf~ir tabor 
Practice 
Section 14 (b)(l) prohibits an employee organization from restraining 
or coercing an employee in the exercise of his rights under the 
statute. The statute does not address the question of whether a 
violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor 
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practice. The IELRB has not conclusively answered that question but 
the indications are that the answer would be affirmative. 
'llte IELRB first faced the question in Custodial & Maintenance 
Employees Organization of District 59, 1 PERI 1107. In that case an 
employee charged the union with violation of Section 14(b) (1) for 
failure to submit a grievance to arbitration. The IELRB dismissed 
the charge for failure to raise an issue of law or fact sufficient to 
warrant a however, in the concluding portion of the opinion, the 
IELRB addressed the issue of whether a breach of the duty of fair 
representation is an unfair labor practice: 
The issue whether there is a duty of fair representation 
under the Act is one of first impression. It cannot be 
ignored that a number of various jurisdictions, both in 
the private and public sector, have found such a duty 
arising out of statutory language similar, if not 
identical, to that contained in Section 3, Section 8 and 
Section 14(b)(l) of the Act in which certain statutory 
rights are granted to the educational employees and 
their exclusive bargaining representative. See e.g.s. 
Steele v. Louisville and Nashville and Nashville 
Railroad, 323 U. s. 192, 15 LRRM 708 (1944); Vaca v. 
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 LRRM 2369(1967); Miranda Fuel 
Co., 140 NLRB 181, 51 LRRM 1584 (1962); Kaufman v. 
"GOI'dberg, 64 Misc. 2d 524, 315 N.Y.s. 2d 35 (1970); 
Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124 (1975); Teamsters 
Local 45 v. Montana, 110 LRRM 2012 (Mont. 1981); 
Kaczmarek v. N.J Turnpike Authority, 99 LRRM 2159 (N.J. 
1978). 
The IELRB then assumed, arguendo, that such a duty did exist 
and went on to dismiss the charge because there was no apparent 
breach of the assumed duty. 
Recognitional Picketing as· an Unfair Labor Practice 
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The IELRA does not have a provision prohibiting recognitional 
or organizational picketing. An examination of the legislative 
record reveals that the legislature was well aware of the existence 
of this kind of picketing in the private sector but did not believe 
that it would occur in public education labor relations. 
SENATOR SANGMEISTER: 
Where are we on the ••• I'm not exactly what you call it 
but •• but I think there are such things as, you know, 
fights between labor unions aon representation strikes 
and picketing and that kind of stuff. Is there any 
pro hi bit ion? Its my understanding that the National 
Labor Relations Act prohibits those kind of strikes or 
picketing where there's union fights. Is there anything 
in this bill to prevent that or go along with the 
National Labor Relations Board regulation, or law, or 
rule? 
PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR SAVICKAS) 
Senator Bruce 
SENATOR BRUCE: 
Recognition strikes are becoming a thing of the ••• the 
past and certainly is not a big item in the area of ••• of 
collective bargaining. This bill, in fact, 
would ••• would ••• would remove any necessity for a 
recognition strike, because the procedure sets forth an 
election procedure and it would be an unfair labor 
practice if the employer did not recognize the 
bargaining unit. So, I can ••• I can see no reason why 
there would ever be a recognition strike, you'd just 
submit names to the Educational Labor Relations Board 
and they shall conduct an election. So, there would 
never be a need for a recognition strike." 
(Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 23 June 27, 1982) 
However, it is not impossible that such action might occur. 
If it does, employees might have to stand to file charges of unfair 
labor practices against the union for restraining or coercing them in 
the exercise of their statutory rights. 
It is also possible that the employer might file unfair labor 
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practice charges alleging violations of Section 14(b)(2). That 
section prohibits employee organizations from restraining or coercing 
an educational employer in the selection of the exclusive 
representative of the employees. 
Before a complaint could be issued, the investigation by the 
IELRB must disclose "adequate credible statements, facts or 
documents, which, if substantiated and not rebutted in a hearing, 
would constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding of a 
violation of the Act." (Lake Zurich) After the charge was issued, 
the charging party would have to prove a violation by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
Based upon the IELRB seeming unwillingness to find a union 
guilty of unfair labor practices (no violations have been found) it 
is unlikely that a violation would be found unless the union's 
actions were particularly egregious. 
The Standard-of' tile :Burden of Proof 
The statute does not make a declaration about the standard of 
the burden of proof in unfair labor practice proceedings. However, 
Section llOS.190 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations 
Rules and Regulations provides that all the hearings shall be 
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applied in the 
courts of Illinois pertaining to civil actions. Under those rules, a 
charging party must prove his charge by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
A preponderance of the evidence is the standard specifically 
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required by the IPLRA and the NLRA. 
applied this standard as well. 
cc>iici\islons 
The IELRB has consistently 
There are three conclusions to be drawn about unfair labor 
practices under the IELRA. The first is that the determination of 
whether an action is an unfair labor practice will be made on a case 
by case basis. The particular fact pattern leading to the charges 
will be considered individually by the IELRB before a decision is 
rendered. Therefore, it is difficult to absolutely define a 
particular practice as unfair unless all the facts are known. 
The second general conclusion is that the IELRA. is unclear 
regarding the mechanics for processing unfair labor charges. The 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Rules and Regulations attempt to 
clarify the process. However, there is certain to be controversy 
about whether the statute enables the IELRB to develop regulations as 
comprehensive as they developed. 
The third general conclusion is that, to date, unions are 
less likely than employers to be found guilty of unfair labor 
practices. That likelihood may be a function of the number of 
changes filed rather than being reflective of a posture by the IELRB. 
As more charges are filed and processed it will become easier to 





The question of unit determination, who will be included in a 
bargaining unit, is of great interest to both unions and employers. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the guidelines developed 
by the NLRB in response to questions dealing with unit determination. 
The statutory scheme of the IELRA and the significant cases issued by 
the IELRB in this area will then be presented and analyzed. The 
discussion of unit determination under the Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Act (IELRA) will include answers to the following 
questions: 
I. Will department chairmen be considered part of the 
professional unit? 
2. Will academic deans be considered part of the professional 
unit? 
3. Will student deans be considered part of the professional 
unit? 
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides the basic scheme for unit 
determination: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes 
of collective bargaining by the majority ( 50%+1) of the 
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall 
be the exclusive representatives of all employees in 
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such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any 
individual employee or a group of employees shall have 
the rights at any time to present grievances to their 
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without 
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as 
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the 
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement 
then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining 
representative has been given opportunity to be present 
at such adjustment. (NLRA, Section 9(a)) 
There are two particularly significant words in that section. 
The first is "majority." This binds all the members of the unit, 
whether the minority of the membership agrees or not. The provision 
that individuals have the right to seek redress of their grievances 
is an attempt to protect the rights of the minority. 
The second is the word "appropriate." The statute does not 
say rt must be the most appropriate, simply that it must be a unit 
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining. The NLRB has 
adopted this approach to avoid the excessive entanglement and 
conflict that would result if it had to determine the most 
appropriate unit. 
Gorman notes that in the history of bargaining in the private 
sector, the jurisdiction of the NLRB to make decisions determining 
units is at the heart of our system of collective bargaining and has 
the most pervasive impact on our industrial system. (Gorman, p. 67.) 
He lists several reasons for this importance. 
First, a large unit will be more difficult for a union to 
organize. The union must demonstrate a showing of interest before an 
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election can be held and that is more difficult in a large unit. 
Second, the larger the unit the more diverse interests within 
the unit. Those diverse interests give rise to more internal 
conflict and make it more difficult for the union to adequately 
represent the interests of all the members. 
Third, if there are several small units it is more likely 
that the employer will face the threat of several work stoppages over 
the course of time rather than facing only one every two or three 
years. It is also more expensive for the employer to be involved in 
several sets of bargaining cycles and negotiation sessions. 
Fourth, large units carry the threat of such major work 
stoppages that production might be completely halted. For that 
reason, some employers may prefer smaller units because that could 
allow them to shift work between units. 
Fifth, if there are a number of smaller units there may be 
juridictional disputes and other forms of rivalry that disrupt the 
production process. 
All of these examples illustrate the important role of unit 
determination in the private sector. 
The NLRA does not give very specific guidelines to assist the 
NLRB in determining what positions should be included in the unit. 
Section 9(b) simply directs the NLRB "to assure to the employees the 
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." In 
an effort to satisfy this statutory requirement, the NLRB has 
developed an approach which seeks to create units which have a 
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coilllllunity of interest. 
Gorman has identified twelve factors which the NLRB considers 
when determining if a community of interest exists: 
1. Similarity in the scale and manner of determining 
earnings; 
2. Similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and 
other terms and conditions of employment; 
3. Similarity in the kind of work performed; 
4. Similarity in the qualifications, skills and training of 
the employees; 
5. Frequency of contact or interchange among the employees; 
6. Geographic proximity; 
7. Continuity or integration of production processes; 
8. Common supervision and determination of labor-relations 
policy; 
9. Relationship to the administrative organization of the 
employer; 
10. History of collective bargaining; 
11. Desires of the affected employees; 
12. Extent of union organization. 
(Gorman p.69) 
Although the NLRB has a great deal of freedom in determining 
what constitutes an appropriate unit, there are some limitations on 
that freedom. Section 9(b) prohibits the inclusion of professional 
employees in a unit with non-professional employees unless a majority 
of the professional employees vote for inclusion in a separate 
representation election. The section also prohibits the inclusion of 
guards in a unit with non-guards and sets up some limitation on 
severance elections involving workers involved with the crafts. 
The NLRA also requires that certain individuals not be 
included in a bargaining unit as they are excluded from coverage by 
the statute. Section (3) specifically excludes supervisors from 
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coverage. Section 2(11) provides the statutory definition of 
supervisor: 
( 11 )The term "supervisor" means any individual having 
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, 
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or 
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their 
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if 
in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, 
but requires the use of independent judgment. 
In NLRB v. Textron, the Supreme Court extended the exclusion 
to "managerial" employee, defined as those who formulate and 
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the 
decisions of their employer. In the landmark case of NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University, the Supreme Court applied this test and found that the 
university faculty members were managerial employees by virtue of the 
fact that they participated in the making and implementation of 
decisions through their participation in the faculty senate and 
committee structure. 
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 
confidential employees who assisted and acted in a confidential 
capacity to persons exercising managerial functions in labor 
relations matters were also excluded. 
However, probationary and regular part-time emploeyes are not 
excluded under the NLRA. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co. 
An awareness of the exclusions and guidelines found under the 
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NLRA is reflected in the legislative history and final wording of the 
IELRA· However, there is also an awareness of the unique nature of 
the relationship between public education employers and employees. 
Section 7 of the IELRA provides the basic statutory framework 
for unit determination under the IELRA. The prefatory statement of 
Section 7 gives the IELRB the right to adminster the recognition of 
bargaining representatives of employee school districts, public 
community colleges, state colleges and universities, and any state 
agency whose major function is providing educational services. This 
power is limited by the provision that the IELRB must make certain: 
That each bargaining unit contains employees with an 
identifiable community of interest and that no unit 
includes both professional employees and nonprofessional 
employees unless a majority of employees in each group 
vote for inclusion in the unit. (IELRA, Section 7) 
It is of particular interest to note that the drafters of the 
IELRA made the community of interest a statutory requirement and that 
it requires a majority vote of both the professional employees and 
the non-professional employees before they can be included in the 
same unit. 
It is also of interest, that unlike the private sector 
setting, there is a trend among unions representing educational 
employees to seek a wall- to- wall bargaining unit. The reason for 
this difference is the historical lack of co-operation between 
different groups of educational employees when one of the groups was 
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involved in labor disputes. That lack of co-operation was due in 
part to the fact that relatively few of the non-professional 
employees were unionized and so subject to employer discipline if 
they did not cross picket lines. It is the apparent intent of the 
major unions representing educational families to seek to represent 
the "educational family." 
Section 7(a) provides the parameters for the decision making 
process of the IELRB: 
(a) In determining the appropriateness of a unit, the 
Board shall decide in each case, in order to ensure 
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights 
guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the 
purpose of collective bargaining, based upon but not 
limited to such factors as historical pattern of 
recognition, community of interest, including employee 
skills and functions, degree of functional integration, 
interchangeability and contact among employees, common 
supervision, wages, hours and other working conditions 
of the employees involved, and the desires of the 
employees. Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or 
negate the current representation rights or patterns and 
practices of employee organizations which have 
historically represented employees for the purposes of 
collective bargaining, including but not limited to the 
· negotiations of wages, hours and working conditions, 
resolutions of employees' grievances, or resulution of 
jurisdictional disputes, or the establishment and 
maintenance of prevailing wage rates, unless a majority 
of the employees so represented experesses a contrary 
desire under the procedures set forth in this Act. This 
Section, however, does not prohibit multi-unit 
bargaining. Notwithstanding the above factors, where 
the majority of public employees of a craft so decide, 
the Board shall designate such craft as a unit 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
It is significant to note that the statute uses the definite 
article "the" when referring to "appropriate unit." Arguably, this 
would require the IELRB to select the most appropriate unit. 
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It is also of significance that although the statute lists 
factors which are to be considered when making the decision, the 
statute also makes it clear that the list is not necessarily 
exhaustive. 
Sections 7(b) and (c) provide the process for recognition of 
representatives by the employer and for recognition by election. 
Neither of these processes will be discussed since the focus of the 
chapter is on how the IELRB will analyze questions of unit 
detennination. 
Exclusions From Bargaining Units 
Section 3 ~xtends the right to organize to educational 
employees. 
employee: 
Section 2(b) provides a definition of educational 
"Educational employee" or "employee" means any 
individual, excluding supervisors, managerial, 
confidential, short term employees, student, and 
part-time academic employees of community colleges 
employed full or part time by an educational employer, 
but shall not include elected officials and appointees 
of the Governor with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. For the purposes of this Act, part-time 
academic employees of community colleges shali be 
defined as those employees' who provide less than 6 
credit hours of instruction per academic semester. 
(IELRA, Section 2(b)) 
Unlike the NLRA, the IELRA provides a statutory exclusion for 
managerial, confidential and part-time employees. 
To date, most of the controversy in interpreting the 
exclusions has revolved around the questions of who will be 
considered supervisors, managerial employees, and confidential 
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employees. 
Section 2(g) provides the statutory definition of supervisor: 
(g) "Supervisor" means any individual having authority 
in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or 
discipline other employees within the appropriate 
bargaining unit and adjust their grievances, or to 
effectively recommend such action if the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature but requires the use of independent judgment. 
The term "supervisor' includes only those individuals 
who devote a preponderance of their employement time to 
such exercising authority. 
In the original version of the statute, the supervisory 
exclusion was the only statutory exclusion. That exclusion was not 
nearly as explicit, the definition only provided that "No employee or 
group of employees shall be deemed to be a supervisor because the 
employee or group of employees participates in decisions with respect 
to course, curriculum, personnel, or other matters of educational 
policy." (H.B. 1530, as enrolled, Section 2(9).) 
This provision was obviously intended to negate the 
application of Yeshiva to public school employees. The language was 
changed to its present form by the governor's amendatory veto. 
(Governor's Amendatory Veto, pp. 2-3) The change was an attempt, in 
his words, "to create a workable and fair system that balances the 
rights of educational employees with the unique managerial problems 
that beset educational employers and the taxpayers who ultimately pay 
the bill." (Id. at p. 2) 
The effect of the change was that now the IELRB was to apply 
a percentage of time test. If an individual devotes a preponderance 
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of her time to exercising supervisory authority, she is to be 
considered a supervisor. In order to understand the legislative 
intent of the meaning of the definition, it is necessary to look at 
the House debates on the IPLRA. The language was taken directly from 
the IPLRA and at the time the language was debated, the IPLRA 
provided for coverage of educational employees. The following 
exchange took place during the floor debates: 
Representative Hoffman: 
"I'm chairman of a social studies department at a small 
suburban high school where I spen ••• 40% of my time in 
the classroom and then ••• 10% of the time ••• with the 
responsibility as the chairman of the department or, to 
translate it into total percentage, I guess it would be 
80% and 20%. And that's fairly typical of the 
supervisors or the department chairmen in our high 
school. Would this language prohibit the department 
chairmen in the high school where I teach from 
organizing their own bargaining unit?" 
Representative Grieman: 




"Then you could not under this Bill ••• ( S )upervisors, 
unless they are presently in a supervisory unit, cannot 
organize in supervisory units after this Bill." 
Representative Hoffman: 
"But since a preponderance of my time is not spent in 
supervision, I would be required to become part of the 
teachers bargaining unit. Is that correct?" 
Representative crleman: 
"I guess if you' re a teacher, you' re a teacher. You 
would not have been a supervisor before either. 
83rd Gen. Assem. House Debate on S.B. 536.pp.287-88 
(June 24, 1983). 
The debates on the House floor reflect a general intent that 
department chairs should not be considered supervisors unless they 
could meet the preponderance of time test. The Senate debates that 
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took place after the amendatory veto made the intent even more 
explicit: 
Senator Davidson: 
Question of the sponsor. 
President: 
Indicates he will yield, Senator Davidson. 
Senator Davidson: 
Senator Bruce, when you were asked earlier about 
supervisor, and you said it would depend on 
the ••• preponderance of employement time. The question I 
have, would that include a department chairperson in 
that title? 
Presiding Officer: (Senator Demuzio) 
Senator Bruce. 
Senator Bruce: 
Senator Davidson, it would be my feeling since that we 
were talking about determination by actual function and 
not title, and since we're talking about whether a 
person has the right to hire, fire and effectvely 
recommend a ••• an individual, that under NLRA rules, 
requlations and prior court decisions, I don't believe 
that department chairs in either K through twelve or 
community colleges would ••• would be considered 
supervisors; they rarely could be, and I think that if 
they were to have spent a preponderance of their 
employment time, as it was defined by the Governor in 
this amandatory veto, they could be, but I don't believe 
that they ••• that they do. The Yeshiva decision which 
dealt with New York seemed to say that they would be, 
but it is clear under Illinois law and the proceedings 
here that that is an entire different situation. They 
do not have the input in its administrative or 
managerial decisions which the Supreme Court found 
determinative in that case. 
83rd. Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 
61, 62 (Nov. 2, 1983). 
It is clear from this exchange that it was the legislative 
intent that department chairmen should rarely, if ever, be considered 
as supervisors. 
Section 2(0) provides the statutory definition of managerial 
employee: 
"Managerial employee" means an individual who is engaged 
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predominantly in executive and management functions and 
is charged with the responsibility of directing the 
effectuation of such management policies and practices. 
(IELRA, Section 2(0)) 
This exclusion was also added by the amendatory veto. 
(Amendatory Veto Message, p. 3) 
The legislative history of this section also indicates that 
this was intended to be a very narrow exclusion. The following 
exchange took place on the Senate floor following the Governor's 
amendatory veto message: 
Senator Luft: 
Question, please, Mr. President. 
President: 0 
Indicates ••• the sponsor indicates he'll yield. Senator 
Luft. 
Senator Luft: 
Managerial employee, the definition, is it determined by 




On ••• on managerial employees, Senator Luft, I believe 
the Governor in ••• in his definition made it very clear 
that it is ••• it is not the title. It is the question of 
the preponderance of time that the employee will spend 
in the question of management, and those people who 
would be excluded from management are only those people 
who would be limited to what is known as the central 
management team. So, I would believe that the ••• it is 




Okay. As a managerial employee, is that normally the 




That ••• when we are ••• I believe that we will develop and 
using NLRA decisions, the National Labor Relations Act, 
that they have ••• they have very narrowly defined 
managerial employees, and I believe that that will be 
the case here ••• that that function of management would 
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be limited to and kept within a central management team. 
We're not talking about excluding everyone, just those 
very limited people that are central management, at the 
very highest leve. 
83rd. Gen. Assem, Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, 
p.45-6 (Nov. 2, 1983) 
The intent to make this a narrow exclusion is reflected in 
the statement that it is limited to the central management team. Not 
only is it to be a very narrow exclusion, the IELRB is to use the 
same preponderance of time test that is to be used in determining the 
supervisory exclusion. 
The statutory definition of confidential employee is found in 
Section 2(n): 
"Confidential employee" means an employee, who (i) in 
the regular course of his or her duties, assists and 
acts in a confidential capacity to persons who 
formulate, determine and effectuate management policies 
with regard to labor relations or who (ii) in the 
regular course of his or her duties has access to 
information relating to the effectuation or review of 
the employer's collective bargaining policies. 
(IELRA, Section 2(n)) 
The legislative history reflects an intent to follow the 
decisions of NLRB which would result in a relatively narrow 
exclusion. This intent is reflected in the following exchange: 
Senator Welch: 
Question of the sponsor, Mr. President. 
President: 
Indicates he'll yield, Senator Welch. 
Senator Welch: 
••• Senator Bruce, I have a question concerning your 
section on confidential employees. Could you tell me 
whether or not that section re£ers to only those persons 




Thank you. Both ••• both this question and the earlier 
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one bring to mind the National Labor Relations Act, and 
when we start talking about confidential employees, 
professional employees, managerial employees, I believe 
that ••• that all of us should be aware that under 
National Labor Relations Act, we have had more than 
thirty years of decisions. Other states, when they have 
enacted collective bargaining bills, have looked to the 
prior decisions under the National Labor Relations Act, 
and I believe that the State of Illinois should also do 
that. We don't have to reinvent the wheel when it comes 
to deciding what is a confidential employee. The 
purpose of that exclusion as it exists in the section 
is ••• is to ensure that people are not put in any sort of 
position of being compromised. The definition within 
the Statute says that they must have access to the 
confidential labor relations material of the employer, 
and so that would probably mean the secretary to the 
head of the labor relations section would be a 
confidential employee. It would not and should not 
include people who have access to the budgets, planning 





Then your specific intent is to exclude any person who 
would be an otherwise confidential employee if they 




That is correct. Again, we should look to the private 
sector where we have a ••• a good case history. The 
matter has been well debated and decided. The 
definition, for example, is not even within the National 
Labor Relations Act at all. This has been done on a 
case-by-case basis, and I believe Illinois, in 
interpreting this law, their courts and the agencies of 
the State of Illinois should not be bound by the private 
sector; but where those prior decisions under the 
National Labor Relations Act can be used to give 
appropriate guidance to the courts and agencies of the 
State of Illinois on how a matter should be ••• decided as 
to whether or not an individual is a confidential 




So, your intent is to include other case decisions in 
NLRB references in interpreting the ••• the provision of 
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I would assume that the courts of the State of Illinois 
and the Educational Labor Board would certainly want to 
look at the National Labor Relations Act and develop 
from that, where they can, a definition of confidential 
employee. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, it's 
thirty years of case decisions. 
83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, P• 
46-48 (Nov. 2, 1983) 
It is important to note that the confidential exclusion has 
two alternatives for satisfying the requirement. The employees may 
be excluded if they regularly assist an individual who has managerial 
responsibilities with regard to labor relations or if the employee 
has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of 
collective bargaining responsibilities. 
Appropdai:e unii:s-irn<ier-the.iELRA 
Section 7 of the IELRA requires the IELRB to find an 
identifiable community of interest among employees within any 
bargaining unit it certifies. The first question to be discussed is 
when an employer with multiple facilities must recognize one unit for 
all of its employees. The most significant published decision 
dealing with this question is Tri-County Special Education 
Cooperative, 2 PERI 1046. 
The case arose out of a recognition petition filed by the 
Tri-County Special Education Association at Anna. The petition 
requested recognition of a unit including all full and regular 
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part-time employees employed by the employer at its Anna, Illinois 
facility• 
Tri-County Special Education Cooperative objected to the unit 
on the basis that recognition of the unit would bring about a 
fragmentation and proliferation of bargaining units. This would 
result in a substantial burden on the Cooperative because it operated 
a number of separate facilities. The Cooperative also argued that 
the proposed unit was inappropriate because it was an artificial and 
arbitrary separation of a larger appropriate unit because the 
employees at the other facilities shared a community of interest with 
the employees at the Anna facility. 
As always, the Hearing Officer began the analysis by 
considering the factual background. The Cooperative has been in 
existence since 1968. It serves three counties and provides services 
to approximately 2,000 students. The Cooperative has approximately 
seventy certified employees and operates six centers. 
The center at Anna employs approximately thirty certified 
employees. Unlike the other centers, the center at Anna is a 
residential placement center. 
The policy making body of the Cooperative is the Executive 
Board comprised of the superintendents of the local districts served 
by the Cooperative. There is an Executive Director responsible to 
this Board who is directly responsible for all of the programs 
operated exculusively by the Cooperative. The other managerial 
personnel include a project coordinator for the program at Anna, and 
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three program coordinators. All of those individuals are supervised 
by the Executive Director. 
There are specialized teaching positions at Anna that do not 
exist at other programs operated by the Cooperative and there are 
positions at the other centers that do not exist at Anna. The 
authority for administration of the Cooperative rests primarily with 
the Executive Board. This is despite the fact that the 
Administrative District has the authority to sanction or disapprove 
the actions of the Executive Board. Although the project coordinator 
and the program coordinators at the Anna Center interview prospective 
employees, they do not have the authority to hire employees. That 
authority, as well as the authority to terminate the employment of 
individuals, rests with the Executive Director. Evaluations and day 
to day personnel matters such as requests for personal leave are 
handled by the immediate supervisors of all employees. The Executive 
Director does not become involved in these matters unless a problem 
arises. The budget for each of the centers is prepared by the on 
site managerial personnel, the Executive Director and the central 
office bookkeeper. Those budgets are subject to approval by the 
Administrative District and the Executive Board. 
At the time the petition was filed there was not a history of 
formal or informal bargaining between the Cooperative and its 
certified employees. All of the salaries for certified employees are 
paid on the same salary schedule and receive the same benefits. The 
only distinction is that teachers working in local school districts 
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work the same calendars as those districts so that students can be 
mainstreamed and go to school with their peers. 
Based on these facts, the Hearing Officer found that the 
proposed unit was inappropriate because the employees working at Anna 
shared a community of interest with employees working at the other 
facilities operated by the Cooperative. 
The Hearing Officer noted that although there were positions 
unique to the center at Anna, the positions all served the same basic 
function as those in other facilities. All of the teachers in the 
Cooperative were required to have the same certification, that of 
teaching the student with severe behavior disorders or severe and 
profound learning disabilities. Therefore, the teachers at Anna did 
not have certification requiring special expertise or qualifications 
that would justify establishing a separate unit. 
The Hearing Officer also found it significant that all of the 
teachers worked under the same salary and fringe benefit scale. This 
indicated that there was no bifurcation of control over labor 
relations as between the Anna Center and the central administration. 
The Hearing Officer also addressed the question of whether 
the employees had the right to create smaller units if it would 
enhance their fullest exercise of their statutory rights. Relying 
upon Downers Grove Community High School District No. 99, 1 PERI 
1105, the Hearing Officer first acknowledged that the statutory 
requirement was that the petitioned for unit meet the minimum 
standards necessary for appropriateness. However, the Hearing 
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Officer relied upon the finding in Elgin Community College District 
HS09, 1 PERI 1085 in finding that the requested unit would result in 
--the separating out of individuals that would be more appropriately 
included in a comprehensive potential certified unit of all certified 
employees of the Cooperative. The portion of Elgin relied on is: 
"even though the Act does not literally command that 
factors other than those specifically enumerated in 
Section 7(a) (historical pattern, community of interest, 
desire of employees) be considered in making unit 
determinations, the Act wisely allows for the weighing 
of factors 'not limited to' those specifically 
identified in the Act. We will, of course, consider 
allegations that a proposed bargaining unit is 
inappropriate based on claims of gerrymandering or 
arbitrary fragmentation or based on allegedly compelling 
efficiency needs dictated by the structure and 
organization of the employer. In weighing these factors 
as well as those that the statute specifically requires 
us to consider in making unit determinations, it will be 
our intent to establish units which are 'appropriate for 
the purpose of collective bargaining.'" (Id. at p. 
168) 
The Hearing Officer acknowledged that there were, in fact, 
differences between the employees at the different facilities 
operated by the Cooperative. Those differences included little 
functional integration, a lack of interchange among facilities, 
special characteristics of each program and geographical separation 
of the facilities. 
However, these differences were outweighed by very 
significant community of interest factors. Those factors included 
central administration of all the facilities, uniform employment 
policies, and the same educational objective shared by all the 
personnel at each facility. 
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The case is significant because it stands for the proposition 
that the IELRB is willing to engage in a balancing test to determine 
if the community of interest factors are outweighed by the 
differences. 
Another significant question in the area of appropriate units 
is whether employees teaching in a joint program, working under the 
auspices of an administrative district, should be included in the 
unit of that district's teachers or should be in a separate unit. 
The most significant case in this area is Sterling Community School 
District No. 5, 2 PERI 1051. 
This case arose out of a unit clarification petition filed by 
the Sterling Education Association. The petition sought the 
inclusion of all teaching personnel employed at the Whiteside Area 
Vocational Center in a bargaining unit consisting of all teaching 
personnel, excluding administrative personnel, employed by the 
Sterling Community School District. 
The Whiteside Area Vocational Center was created pursuant to 
a joint agreement authorized by Section 10-22.3la of the School Code. 
Seventeen school districts are parties to the joint agreement and 
three private schools participate to a lesser degree in the program. 
The Center is directed by a Board of Control comprised of the 
district superintendents of each of the seventeen districts. It has 
the responsibility to develop general policies not in conflict with 
the policies of the individual Boards of Education and is to advise 
the Administrative District relative to the administration of the 
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Center. The Sterling School District was designated as the 
Administrative District but the Board of Control has the right to 
change the Administrative District. 
The 1982-83 joint agreement provided that the staff of the 
Center, for legal purposes, should be considered as employees of the 
Sterling school district and would be subject to all the policies 
adopted by Sterling's Board of Education. 
The 1983-84 joint agreement changed that portion to make the 
employees subject to Sterling's policies except where those policies 
conflicted with the Center's policies. 
It was unclear whether collective bargaining agreements 
between the school district and the union covered Center teachers. 
The language consistently ref erred to "regulary employed, 
certificated teachers" and referred to vocational teachers only in 
the "miscellaneous" section of the contract. 
The hiring procedure of the Center was found to be of 
particular significance in the IELRB' s decision that the Board of 
Control should be considered a separate employer for purposes of unit 
determination. The Board of Control has to approve the filling of a 
position before the position can be posted. The Director of the 
Center, legally an employee of the Administrative District although 
hired by the Board of Control, then interviews candidates for the 
position. The Director recommends an individual to the 
Administrative District's Board of Education who has the authority to 
approve the employement of the candidate. However, the Board of 
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control also has the authority to approve the hiring of an individual 
before the district's Board of Education considers the matter. 
The Director recommends discharges of Center employees as 
well· The Board of Control then approves the action and then the 
district's Board of Education approves the action. 
The Board of Control has a reduction in force policy 
different than the district's. The Center teachers have tenure at 
the Center only and the seniority lists at the district and the 
Center are different. 
The salary schedule for Center teachers is the same as that 
of the district teachers. However, Center teachers also receive 
supplemental pay, set by the Board of Control, and their entire 
salary is paid for with Center funds. 
The IELRB relied upon Section 2(a) of the Act which provides 
that "the governing body of joint agreements of any type formed by 
two or more school districts" may be considered an educational 
employer. Although the Administrative District displayed some 
attributes of an employer as program administrator, the Board of 
Control possessed sufficient decision making authority to obtain 
separate employer status. Characteristics of that authority included 
the right to vote on the hiring and firing of employees, the adoption 
of governing policies that were substantially different than those of 
the district's, the element of financial control exhibited by the 
right to determine supplemental pay, and the supervision of Center 
teachers by Center supervisory personnel rather than district 
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personnel. 
The IELRB also noted that a recent court decision had found 
that the Center, as the educational employer, could only grant tenure 
-within the Center and did not have the power to confer tenure in 
member districts. Koppi v. Board of Control of Whiteside Area 
vocational Center, 133 Ill. App. 3d 591. 
The case is significant because it discusses factors the 
IELRB will consider when determining whether employees working in a 
joint agreement setting should be considered employees of the 
Administrative District or of the governing body of the joint 
agreement. 
The question of what employees qualify as regular part-time 
employees is also important for questions of unit determination. The 
case of Mt. Zion Community School District No.3, 1 PERI 1013 reveals 
some of the factors the IELRB will consider in coming to a 
conclusion. The case arose when the employer refused to consider 
regular part-time employees working less than thirty hours a week as 
members of a unit comprised of full and part-time cafeteria workers, 
custodial and maintenance employees, mechanics, bus drivers and 
secretaries. 
The statement of facts reveals that all part-time employees 
are appointed on a yearly basis, are scheduled to work a set number 
of hours each day, receive the same benefits and are subject to the 
same evaluation and personnel policies. Because of the common nature 
of their employment with other employees, the Hearing Officer found 
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that the part-time employees working less than thirty hours a week 
shared a sufficient community of interest that they should be 
included in the unit with other full and part-time employees. 
The case is significant because it makes it clear that the 
test for community of interest is shared characteristics and is not a 
function of hours of employment. 
The question of whether part-time certified employees possess 
a sufficient community of interest with full-time certified employees 
is another issue that was addressed by the IELRB. The case of 
Pleasant Valley School District No. 62, 2 PERI 1020 addressed that 
question. 
In that case, the Pleasant Valley Federation of Teachers 
filed a representation petition. The petition sought the right to 
represent all full-time certified teachers. The petition sought to 
exclude the statutory exclusions as well as substitutes and part-time 
employees. The district had three part-time employees - a music 
teacher, band teacher, and school nurse. 
The findings of fact established the following: 
1. Full-time certified employees normally work Monday 
through Friday from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20 p.m. 
(tr.6). 
2. Carol Wagaman is a certified teacher of vocal 
music. She normally works on Monday and Tuesday 
from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20 p.m. She is on the 
nontenure track (tr.6). 
3. Diane Roeder is a certified teacher of band. She 
normally works on Friday from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20 
p.m. She is on the nontenure track (tr.6). 
4. Carol Tjaden is a certified school nurse. She 
normally works on Tuesday afternoons for two hours 
(Emp. 4). 
S. Salaries for part-time employees are based on their 
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years of service and education commensurate with 
full-time teachers and then prorated accordingly 
(Tr. 13). 
6. Wagaman and Roeder signed contracts substantially 
similar to those signed by full-time tenured and 
nontenured classroom teachers, i.e., providing for 
an annual salary (Emp. 7,8). 
7. Tjaden signed a contract for an hourly wage (Emp. 
6). 
8. Wagaman, Roeder and Tjaden receive the same paid 
days off as full-time employees except such are 
prorated (Tr. 20, 28). 
9. Wagaman, Roeder and Tjaden do not receive the 
insurance benefits, prorated or otherwise, provided 
to the full-time employees (Tr. 21-22, 38-39). 
10. Wagaman and Roeder are eligible to participate in 
extracurricular programs (Tr. 15). 
11. Full- and part-time employees have the same 
supervisors (Tr. 14). 
12. There is recurring interaction between full- and 
part-time employees. Wagaman and Roeder make 
arrangements with the classroom teachers for 
students' release for vocal music, band and related 
programs (Tr. 16-18). Tjaden interacts with the 
classroom teachers in terms of both nursing and 
providing supplemental instruction (Tr. 26-27). 
13. Wagaman and Roeder grade students and communicate 
the grades to classroom teachers for placement of 
the grade on report cards (Tr. 20). 
14. Roeder and Tjaden are also employed at other school 
districts (Tr. 36). (Id. at 50) 
Based on these facts, the Hearing Officer found that there 
was a sufficient community of interest to warrant the inclusion of 
the part-time certified employees in the unit. The salaries of the 
part-time staff are determined on the same basis, they are located 
within the same buildings, the skill levels are similar, the calendar 
length of employement and expectations of re-employment are similar, 
the supervision is identical, benefits are substantially the same, 
there are regularly recurring work schedules and there is regular 
interaction between the two groups. There was only one factual 
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difference and that was that one group was full-time and the other 
group was part-time. 
The Hearing Officer distinguished this finding from that of 
Downers Grove, 1 PERI 1105. In that decision, the IELRB found that a 
musical accompianist used on an occasional basis did not have a 
sufficient community of interest to be included in a unit of full and 
part-time employees. In that case, the pianist worked only on a need 
basis and there was no contractual obligation to use her when the 
need did arise. The Hearing Officer characterized that type of 
position as casual and short term. 
All school districts have occasion to use substitute 
teachers. Therefore, it is of interest to both substitute teachers 
and school districts whether substitute teachers have the right to 
organize under the IELRA. The IELRB has addressed that question 
regarding on-call substitutes in Rockford School District No. 205, 2 
PERI 1031. 
The case arose when the Rockford Council of Substitute 
Teachers filed a representation petition for a bargaining unit 
consisting of all regularly employed, on-call substitute teachers. 
The school district objected to this petition on the basis that 
employees were short term and thus not educational employees under 
Section 2(b). 
The statement of facts reveals that substitute teachers in 
the district are listed on a roster kept by the district. In order 
to be on the approved roster, a teacher must be a certified teacher. 
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She is also required to complete an application, take a physical 
examination and be interviewed. After the teacher is approved by the 
Board of Education and placed on the list, she may substitute for up 
to ninety days in any one postiion. Substitutes do not sign 
employment contracts nor are they eligible for tenure. 
Substitute teachers are paid on a salary schedule separate 
from the regular teachers' salary schedule. Placement on that 
schedule is a function of education and experience. After a 
substitute accumulates a total of 170 days of substitute teaching 
(the total may be over a period of time) she becomes eligible for 
step increases. 
A letter is sent to every person on the list at the end of 
the school year and the person must respond affirmatively if she 
wishes to remain on the list. 
The Hearing Officer first considered the district's 
contention that the substitutes were short-term employees and thus 
not covered by the statute. Bismarck Community School District #1, 1 
PERI 1163 provides a definition of short-term employee. The elements 
of that definition are 1 )employment for a definite period of time, 
2)in place of another employee who is expected to return, and 3)who 
does not share an adequate community of interest with the rest of the 
bargaining unit. In Bismarck, a long-term substitute teacher was 
seeking the same rights as regularly employed teachers and was denied 
that right. The Hearing Officer distinguished the case in Rockford 
from Bismarck for several reasons. 
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The first reason was that the substitute list comprised an 
exculsive pool of workers that the district would draw from as the 
need arose. Based on NLRB decisions and an ISLRB decision, the 
Hearing Officer found that by virtue of being in that exclusive 
manpower pool, "Substitutes can be considered employees despite the 
fact that the actual work they perform does not occcur daily or even 
regularly." (Rockford at p.88) 
The Hearing Officer also found that the substitutes had a 
reasonable expectancy of employment. The district maintains a list 
of between 200 and 300 substitues and had in excess of 13,000 
substitute days in school year 1984-85. Based on those numbers, the 
Hearing Officer found that although the substitutes do not have a 
certain expectancy of employment they do enjoy a reasonable 
expectancy of employment by virtue of their placement on the list. 
The Hearing Officer also found that the existence of salary 
steps provided some reason for expectancy of employment. Indeed, the 
district had ten steps on its salary schedule which the Hearing 
Officer interpreted as holding out the promise of a long term 
relationship between the district and the substitutes. 
The Hearing officer also distinguished Rockford from the 
situation in Bismarck on the basis that work performed by per diem 
substitutes is more on-going than that of long-term substitutes: 
The focus should not be placed upon the expected return 
of the absent teachers. Rather, the focus should be on 
the fact that absences are conditinuous. In fact, they 
occur daily throughout the school year and, presumably, 
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from school year to school year. In that sense the work 
is not temporary. (Id. at p. 88-89) 
In summary, the Hearing Officer found that: 
The substitutes share common qualifications, a common 
salary schedule, similar working conditions, are 
interchangeable, and share common superision. 
Substitutes do not receive fringe benefits such as sick 
leave days, personal leave days, hospitalization or 
pension. They are selected from a common pool and the 
employees desires have been demonstrated through the 
requisite showing of interest. In addition, during the 
pendency of this matter, no other labor organization has 
sought to intervene. (Id. at 89) 
The case is significant because while it acknowledges the 
definition of short-term employee under Bismarck, it substantially 
expands the coverage of the statute by providing an exception to the 
short-term exclusion if the employees can demonstrate an expectancy 
of employment. 
One of the early IELRB decisions dealing with unit 
determination was Jacksonville District No. 117, 1 PERI 1106. This 
case arose out of a representation petition filed by the IEA-NEA. 
The petition sought an election to represent a union comprised of all 
full and part-time secretaries, custodians, maintenance employees and 
teacher aides. The IELRB granted an election but ordered that three 
separate units would be most appropriate. The units found to be 
appropriate were (1) custodial and maintenance employees; (2) bus 
drivers; and (3) secretaries. 
The IELRB reached the decision based on the fact pattern 
shown by the record. 
First, custodial and maintenance workers work out of the 
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maintenance shop in the Central Administrative Office and are part of 
the Buildings and Grounds Department. They are supervised by the 
supervisor of the Buildings and Grounds Department. They are paid by 
the hour and receive overtime pay for any hours worked in excess of 
forty hours per week. They are scheduled for work during the winter 
and spring vacations and receive Good Friday, Thanksgiving, and 
Christmas as paid holidays. They receive pay raises for every five 
years of service to the district and are entitled to a paid vacation 
based on the number of hours of employment. 
Bus drivers work out of the transportation building and are 
supervised by the Director of Transportation. Most of them work from 
7:00 a.m. until 8:15 or 8:30 a.m. and again from 2:30 p.m until 4:00 
p.m. They are paid by the trip for their regular assignments and 
receive an hourly rate for Saturday work or other extra assignments. 
Like the custodial and maintenance workers, bus drivers are entitled 
to pay raises for every five years of service to the district. They 
are not formally evaluated on their work performance and do receive 
paid vaction time. They do receive ten days sick time as do the 
other employees of the district. 
The secretaries in the district all work regular eight hour 
days. They work in individual school buildings and are supervised by 
the administration center administrator or building principal for 
whom they work. Their work year varies from ten months to a 
year-round schedule. Those secretaries who work at least ten and 
one-half months receive paid vacations and approximately fifty per 
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cent of the secretaries are entitled to paid vactions. Most of the 
secretaries do not work during Thanksgiving, winter and spring 
vacations. 
The IELRB found that the differences in terms of wages, 
supervision, hours, skills and functions and degree of contact were 
sufficient to direct an election for each of the units. Within each 
of the units, the IELRB found a sufficient community of interest. 
This case is significant because it was the first full IELRB 
decision to address the appropriate unit question and established the 
analytical approach the IELRB would take. The IELRB will consider 
the way pay is determined, commonality of supervision, work hours and 
the comparability of fringe benefits. 
Section 7 of the IELRA provides, in part, that no unit shall 
include both professional and non-professional employees unless a 
majority of both groups vote for inclusion in the unit. There are 
three particularly important decisions that deal with attempts to 
include professional and non-professional employees in the same unit. 
The decisions are Niles Elementary School District No. 71, 2 PERI 
1009, Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 2 PERI 1048 and 
Kankakee Area Special Education Cooperative, Case No. 84 UC 0007-C. 
The Niles decision arose out of a representation petition 
filed by the Niles Council of Teachers. The petition sought the 
recognition of a unit comprised of all full and part-time 
professional instructional personnel including classroom teachers, 
special education teachers, librarians, nurses, social workers, 
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psychologist, speech therapists and reading specialists. The Hearing 
officer directed an election for a bargaining unit including all 
those positions and the health aide. Every member of the unit except 
the health aide holds a teaching certificate. 
The district excepted to the inclusion of the health aide on 
the basis that she did not have a teaching certificate so could not 
be considered a professional employee under Section 2(1) of the 
statute. Without a vote to determine if professional and 
non-professional employees desired to be in the same unit, the 
district maintained that the health aide could not be considered as 
part of the unit. 
The district also maintained that the health aide lacked a 
community of interest with the other employees because she did not 
contribute to the district's educational programs except in an 
incidental manner. 
In her findings, the Hearing Officer found that the health 
aide was a registered nurse but did not hold a teaching certificate. 
She found that the health aide provides emergency health care, 
answers the phones when the secretary is not present, monitors 
student absences, and maintains and reviews student health records. 
She also found that there was not instruction of classes by the 
health aide. 
Because the health aide is a registered nurse and because of 
the nature of her duties, the Hearing Officer determined that the 
health aide is a professional employee and shared a community of 
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interest. 
The full IELRB reversed the decision of the Hearing Officer 
to the extent that the health aide was included in the bargaining 
unit. The basis of the reversal was that the health aide did not 
meet the standard of a professional employee as set by Section 2(1) 
of the statute. Because the health aide was not a professional, the 
statute requires a majority vote of both the professional and 
non-professional employees in the unit. No such vote was ever 
conducted so the health aide must be excluded from the unit. 
The Alton decision marked the first time the IELRB extended 
recognition to a "wall to wall" bargaining unit that included all of 
the professional and non-professional employees (with statutory 
exclusions) of a district. The decision arose out of a 
representation petition filed by the Alton Education Association 
(AEA). The petition sought a unit consisting of: 
All full and part-time certificated and educational 
support personnel including but not limited to: 
teachers, counselors, nurses, librarians, social 
workers, psychologist, coordinators, department 
chairpersons, secretaries, aides, special education 
aides, safety aides, bus aides, clerks, food service 
workers, custodians, maintenance workers, crossing 
guards, warehouse workers, and drivers. (Alton at 119) 
The district contended that there were major differences in 
the duties, responsibilities and working conditions of the 
certificated and non-certificated personnel and that no community of 
interest existed. The district also argued that the historical 
pattern of recognition and bargaining confirmed the significance of 
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those differences. 
The Hearing Officer found that the district recognized the 
AEA as the representative of its certified employees in 1972 and had 
negotiated collective bargaining agreements with them since that 
time. The Hearing Officer also found that the district recognized 
the Alton Association of School Personnel (AASSP) as the 
representative of its non-certificated employees in 1977 or 1978. In 
1978 the AASSP affiliated with the IEA and, with the assistance of 
the IEA, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the 
district. In 1981, the AEA and the AASSP voted to merge into a 
single organization, the AEA. Since that time the district has 
bargained with, and entered into separate collective bargaining 
agreements with the AEA for the certificated and non-certificated 
employees. 
The Hearing Officer found that there was a significant 
community of interest between two groups of employees with regard to 
wages, hours and other working conditions. Although the levels of 
pay are different, pay for both groups is influenced by longevity. 
Medical and life insurance, sick leave, personal leave and leaves of 
absence are very similar. Employees in both groups may volunteer for 
extracurricular duty such as loading buses and taking tickets at 
athletic contests. Both groups are paid the same rate of pay for 
those duties. Both groups attend orientation days, participate in 
safety and other committees, and have access to the same procedures 
for resolving differences not covered by the collective bargaining 
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agreement. 
The Hearing Officer also found that the history of bargaining 
in the district reflected an interrelationship between the two 
groups. There had been separate sets of negotiations but the same 
members on both sides of ten participated as bargaining team members 
or as observers. Virtually identical language was contained in many 
sections of both contracts. 
Based on these findings, the IELRB affirmed the Hearing 
Officer's decision, pending approval by a majority of both groups, to 
extend recognition to the combined unit of professional and 
non-professional employees. The IELRB acknowledged that there were 
many differences between the duties, responsibilities and conditions 
of employment between the two groups. However, the community of 
interest and historic patterns of bargaining combined to outweigh 
those differences and warrant the inclusion of both groups in a 
single bargaining unit. 
The IELRB also noted that H.B. 701, the predecessor to the 
IELRA had sanctioned wall to wall units. The IELRB stated that the 
General Assembly was clearly aware of that fact and that the IELRA's 
provision for wall to wall units was a manifestation of the General 
Assembly's intent to provide for precisely the type of unit proposed 
in this case. 
This case is particularly significant because it isolates the 
factors the IELRB will consider when faced with decisions about wall 
to wall units, which are primarily community of interest, historic 
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patterns of bargaining and the wishes of employees. 
Kankakee arose as a result of a unit clarification petition 




The existing unit, recognized pursuant to the 
701, consisted of all regularly employed 
non-supervisory employees and teacher aides, 
occupational therapists, and music therapists. The creation of the 
unit had bee approved by a majority vote of both professional and 
non-professional employees. The employer sought a unit clarification 
on the basis that there was not a shared community of interest 
between the groups. The Hearing Officer denied the petition and the 
IELRB upheld the Hearing Officer's decision. 
The Hearing Officer found that all employees in the unit work 
directly with children to improve the children's physical or mental 
condition. Teacher aides assist teachers with instruction and 
perform similar duties in the classroom. They prepare classroom 
materials, correct work and assist students on an individual basis. 
Teachers and teacher aides are paid on a salaried basis 
although they are on different pay scales. They work the same 
schedules and the same number of days. With the exception of 
belonging to different retirement systems, they receive the same 
benefits. Teachers are eligible for professional leave and can 
accrue seniority while aides cannot. Teachers can obtain tenure but 
aides cannot. 
Teacher aides and teacher are in almost constant contact. 
Teacher aides attend faculty meetings, in-service training with the 
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teachers and participate in the annual reviews of students where 
their input is given equal weight to that of the teachers. 
The teachers do have some oversight responsibilities vis a 
vis the teacher aides. They are responsible for assigning work to 
the aides and may participate in the interview process. They may 
also have some informal input into the evaluation of the aides. 
However, the ultimate responsibilities in these areas belongs to the 
Program Coordinator. The teachers have no authority to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, or discipline 
teachers aides or increase aides' salaries. 
These oversight responsibilities, the IELRB found, do not 
negate the community of interest demonstrated by the factors 
considered. Therefore, the combined unit was held to be appropriate. 
This case is significant because it reaffirms the IELRB's 
willingness to weigh differences against factors indicating a 
community of interest. 
Supervisory~ Manageriai and Confidential Exciusions 
Supervisory, managerial, and confidential exclusions play a 
major role in the determination of professional units. The 
legislative history makes it clear that these are to be narrow 
exclusions. However, school districts would prefer to broaden those 
exclusions since many school personnel act in more than one capacity. 
Four Rivers-Jacksonville District No. 117, 2 PERI 1058 is an 
example of a case where all three of the exclusions are dealt with. 
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The case arose out of a representation petition filed by the Illinois 
Federation of Teachers (!FT). The petition sought certification of a 
bargaining unit consisting of all certified and non-certified 
employees excluding supervisors, managerial and confidential 
employees. 
The Hearing Officer held a hearing on the petition and 
reached the following conclusions: 
1. Under the Act, the "employer" is the Four Rivers 
Council rather than the Operating Board of 
Directors or the Administrative District; 
2. Administrative Secretary Eleanor Abel is a 
confidential employee under the Act, but 
Administrative Secretaries Velma Smith and Marilyn 
Johnson are not confidential employees; 
3. Program Supervisors Pat Baptist, Delores Hill and 
Edward Randorf are not managerial employees under 
the Act; 
4. Program Supervisors Donald Bryan, Janet Engle, 
Robert Everett, Beverly Johns and Veva Siria are 
not supervisory employees under the Act; 
5. The unit petitioned for by the IFT, which includes 
professional and nonprofessional employees of the 
Cooperative, is appropriate under the Act. 
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 143) 
Four Rivers-Jacksonville School District No. 117 (the 
Cooperative) filed exceptions to those findings, asserting that 
administrative secretaries Velma Smith and Marilyn Johnson are 
confidential employees, that all of the program supervisors named in 
the third conclusion are managerial employees, that all of the 
program supervisors named in the fourth conclusion are supervisors, 
and that the IELRB should find separate units of professional and 
non-professional employees to be appropriate for collective 
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bargaining. 
The IELRB affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that the 
employees alleged should be included in the unit and affirmed the 
decision that a combined unit was appropriate. The IELRB reversed 
the Hearing Officer's decision regarding the inclusion of certain 
program supervisors named in the petition. The basis of the reversal 
was that although those positions were neither managerial nor 
supervisory they had duties and responsibilities which made it 
inappropriate to include them in a bargaining unit with other 
employees. 
The Cooperative consists of twenty-four school districts 
which combined to provide special services for students requiring 
such services. The Cooperative is governed by the Four Rivers 
Council (Council) and by the Operating Board· of Di rectos (Operating 
Board). The administrative staff consists of the Director of Special 
Education and two assistant Directors. 
Prior to the filing of the petition, a personnel committee of 
the Operating Board met on an informal meet-and-confer basis with a 
personnel committee of elected representatives of certified and 
non-certified employees. 
The IELRB considered the issue of confidential employees 
first. The Hearing Officer found that the Director has substantial 
input into the formulation, determination and effectuation of the 
Cooperative's management policies regarding labor relations. He 
makes recommendations regarding the hiring, firing and transfer of 
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personnel. He has the day-to-day responsibility for implementing 
labor relations policies and acts as an advisor to the personnel 
committee involved in the meet and confer sessions. 
The three administrative secretaries keep the files for the 
administrative personnel, type reports and correspondence and keep 
the financial records. 
Abel is the secretary to the Operating Board. Her duties 
include acting as recording secretary for the Operating Board and 
acting as the personal secretary to the Director. As his secretary, 
she types all of his confidential memos and has access to all the 
administrative files, including those dealing with labor relations. 
As recording secretary to the Operating Board she is privy to 
confidential information dealing with preparations for the meet and 
confer sessions. Based on the nature of these duties the IELRB 
affirmed the decision of the Hearing Officer that she is a 
confidential employee. 
Smith's main administrative responsibility is handling 
personnel files. There is no evidence that she regularly assists the 
Director regarding his responsibilities dealing with labor relations. 
She provides no direct assistance to the Operating Board. Her mere 
handling of personnel files was found to be insufficient to qualify 
her as a confidential employee. 
Johnson works for the Cooperative as a financial secretary. 
Her duties include the preparation of the payroll, maintaining 
accounts, the payment of bills, and the keeping of a general and a 
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master ledger. Most of the documents she keeps are open to 
inspection by the public. She does not handle personnel files or 
type documents dealing with labor relations. She does not prepare 
financial information for the meet and confer sessions. 
Based on these facts, the Hearing Officer found that Johnson, 
as financial secretary, does not perform a single duty relating to 
confidential labor relations. Therefore, Johnson is not eligible for 
exclusion as a confidential employee. The IELRB also affirmed the 
Hearing Officer's decision that Baptist, Hill, and Randorf, the 
program supervisors, are not managerial employees. All three of the 
program supervisors have similar responsibilities. They all spend 
the majority of their time in local school districts, prepare 
curricula, monitor students and prepare program goals. Hill 
recommends the attendance of teachers at particular training 
programs, evaluates non-tenured teachers, participates in the 
interview process and makes employment recommendations. However, 
recommendations by Hill are subject to approval by the local school 
boards. Baptist and Randorf do not evaluate teachers unless they are 
requested to do so by local school districts. They are not involved 
in personnel decisions at all unless the local school district 
requests their input. 
None of the three have any administrative authority over 
Central Service personnel. Their only participation in the 
administration of the Cooperative is through their participation in 
the following advisory committees and groups: 
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1. An "administrative/supervisory group" to which all 
administrators and program supervisors belong. 
This group discusses such topics as job vacancies, 
current status of rules and regulations governing 
special education, status of Committees of the 
Cooperative, · in-service training procedures and 
proposed personnel policies (before these policies 
are proposed to the Operating Board). 
2. Committees of the Cooperative. These committees, 
to which Cooperative administrators, teachers and 
secretaries and local district superintendents and 
principals may also belong, serve .a wide variety of 
purposes, including development of procedures and 
guidelines for evaluation of Central Service 
personnel, guidelines for evaluation of students 
and development of forms. 
3. Annual multidisciplinary staff conferences, 
attended by both Central Service and local district 
personnel, which develop individual education plans 
for students in special education programs or 
terminated from programs. 
4. Administrative Roundtables, sponsored by the 
Cooperative and coordinated by the Director, 
Assistant Director and several supervisors, which 
inform local school districts of programs offered 
by the Cooperataive, and discuss the views and 
concerns of the local districts. 
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 145) 
Each of the program supervisors is on the teachers' salary 
schedule and receives an additional stipend for acting as a 
supervisor. 
In affirming the Hearing Officer, the IELRB relied upon the 
statutory definition of managerial employee and the interpretation of 
that definition that was provided in Niles Township. Niles Township 
interpreted the definition to cover those employees who "exercise 
substantial and continuing authority over relatively crucial aspects 
of the Employer's operations which impact on, or have the potential 
for impacting on, the wages, hours or terms and conditions of 
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employment of significant numbers of bargaining unit employees" Niles 
Township at p. 92. 
Based on this interpretation, the IELRB found that the 
supervisors were not managerial employees. Any managerial functions 
served by them were incidental to their primary job responsibilities 
and only took the form of providing advisory services. 
The IELRB also affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that 
program directors Bryan, Engle, Everett, Johns and Siria were not 
entitled to be excluded as supervisory employees. 
The duties of these program directors differ from those of 
Baptist, Hill and Randorf in three respects. They have the power to 
evaluate subordinate teachers, to make non-binding recommendations 
based on the evaluations and to hear grievances at the first and 
second steps. 
The Hearing Officer made factual findings concerning the 
specific duties of these program supervisors. Those findings are: 
1. Donald Bryan works as a part-time field 
psychologist (which accounts for 70% of his work 
time) and spend the remainder of his workday as a 
part-time supervising psychologist. As Supervising 
Psychologist, Bryan annually evaluates other school 
psychologists, submits recommendations based on 
these evaluations, and provides monthly in-service 
training to the other psychologists. The 
psychologists working under Bryan set their own 
schedules, and Bryan may not alter these schedules. 
Bryan has interviewed eight of the fifteen 
psychologists whom the Cooperative has hired since 
he assumed this present position. The Cooperative 
has not acted in accordance with his 
recommendations that one candidate be hired and 
that another currently employed psychologist be 
discharged. One transfer of a psychologist 
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occurred without Bryan's prior knowledge or 
recommendation. Bryan -can recommend changes in 
work behavior to his subordinates but he cannot 
unilaterally impose discipline. 
2. Janet Engle works as part-time Program Supervisor 
for the Hearing Impaired Program (40% of work 
time), and as part-time In-Service Coordinator. 
The Hearing Impaired Program uses the services of 
three teachers and two aides, whom the Cooperative 
hires but who work in buildings of the 
Administrative District. Engle evaluates the 
teachers but not the teacher aides. She may not 
unilaterally order changes in the work behavior of 
her subordinates. In addition to her evaluative 
duties, Engle provides teachers with necessary 
forms and reports, gives teaching advice when 
needed, participates in development of Individual 
Educational Plans (IEPs) for students in the 
hearing impaired programs, follows up on students 
who need hearing screening, and provides 
transportation for students who need hearing tests. 
Engle does not recruit job applicants and the 
Cooperative does not consult her before making 
hiring decisions. 
Engle' s duties as In-Service Coordinator do not 
appear to involve supervision or evaluation of 
other employees. Her duties include planning and 
appropriating adequate funds for the in-service 
committees described in the preceding section. As 
part of an in-service proposal, Engle has prepared 
a hearing-impaired curriculum. Engle is also in 
charge of a "Material Center" of the Cooperative 
which functions as a lending library. 
3. Robert Everett is employed by the Cooperative as 
the Coordinator of the Child Find Services Center. 
This Center screens children between the ages of 
three and five who are suspected of having 
disabilities. There are two components to the 
Center: a Developmental Screening Component, which 
identifies children with handicaps, and a 
Diagnostic Clinic component, where diagnostic tests 
are performed. The Developmental Screening 
Component is headed by the Developmental Screening 
Coordinator, who is assisted by a second-level 
screening technician and two part-time screening 
technicians. The diagnostic staff includes a 
speech and language therapist and a clinical 
diagnostician. Everett, who splits his work time 
equally between the Center's two components, 
evaluates both the Developmental Screening 
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Coordinator and the clinical diagnosticians. 
4. Beverly Johns is the program supervisor for 
programs in the areas of learning disabilities, 
behavioral disorders and educational handicaps. 
These programs are scattered throughout the 
participating local school districts. In addition, 
Johns supervises Central Service programs for 
severe and alternative behavior disorders which are 
instructed by four teacher aides, a part-time 
social worker and a contractual psychiatrist. 
Approximately 65% of her working time, Johns 
advises the local school districts and 
approximately 35% of her time she supervises 
Central Service Programs. Although she formally 
evaluates teachers in the Central Service programs, 
Johns makes no evaluations of local district 
teachers unless requested to do so. Johns has 
helped to develop a teacher evaluation form. She 
has assisted in interviewing teacher aide 
applicants, but has no unilateral authority to 
hire. Suspensions, layoffs, promotions or 
discharges are not within her authority. Johns has 
dealt with one grievance, which she transferred to 
the jurisdiction of the Director prior to making a 
ruling. She has submitted to Jan Engle proposals 
outlining the cost of specific in-service programs, 
but is not involved in developing proposals for the 
Cooperative' s budget or in submitting 
recommendations how the budget should be divided 
between various items. 
5. Veva Siria supervises programs for Early Childhood 
educational intervention, which are located 
throughout the local school districts. The 
Cooperative directly employs eight teachers and 
eight teacher aides who work in this program area. 
Siria evaluates Cooperative employees under her 
jurisdiction. She is involved in interviewing 
applicants, but has no final hiring authority. 
Similarly, she can recommend discipline, but cannot 
unilaterally impose significant disciplinary 
measures. As part of her duties, Siria offers 
suggestions to the Director on which programs 
should be expanded to meet students' needs. She 
consults with Central Service and local district 
personnel concerning problems in the area of early 
childhood education and suggests procedures, 
materials and equipment to be used in connection 
with the early childhood education curriculum. 
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 146) 
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The IELRB agreed with the Hearing Officer that the duties 
listed do not meet the statutory requirement for the supervisory 
exclusion. The program supervisors formally evaluate the teachers 
working under their direction but do not have the authority to 
unilaterally direct or to effectively recommend the hiring, 
suspension, lay off, recall, promotion, discharge, reward or 
discipline of other employees. The final authority to make personnel 
decisions rest solely with the Operating Board acting either directly 
or upon the recommendation of the Director. The record also showed a 
number of instances where the Operating Board did not consult the 
supervisors before making personnel decisions or acted aginst the 
recommendations of the supervisors. 
The IELRB affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that a 
community of interest existed between the professional and 
non-professional employees. The IELRB considered three factors to be 
significant in reaching this decision. First, the meet and confer 
sessions had always involved a committee representing both groups of 
employees. Although not technically a bargaining team, the IELRB 
viewed it as indication that there was a historical pattern of 
recognition. 
Second, there is significant contact between the two groups. 
They work jointly in multidisciplinary staff conferences and in the 
Diagnostic Clinic. The specialized nature of the educational 
services provided by the Cooperative requires that the two groups 
work closely together as a team. 
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The third factor considered significant by the IELRB is the 
similarity of work schedules, fringe benefits and scheduled holidays. 
Al though the IELRB found that the unit was appropriate and 
that the program supervisors did not qualify under the managerial or 
supervisory exclusions, the IELRB found that it was not appropriate 
for the program supervisors to be included in the unit. They based 
this finding upon the fact that the supervisors, through their 
participation in the groups, committees and conferences have a degree 
of involvement in the formulation and implementation of educational 
policy that impacts both the Cooperative and the participating school 
districts. This involvement is not shared by the other members of 
the unit. 
In addition, the program supervisors exercise some degree of 
true supervisory authority. The evaluations made by Bryan, Everett, 
Engle, Johns and Siria serve as formal measures of work. The 
Cooperative may, at its discretion, use those evaluations as the 
basis for personnel decisions. The role played by Baptist, Hill and 
Randorf in monitoring curriculum and teaching methodology has some 
potential for impacting the working conditions of teachers in the 
Cooperative. 
Based on this potential for tension and conflict, the IELRB 
essentially created a new category of exclusions: 
The "quasi-managerial" and "quasi-supervisory" status of 
the program supervisors, within the context of the 
District's overall special education program, 
establishes a potential for tension and conflict in the 
performance of their duties and responsibilities were 
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they to be included in the same unit with the other 
employees that is of greater significance than the 
community of interest they share with the other 
employees. Thererfore, we shall exclude them from the 
unit. 
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 148) 
The case is significant for two major reasons. First, the 
IELRB created a new exclusion based on the facts of the case. They 
are willing to exclude positions if they are of a quasi-supervisory 
or quasi- managerial nature. The IELRB has thus developed a sort of 
sliding scale to be applied in cases of this sort. 
The second major reason for the significance of this case is 
the application of a balancing test in cases of this sort. The IELRB 
will weigh the potential for conflict as a result of this status 
against the community of interest. If the potential for conflict and 
tension outweighs the community of interest the IELRB will exclude 
the positions. 
There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the program 
supervisors could not petition for recognition of a unit composed of 
program supervisors. Arguably, they share a community of interest 
and are not barred by the statute from being members of a recognized 
unit. The opinion simply states that it would be inappropriate for 
the program supervisors to be included in the unit petitioned for in 
this case. 
The other major case dealing with supervisory exclusion from 
a professional unit is Indian Prairie Community Unit School District 
204, Case No. 86-UC-0001-C. The case arose out of a unit 
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clarification petition sought by the school district. The petition 
sought to exclude the newly established classification of 
Instructional Supervisor from the professional employee bargaining 
unit. 
The record established that the three instructional 
supervisors make budget recommendations for their divisions, conduct 
teacher evaluations, participate in the hiring and dismissal 
procedures for teachers within their divisions and participate in the 
scheduling of teacher assignments. They each teach two periods out 
of a seven period day and are paid on the administrators' salary 
schedule rather than on the teachers' salary schedule 
The Hearing Officer relied upon the test of Four 
Rivers-Jacksonville, discussed supra, after determining that the 
Instructional Supervisors satisfied the definition of 
"quasi-managerial" or "quasi- supervisory" as interpreted by that 
decision. 
Using that test, the Hearing Officer determined that the 
potential for tension or conflict outweighed the community of 
interest shared by the Instructional Supervisors and the other 
members of the bargaining unit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer 
excluded the postiions from the unit. 
The case is significant because it shows the application of 
the Four Rivers-Jacksonville test in another context. It also is an 
indication of how department chairmen might be excluded from a 
bargaining unit. 
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There is one particularly important decision dealing with the 
managerial exclusion and professional units. That case is Niles 
Township High School District No. 219, 2 PERI 1033. The case arose 
out of a unit clarification petition filed by the IFT. The petition 
sought to include the districts' six deans in the historically 
recognized bargaining unit. The deans had never been part of the 
unit nor covered by the collective bargaining agreement. 
The record shows that the primary duties of the deans are to 
oversee student discipline and attendance. This is the only area in 
which they have substantial discretion and independence. 
The deans monitor the day to day work of their own 
secretaries but they do not evaluate them. They serve on various 
administrative and managerial committees but there is no evidence 
that they can substantially influence district policies concerning 
wages, hours or working conditions of other employees. The deans do 
not have the "Type 75" certificates held by other administrators in 
the district. Based on these facts, the IELRB affirmed the decision 
of the Hearing Officer that the deans had only minimal managerial 
responsibilities and did not meet the statutory requirements for 
managerial exclusion. 
In order to overcome the fact that the deans had historically 
not been part of the bargaining unit the IELRB engaged in a balancing 
exercise. It weighed the fact of historical exclusion against the 
factors favoring a finding of a community of interest. Those factors 
included the facts that there is a substantial interchangeability of 
177 
job duties, identical certification requirements, comparable 
benefits, similar hours and wages, shared job purposes, and shared 
authority to discipline students. The conclusion was that the shared 
community of interest outweighed the fact of historical exclusion. 
The case indicates that the IELRB intends to heed the 
expressed legislative intent that these exclusions are to be narrow. 
It also indicates a willingness to allow a shared community of 
interest to overcome historical patterns of recognition. 
It may be of interest that this decision was delivered six 
weeks before the Four Rivers-Jacksonville decision. The inference to 
be drawn is that the "quasi" exclusion fashioned in Four 
Rivers-Jacksonville is only applicable in cases where there is truly 
potential for tension or conflict. 
At this point, there are no reported decisions dealing with 
the confidential employee exclusion and professional units. 
Presumably, this is because any professional employee dealing with 
confidential matters is excludable on another basis. However, there 
are many cases dealing with confidential employees and 
non-professional units. Three cases to be discussed are: Vermillion 
Occupational Technical Center, 1 PERI 1041, Plainfield Community 
Consolidated School District No. 202, 1 PERI 1157, and Avon School 
District 176, 2 PERI 1072 
Vermillion Occupational Technical Center arose out of a unit 
clarification petition filed by the VOTEC Education Association. The 
petition sought to include the administrative secretary, Mona 
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Collins, as a member of the unit on the basis that she is not a 
confidential employee. Collins is the secretary to Paul Wasser, the 
Director of VOTEC. 
The record shows that Wasser is involved in the formulation, 
determination and effectuation of management labor policies. The 
record also shows that Collins types and maintains minutes, agendum, 
and records, for VOTEC 's Board of Control. However, confidential 
labor related matters are given to the secretaries of the Board of 
Control chairman and negotiator for the Board of Control. Wasser 
expressed an intent to expose Collins to confidential labor related 
matters in the future. 
The IELRB concurred with the Hearing Officer's finding that 
although Collins works for a manager handling labor relations 
policies, she does not act in a confidential capacity regarding such 
matters. Although Wasser expressed an intent to use her in a 
confidential capacity she was not working in that way at the time of 
the petition. Decisions dealing with confidential exclusions must 
deal with the employee's present activities. 
The case is significant for three reasons. The first is the 
ruling that an employee working for a manager handling labor related 
matters must act in a confidential capacity to that manager. The 
second item of note is the ruling that the exclusion must be based on 
the employee's present activity rather than what might later develop. 
The third noteworthy aspect of the case is the IELRB's stated 
intention to "adhere to a very narrow definition of confidentiality." 
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(Id. at p. 204.) 
Plainfield arose out of a representation petition filed by 
the Plainfield Association of Clerical and Secretarial Support Staff. 
The petition sought recognition for a unit consisting of all 
regularly employed secretaries employed by Plainfield School 
District. The only secretary excluded by the petition was the 
secretary to the superintendent. The district sought to exclude the 
secretary to the assistant superintendent. 
The record shows that the assistant superintendent is 
involved in the determination, formulation, and effectuation of 
management policy regarding labor relations. It also shows that the 
secretary is not regularly exposed to confidential labor related 
matters. However, on occasion she does handle the overflow work and 
is then exposed to confidential labor related matters. 
The IELRB established a two step analysis for determining 
when an employee can be considered as confidential. The first step 
is to determine whether the person for whom the employee in question 
works does in fact determine, formulate and effectuate management 
policy regarding labor relations. The second step is to determine 
whether the employee in question acts in a confidential capacity to 
that person. 
Using that analysis, the IELRB held that the assistant 
superintendent is a confidential employee but that his secretary is 
not because she does not regularly handle matters which, if divulged, 
would give bargaining unit members advance notice of the district's 
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policies with regard to labor relations. The principals in this 
district, however, are not confidential in this sense because their 
role in labor relations is not at the level of determining and 
formulating the policies. At best, their role is in effectuating the 
policies. The IELRB left unanswered the question of whether the 
secretary to a principal on the bargaining team could be excluded. 
This decision by the IELRB was recently reversed by the 
Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court. (494 N.E.2d 1130.) 
The court held that the secretary should be deemed confidential since 
her regular duties include handling the overflow work of a 
confidential nature. 
Avon arose out of a representation petition filed by the IEA. 
The petition sought recognition of a unit composed of all full-time 
and part-time certified and non-certified staff. The important issue 
for the purpose of this discussion is whether the secretary to the 
district superintendent is a confidential employee. The Hearing 
Officer found that the secretary is a confidential employee. 
Wayne Buhlig, the superintendent, also acts as the part-time 
elementary school principal. Besides acting as chief administrative 
officer, he has the primary responsibility for labor relations in the 
district. Approximately ten to fifteen per cent of his time is spent 
handling labor related matters. 
Zella Whistler is Buhlig' s secretary and is the part-time 
grade school secretary. She spends approximately fifty per cent of 
her time assisting Buhlig. Her duties include typing his official 
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correspondence, typing his responses to school board inquiries 
regarding personnel matters, filing personnel documents and typing 
personnel evaluations. 
The !EA argued that Buhlig can not be considered an employee 
who determines, formulates or effectuates policies with regard to 
labor policies because he only spends ten to fifteen per cent of his 
time on labor related matters. The Hearing Officer rejected this 
argument, stating that "there is no requirement in the Act that 
Buhlig spend a majority of his time in labor relations matters." (Id 
at P• 210.) 
The Hearing Officer found the Whistler could, in the regular 
course of her duties, gain and convey information that could have 
potential impact on the bargaining relationship. Therefore, she 
could be excluded from the bargaining unit. He distinguished this 
situation from Vermillion by noting that her regular duties involved 
much more than mere access to confidential personnel data. 
The legislative history makes it very clear that the 
supervisory exclusion is to be very narrow. However, the IELRB has 
shaped a quasi-supervisory exclusion that may make it easier to 
exclude department chairmen. In order to satisfy the statutory 
exclusion, the chairman will have to satisfy the preponderance of 
time test. In order to qualify for the quasi-supervisory exclusion 
the chairman will have to face the clear potential of tension or 
conflict with other members of the bargaining unit. It is unlikely 
that a department chairmen in most schools will satisfy either 
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requirement if his primary responsibility is managing curricular 
supplies, curriculum development and scheduling testing. 
Mere membership on administrative committees will not satisfy 
the statutory requirements for exclusion. In order for an academic 
dean to be excluded he will have to engage in supervisory acts such 
as hiring, evaluating and terminating employees. Those actions must 
be a result of his independent judgment. If those actions are 
subject to review, the possibility of exclusion is enhanced if his 
decisions are rarely if ever reversed. If different certification is 
required for the position, that will also increase the possibility 
that he will be excluded from the bargaining unit. Other factors 
that work in favor of exclusion are different work schedules, 
different salary schedule and different fringe benefits. 
Niles Township makes it very clear that deans whose only 
sphere of independent judgment is the discipline of students, and 
whose certification is no different than a teacher will not be 
excluded from the bargaining unit. However, if his duties also 
include evaluations and he differed from the members in terms of 
salary, work schedule and fringe benefits he may be excluded on the 
basis that there is a lack of a community of interest. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are six general conclusions that can be drawn at this 
point. 
The first is that the IELRB intends to consider and weigh 
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nine factors when faced with deciding what constitutes an appropriate 
unit. Those factors are: (1) Historical pattern of recognition; (2) 
Employee skills; (3) Employee functions; (4) Degree of functional 
integration; (5) Interchangeability; (6) Contact among employees; (7) 
Common supervision, wages, hours and other condition; (8) Desire of 
employees; and (9) The fact that nothing shall interfere or negate 
the current representation rights or patterns and practices of 
employee organizations which have historically represented employees 
for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
The second is that a stated objective of the IELRB is to 
carry out the legislative intent to have a very narrow scope of 
exclusions. 
The third is that despite the objective of providing a narrow 
scope of exclusions, the IELRB significantly broadened the exclusions 
when it shaped the quasi-supervisory and quasi-managerial exclusions. 
The fourth general conclusion to be drawn is that the IELRB 
will not concern itself with finding the most appropriate unit. 
Rather, it will be concerned that the unit simply be appropriate. 
The fifth general conclusion is that the IELRB is unwilling 
to broaden the definition of "professional employee." It will insist 
that employees meet the statutory requirement of holding a 
certificate issued under Article 21 or Section 34-83 of the School 
Code. 
The sixth conclusion is that the IELRB will give great 
deference to the expressed wishes of the employees if the statutory 
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requirements have been met and the employees can demonstrate that the 
unit sought is appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This chapter briefly summarizes the nature of the study and 
the conclusions which developed from the findings. Recommendations 
for further study concludes the chapter. 
Illinois is a relatively late addition to the ranks of states 
which have adopted statutes governing the employment rights of public 
school teachers. However, although there are many states with 
existing statutes, the Illinois statute is unique enough that it will 
have to be interpreted by its own administrative agency and court 
system before teachers, administrators and other school employees 
will truly understand how it will be applied in the workplace of 
public schools. 
The legislative history and the decisions of the IELRB make 
it clear that although the IELRB will look to t;he body of private 
sector labor law and to the decisions of other states for guidance, 
the IELRB should not and will not be bound by those decisions. The 
IELRB will interpret the statute in light of what the legislative 
intent was and by applying with particularity, the words of the 
Illinois statute. 
In order to develop a basis for discussing probable 
interpretation of selected provisions of the IELRA, the study 
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combined an analysis of the legislative history, the consideration of 
published IELRB decisions, relevant court decisions from other states 
and appropriate law from the private sector. These analyses lead to 
the conclusions discussed in the next section. 
toiicius:ions 
The sections in each chapter have conclusions dealing with 
the subject discussed in that section. Those conclusions should be 
referred to for conclusions regarding those particular topics. 
However, in addition to those conclusions, there are some general 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
First, it is apparent that the IELRB is not going to be 
hesitant about going beyond the actual words of the IELRA to create 
law that it believes accurately reflects the intent of the statute. 
This is most clearly apparent in its decision to create a 
quasi-supervisory status when there is no mention of such a 
classification in either the statute or in the legislative history. 
Second, the IELRB will certainly be willing to look to the 
body of the law under the NLRB and other states for approaches and 
analytical tools. However, the IELRB will not consider itself to be 
bound by those approaches or by the substantive law of other agencies 
or states. 
Third, the IELRB is going to be particularly sensitive to the 
expressed desires of the employees in determining whether a 
bargaining unit is appropriate. This attitude is reflected most 
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clearly in the Alton decision and has been substantiated in 
subsequent decisions. 
Fifth, a considerable length of time will elapse before there 
is a comprehensive list of what topics are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. After fifty years of collective bargaining under the 
NLRA, the list is still not final for the private sector. Because 
the IELRB has made it clear that it is not bound by the decisions 
under the NLRA, and because of the unique nature of collective 
bargaining in public education, the determination of what is 
mandatorily bargainable will likely be determined on a case by case 
basis. 
Sixth, the legislature is clearly sensitive to how the 
statute is being applied and is willing to take legislative action to 
correct perceived shortcomings. Evidence of this willingness 
includes the amendment of the statute to allow an individual to file 
an unfair labor charge and the amendment proposed in the 1987 session 
to require binding arbitration if a strike is not resolved by the 
fifteenth day of the strike. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The first recommendation is obvious. There needs to be a 
continued reading of IELRB decisions in the areas discussed to 
determine if the statute is, indeed, interpreted as it is suggested 
it might be. Because the statute does not provide a comprehensive 
list of unfair labor practices or mandatory topics of bargaining, a 
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student or practitioner must be aware of the pronouncements by the 
IELRB in these areas. 
A second recommendation is that there needs to be an analysis 
of what must be bargained under the category of impact bargaining. 
It is clear that matters of inherent managerial policy need not be 
bargained but the impact of those decisions must be bargained. It is 
not so clear, however, what must be bargained under the term 
"impact." As this body of law grows, it will be of major 
significance in those situations where a decisi.on was found to be a 
matter of inherent managerial policy. 
The third recommendation is that an analysis be made of what, 
precisely, are the factors that the IELRB will weight most heavily 
when determining whether a unit is appropriate. The early 
indications are that the desires of the employees will count heavily 
but there is no clearly discernible trend yet regarding how the IELRB 
will weight other factors. 
The fourth recommendation is that a study be conducted to 
determine patternc of decisions rendered by individual hearing 
officers. That was he yo rid the scope of this study but it is likely 
that there is a pattern to the processes and decisions of individual 
hearing officers. A determination of what those patterns are will be 
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